Fiscal Affairs Department How-To Notes
2020
February 25, 2020
How to Design Subnational Fiscal Rules: A Primer
Description: This note discusses how to design subnational fiscal rules, including how to select them and calibrate them. It expands on the guidance provided at the national level on rule selection and calibration in IMF (2018a) and IMF (2018b). Thinking on subnational fiscal rules is still evolving, including their effectiveness (for example, Heinemann, Moessinger, and Yeter 2018; Kotia and Lledó 2016; Foremny 2014), and this note only provides a first analysis based on international experiences and the technical assistance provided by the IMF. Main findings are summarized in Box 1. The note is divided into five sections. The first section defines fiscal rules. The second section discusses the rationale for subnational rules. The third section provides some guidance on how to select the appropriate rule(s) and whether they should differ across individual jurisdictions. The fourth section explores the issue of flexibility by looking at how rules should adjust to shocks. Finally, the last section focuses on the “calibration” of the rules.
2019
September 20, 2019
How to Design Tax Policy in Fragile States
Description: The purpose of this note is to provide a framework for improving tax policy design in fragile and conflict-affected states, which face political and institutional constraints. This note begins with an overview of experiences in revenue mobilization in fragile states, including relative to other country groups—in particular, nonfragile states and formerly fragile states; that is, countries that exited fragility during the period under study. A discussion follows of how the principles of tax policy design should be applied in fragile states, particularly the relative importance of the revenue objective vis-à-vis other objectives, such as equity and efficiency. The two sections that follow provide guidance on tax policy design in the emergency and consolidation phases, respectively, and discuss how governments can use tax policy to transition from one phase to another, eventually overcoming fragility. The note concludes with key lessons and a set of guiding principles for tax reform in fragile states.
May 15, 2019
How to Design a Financial Management Information System: A Modular Approach
Description: A well-functioning financial management information system (FMIS) provides timely, reliable, and comprehensive reports that support implementation of the government’s fiscal policies and fiscal rules, and the formulating, controlling, monitoring, and executing of the budget. The architecture of FMISs has undergone a transformation since these systems were first developed in the 1980s. Rather than attempting to cover all or most public financial management (PFM) functions, many FMISs now focus on a few core functions such as accounting and reporting, budget execution, and cash management. Yet a survey of 46 countries shows that many face severe challenges in transforming their FMIS into an effective tool of fiscal governance. These challenges relate to weaknesses in the system’s core functions, its institutional coverage, the information technology platforms it uses, and the ease of sharing data with other IT systems. This How to Note discusses how to address these chal-lenges. Replacing an FMIS with an entirely new system may not be an optimal strategy. By utilizing the latest technology, a better approach may be to update or replace one or more core modules of the system: the so-called modular approach. Implementation of an effective FMIS, however, depends on two critical preconditions: strong political motivation and commitment, and the system’s ability to meet ongoing and anticipated PFM needs.
March 27, 2019
Tax Expenditure Reporting and Its Use in Fiscal Management: A Guide for Developing Economies
Description: This note aims to inform governments on how to account for tax expenditures and use that information in fiscal management. The emphasis is on developing and emerging market economies, where the use of such accounts is in its infancy because of data constraints, insufficient human and financial resources, and weak fiscal institutions. Most developing economies, more-over, do not have tax policy units in their Ministry of Finance to provide analytical support to the govern¬ment and legislature that integrates all revenue policy aspects. As a result, the tax policy framework can be fragmented: line ministries compete in the provision of sectoral tax incentives, but do not report on their cost. The note is organized as follows. The second section outlines the role that tax expenditure measurement and reporting can play in fiscal management. The third section provides a step-by-step approach on how tax expenditure accounts can be built, with emphasis on data, methods and models, and institutional requirements. The section is concerned primarily with the direct cost of tax expenditures—that is, the revenue forgone because of them. It does not deal with their indirect costs, which could include economic efficiency losses and additional tax administration resources, and it does not address assessment of the benefits of tax expenditures. The fourth summarizes the current sta¬tus of tax expenditure reporting in developing econo¬mies, with some reference to advanced economies. The last section concludes.
February 4, 2019
How to Organize Central Securities Depositories in Developing Markets: Key Considerations
Description: The key objective of this note is to support authorities in their decision making about the optimal organization of central securities depositories (CSDs) in their country. For the purpose of this note, a CSD is defined as an entity that provides securities accounts, a securities settlement system, and central safekeeping services to market participants, which can be banks and other financial institutions. Authorities in developing markets, in particular central banks, may grapple with two questions: (1) whether to pursue a single CSD to increase market efficiencies and benefit from economies of scale and scope and (2) whether to partake in the governance of the CSD as owner or operator. This note presents seven considerations for authorities to take into account when answering these questions and determining the best model for their country.
2018
October 16, 2018
How to Control the Fiscal Costs of Public-Private Partnerships
Description: This note discusses what finance ministries can do to ensure that public-private partnerships (PPPs) are used wisely. By inviting private participation in infrastructure development and service provision, PPPs can help improve public services. Yet, strong governance institutions are needed to manage risks and avoid unexpected costs from PPPs. While in the short term, PPPs may appear cheaper than traditional public investment, over time they can turn out to be more expensive and undermine fiscal sustainability, particularly when governments ignore or are unaware of their deferred costs and associated fiscal risks. To use PPPs wisely governments should (1) develop and implement clear rules for their use; (2) identify, quantify, and disclose PPP risks and expected costs; and (3) reform budget and government accounting frameworks to capture all fiscal costs comprehensively.
June 11, 2018
How to Manage the Fiscal Costs of Natural Disasters
Description: This how-to note focuses on the management of the fiscal costs associated with natural disaster risks. Unlike other types of fiscal risks (for example, unexpected macroeconomic changes or materialization of contingent liabilities), a natural disaster presents a unique challenge to fiscal risk-management and budget processes because of its exogenous nature and potentially overwhelming scale. This note discusses how governments can build fiscal resilience against natural hazards and strengthen fiscal management after a disaster, including through budgeting frameworks and other fiscal policies. The note aims to answer three central questions: How large should fiscal buffers be? How should fiscal buffers be built up? How should fiscal buffers be used efficiently and transparently once a natural disaster has struck? These three questions directly relate to fiscal policy, fiscal risk management, and the budget process—all core areas of IMF expertise. To address them, the note focuses on fiscal strategies for financing recovery efforts and considers approaches to mitigate disaster impact. The note also provides guidance on how to conduct regular risk analyses of natural disasters’ potential fiscal consequences and outlines best practices for defining and accounting for the contingent liabilities associated with natural disasters in budgeting frameworks. Finally, the note touches on approaches for risk reduction, disaster risk financing strategies, and risk transfer mechanisms, such as various insurance instruments.
March 15, 2018
How to Select Fiscal Rules: A Primer
Description: This note provides guidance on how to select fiscal rules in a wide range of economies, including advanced, emerging market, and developing economies. The principles and methods discussed are intuitive and easy to implement, and leave room for policy judgment. The methods are based on past academic and IMF work, including analytic and policy papers, technical assistance missions, and training. The note is structured as follows. The first section lays out general principles regarding the design of fiscal rules. The second section reviews the most common rules and describes their pros and cons. The third section presents the various types of analytical tools used to select fiscal rules (some files and manuals accompany this note to implement the methods; they are available from the authors upon request). The last section offers some considerations on rules in developing countries, with a specific focus on commodity exporters. An overview of the theoretical literature is provided in the Appendix. This is one of two guidance notes on the design of fiscal rules; the other one focuses on rule calibration. The two exercises are linked: if a fiscal framework had to be built from scratch, rules would need to be selected and calibrated at the same time.
March 15, 2018
How to Calibrate Fiscal Rules: A Primer
Description: This note provides guidance on how to calibrate fiscal rules, that is, how to determine the thresholds (ceiling, floor, or target) for specific fiscal aggregates constrained by rules. The note focuses, more specifically, on the calibration of the debt, balance, and expenditure rules. The note is divided into four sections. The first section discusses general principles used to calibrate rules. The second section reports international evidence on the numerical ceilings used in existing rules. The third and fourth sections provide guidance on the calibration of the debt ceiling and the operational rules (fiscal balance and expenditure rules). This is one of two guidance notes on the design of fiscal rules; the other one focuses on rule selection. The two exercises are linked: if a fiscal framework had to be built from scratch, rules would need to be selected and calibrated at the same time.
2017
October 19, 2017
How to Strengthen the Management of Government Guarantees
Description: This note highlights commonly observed weaknesses in the management of government guarantees, good practices, and measures governments could take to strengthen: (i) the evaluation of guarantee proposals; (ii) the quantification of risks arising from guarantees and their mitigation; and (iii) the budgeting, accounting, monitoring, and disclosure of guarantees.