IMF Working Papers

Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto

By Reza Baqir

December 1, 2001

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Reza Baqir. Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2001) accessed November 9, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers.

Subject: Budget planning and preparation, Econometric analysis, Expenditure, National accounts, Personal income, Population and demographics, Probit models, Public financial management (PFM)

Keywords: Budget planning and preparation, City government, City manager, Council size, Executive veto, Government spending, Mayor-council city, Personal income, Political institutions, Probit models, State indicator, Veto authority, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    30

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2001/208

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA2082001

  • ISBN:

    9781451874709

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941