Working Papers
2012
August 1, 2012
A New Heuristic Measure of Fragility and Tail Risks: Application to Stress Testing
Description: This paper presents a simple heuristic measure of tail risk, which is applied to individual bank stress tests and to public debt. Stress testing can be seen as a first order test of the level of potential negative outcomes in response to tail shocks. However, the results of stress testing can be misleading in the presence of model error and the uncertainty attending parameters and their estimation. The heuristic can be seen as a second order stress test to detect nonlinearities in the tails that can lead to fragility, i.e., provide additional information on the robustness of stress tests. It also shows how the measure can be used to assess the robustness of public debt forecasts, an important issue in many countries. The heuristic measure outlined here can be used in a variety of situations to ascertain an ordinal ranking of fragility to tail risks.
August 1, 2012
What (Really) Accounts for the Fall in Hours After a Technology Shock?
Description: The paper asks how state of the art DSGE models that account for the conditional response of hours following a positive neutral technology shock compare in a marginal likelihood race. To that end we construct and estimate several competing small-scale DSGE models that extend the standard real business cycle model. In particular, we identify from the literature six different hypotheses that generate the empirically observed decline in worked hours after a positive technology shock. These models alternatively exhibit (i) sticky prices; (ii) firm entry and exit with time to build; (iii) habit in consumption and costly adjustment of investment; (iv) persistence in the permanent technology shocks; (v) labor market friction with procyclical hiring costs; and (vi) Leontief production function with labor-saving technology shocks. In terms of model posterior probabilities, impulse responses, and autocorrelations, the model favored is the one that exhibits habit formation in consumption and investment adjustment costs. A robustness test shows that the sticky price model becomes as competitive as the habit formation and costly adjustment of investment model when sticky wages are included.
August 1, 2012
Measuring Systemic Risk-Adjusted Liquidity (SRL): A Model Approach
Description: Little progress has been made so far in addressing—in a comprehensive way—the externalities caused by impact of the interconnectedness within institutions and markets on funding and market liquidity risk within financial systems. The Systemic Risk-adjusted Liquidity (SRL) model combines option pricing with market information and balance sheet data to generate a probabilistic measure of the frequency and severity of multiple entities experiencing a joint liquidity event. It links a firm’s maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities impacting the stability of its funding with those characteristics of other firms, subject to individual changes in risk profiles and common changes in market conditions. This approach can then be used (i) to quantify an individual institution’s time-varying contribution to system-wide liquidity shortfalls and (ii) to price liquidity risk within a macroprudential framework that, if used to motivate a capital charge or insurance premia, provides incentives for liquidity managers to internalize the systemic risk of their decisions. The model can also accommodate a stress testing approach for institution-specific and/or general funding shocks that generate estimates of systemic liquidity risk (and associated charges) under adverse scenarios.
August 1, 2012
Reforming the Public Pension System in the Russian Federation
Description: Pension reform is a key policy challenge in Russia. This paper examines how pension spending could increase in Russia in the absence of reforms, quantifies the impact of some recent proposals, and suggests some alternatives that would ensure public pension benefits - relative to wages - not fall from current levels while containing spending.
August 1, 2012
Resource Windfalls, Optimal Public Investment and Redistribution: The Role of Total Factor Productivity and Administrative Capacity
Description: This paper studies the optimal public investment decisions in countries experiencing a resource windfall. To do so, we use an augmented version of the Permanent Income framework with public investment faced with adjustment costs capturing the associated administrative capacity as well as government direct transfers. A key assumption is that those adjustment costs rise with the size of the resource windfall. The main results from the analytical model are threefold. First, a larger resource windfall commands a lower level of public capital but a higher level of redistribution through transfers. Second, weaker administrative capacity lowers the increase in optimal public capital following a resource windfall. Third, higher total factor productivity in the non-resource sector reduces the degree of des-investment in public capital commanded by weaker administrative capacity. We further extend our basic model to allow for "investing in investing" - that is public investment in administrative capacity - by endogenizing the adjustment cost in public investment. Results from the numerical simulations suggest, among other things, that a higher initial stock of public administrative "know how" leads to a higher level of optimal public investment following a resource windfall. Implications for policy are discussed.
August 1, 2012
Bond Yields in Emerging Economies: It Matters What State You Are In
Description: While many studies have looked into the determinants of yields on externally issued sovereign bonds of emerging economies, analysis of domestically issued bonds has hitherto been limited, despite their growing relevance. This paper finds that the extent to which fiscal variables affect domestic bond yields in emerging economies depends on the level of global risk aversion. During tranquil times in global markets, fiscal variables do not seem to be a significant determinant of domestic bond yields in emerging economies. However, when market participants are on edge, they pay greater attention to country-specific fiscal fundamentals, revealing greater alertness about default risk.
July 1, 2012
Barriers to Household Risk Management: Evidence from India
Description: Why do many households remain exposed to large exogenous sources of non-systematic income risk? We use a series of randomized field experiments in rural India to test the importance of price and non-price factors in the adoption of an innovative rainfall insurance product. Demand is significantly price sensitive, but widespread take-up would not be achieved even if the product offered a payout ratio comparable to U.S. insurance contracts. We present evidence suggesting that lack of trust, liquidity constraints and limited salience are significant non-price frictions that constrain demand. We suggest contract design improvements to mitigate these frictions.
July 1, 2012
Foreign Aid and Revenue: Still a Crowding Out Effect?
Description: This paper reexamines the relationship between aid and domestic tax revenues using a more recent and comprehensive dataset covering 118 countries for the period 1980 - 2009. Overall, our results support earlier findings of a negative association between net Official Development Assistance (ODA) and domestic tax revenues, but this relationship appears to have weakened in reflection of greater efforts at mobilizing domestic revenues in many countries. The composition of net ODA matters: ODA grants are associated with lower revenues, while ODA loans are not. The paper further finds that net ODA and grants are negatively associated with VAT, excise and income tax revenues, but have a positive relationship with trade taxes. Aid has a particularly strong negative effect on domestic tax revenues in low-income countries and in countries with relatively weak institutions.
July 1, 2012
Quality of Government and Living Standards: Adjusting for the Efficiency of Public Spending
Description: It is generally acknowledged that the government’s output is difficult to define and its value is hard to measure. The practical solution, adopted by national accounts systems, is to equate output to input costs. However, several studies estimate significant inefficiencies in government activities (i.e., same output could be achieved with less inputs), implying that inputs are not a good approximation for outputs. If taken seriously, the next logical step is to purge from GDP the fraction of government inputs that is wasted. As differences in the quality of the public sector have a direct impact on citizens’ effective consumption of public and private goods and services, we must take them into account when computing a measure of living standards. We illustrate such a correction computing corrected per capita GDPs on the basis of two studies that estimate efficiency scores for several dimensions of government activities. We show that the correction could be significant, and rankings of living standards could be re-ordered as a result.
July 1, 2012
Macro-prudential Policy in a Fisherian Model of Financial Innovation
Description: The interaction between credit frictions, financial innovation, and a switch from optimistic to pessimistic beliefs played a central role in the 2008 financial crisis. This paper develops a quantitative general equilibrium framework in which this interaction drives the financial amplification mechanism to study the effects of macro-prudential policy. Financial innovation enhances the ability of agents to collateralize assets into debt, but the riskiness of this new regime can only be learned over time. Beliefs about transition probabilities across states with high and low ability to borrow change as agents learn from observed realizations of financial conditions. At the same time, the collateral constraint introduces a pecuniary externality, because agents fail to internalize the effect of their borrowing decisions on asset prices. Quantitative analysis shows that the effectiveness of macro-prudential policy in this environment depends on the government's information set, the tightness of credit constraints and the pace at which optimism surges in the early stages of financial innovation. The policy is least effective when the government is as uninformed as private agents, credit constraints are tight, and optimism builds quickly.