Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions
IMF Working Papers, December 1, 2001
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- Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Francesca Castellani, Xavier Debrun
- Published: December 1, 2001
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- Volume: 2001
- Issue: 205
- Pages: 37
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451874556.001
- Stock No: WPIEA2052001
- ISBN: 9781451874556
- ISSN: 1018-5941
Summary
- We study the desirability of reforming fiscal institutions along with the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central
- Subject: Central bank autonomy, Expenditure, Fiscal policy, Fiscal rules, Inflation
- Keywords: CB governor, CB independence, inflation rate, monetary policy, WP
- Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
Authors and Publication
- Authors: Francesca Castellani, Xavier Debrun
- Date: December 1, 2001
- Format: IMF Working Papers
- Download PDF (available on IMF eLibrary)
Key Analytical Focus (as stated)
- Desirability of reforming fiscal institutions in conjunction with delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank
- Interaction between central bank independence and the design of fiscal institutions
Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions — IMF Working Paper No. 2001/205
Content in this bundle
- Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions - WP/01/205