Working Papers
2001
December 1, 2001
A Model of the Joint Distribution of Banking and Exchange-Rate Crises
Description: We develop a simple framework for studying the joint distribution of banking and currency crises triggered by real shocks. Our framework illustrates the fact that bank and currency collapses are related but they are not the same thing. Studying currency and bank collapses either in isolation or in perfect correlation with each other is inappropriate, producing biased estimates of the likelihood of crises.
December 1, 2001
Systemic Weaknesses of Budget Management in Anglophone Africa
Description: This paper examines the merits of the British budget management system that was inherited in Anglophone African countries and which has changed substantially in the United Kingdom since the 1960s. It considers whether the disappointing budgetary performance in Africa is due to weaknesses in the inherited British system, other external influences, or domestic developments. It finds that all three factors have played a role in the widespread problems with budget management systems. Reforms in institutional arrangements are needed, especially in budget execution. Technical reforms will be ineffective unless there are concomitant changes to enhance accountability, improve governance, and increase compliance.
December 1, 2001
The Treatment of Nonperforming Loans in Macroeconomic Statistics
Description: This paper seeks to promote discussion on the treatment of nonperforming loans in macroeconomic statistics. After reviewing current recommendations in international statistical manuals and the guidelines provided by some main banking and accounting institutions, the paper recommends that the information on nonperforming loans provided by macroeconomic statistics should be expanded. The paper concludes with a list of issues that deserve further study.
December 1, 2001
Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto
Description: Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers.
December 1, 2001
Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions
Description: We study the desirability of reforming fiscal institutions along with the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central
December 1, 2001
The Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on the Agency Cost of Debt
Description: This paper uses a stochastic continuous time model of the firm to study how different corporate governance structures affect the agency cost of debt. In the absence of asymmetric information, it shows that control of the firm by debtholders with a minority stake delays the exit decision and reduces the underinvestment problem. Such a governance structure may play an important role in diminishing conflicts between shareholders and debtholders.
December 1, 2001
Financial Stability and Fiscal Crises in a Monetary Union
Description: The main tasks of central banks are to secure price and financial stability. These objectives can, in times of crises, conflict with one another, and the central bank may have to renounce one of them in order to secure the other. In a monetary union, this trade-off can be exacerbated by the presence of highly indebted countries or by the risk of loose fiscal policies. This paper offers a simple theoretical model that captures the trade-off. Different fiscal institutions are compared in order to evaluate their impact on the conduct of monetary policy. More specifically, the fiscal criteria of the Maastricht Treaty and the Pact for Stability and Growth in Europe are analyzed in light of this model. Fiscal mechanisms exist to help prevent or minimize the risk of fiscal crises and the corresponding risk of central bank financing and inflation.
December 1, 2001
Stock Market Liberalizations: Financial and Macroeconomic Implications
Description: Using a panel of 27 countries, we analyze the effects of stock market liberalization on financial and macroeconomic development. We find that liberalization is associated with a short-term increase in real private investment growth of about 14 percentage points cumulatively in the four years following liberalization and a cumulative 4 percentage point increase in real GDP per capita growth. Growth tends to be higher if institutional reforms precede liberalization. In contrast to other studies, we also find evidence for a permanent growth effect of about 0.4 percent a year in an extended sample of 72 countries.
December 1, 2001
Capital Flows and Their Macroeconomic Effects in India
Description: This paper documents trends in movement and composition of capital flows into India in a comparative perspective, examines the impact of these flows upon key macroeconomic variables in the economy, and dwells on implications for economic policy. We find that an inflow of foreign capital results in a real appreciation and has a significant impact on domestic money supply. During a capital surge, these effects have been countered through intervention and sterilization. The paper concludes with a discussion on the costs of these policies in the event of a heavy inflow of foreign capital into India.
December 1, 2001
Foreign Currency Credit Ratings for Emerging Market Economies
Description: This paper examines how ratings for emerging market economies have been set. Given the high degree of autocorrelation in ratings, we use estimators that yield consistent parameters in the presence of such correlation. The results show that rating changes for emerging market economies have been dominated by variables different from those suggested by the literature. We also conclude that some deterioration in the ratings was warranted during the recent crisis episodes in view of the behavior of economic fundamentals, but that the agencies overreacted for several key countries. We find evidence of a structural break: since the Asian crisis period, ratings have been influenced by reserves in relation to short-term debt.