Working Papers

September 26, 2019

Multiple Dimensions of Human Development Index and Public Social Spending for Sustainable Development

Description: Multidimensional assessment of human development is increasingly recognized as playing an important role in assessing well-being. The focus of analysis is on the indicators measuring the three dimensions of Human Development Index (HDI) — standard of living, education and health, and their relationship with public social spending for achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The study estimates the effects of public social spending on gross national income (GNI) per capita (in PPP in $), expected years of schooling and life expectancy for a sample of 68 countries. The relationship is robust to controlling for a variety of factors and the estimated magnitudes suggest a positive long-run effect of public educational spending on GNI per capita, public educational spending on expected years of schooling, and public health expenditures on life expectancy.

September 20, 2019

How Should We Measure City Size Theory and Evidence Within and Across Rich and Poor Countries

Description:

It is obvious that holding city population constant, differences in cities across the world are enormous. Urban giants in poor countries are not large using measures such as land area, interior space or value of output. These differences are easily reconciled mathematically as population is the product of land area, structure space per unit land (i.e., heights), and population per unit interior space (i.e., crowding). The first two are far larger in the cities of developed countries while the latter is larger for the cities of developing countries. In order to study sources of diversity among cities with similar population, we construct a version of the standard urban model (SUM) that yields the prediction that the elasticity of city size with respect to income could be similar within both developing countries and developed countries. However, differences in income and urban technology can explain the physical differences between the cities of developed countries and developing countries. Second, using a variety of newly merged data sets, the predictions of the SUM for similarities and differences of cities in developed and developing countries are tested. The findings suggest that population is a sufficient statistic to characterize city differences among cities within the same country, not across countries.

September 20, 2019

How Should We Measure City Size? Theory and Evidence Within and Across Rich and Poor Countries

Description: It is obvious that holding city population constant, differences in cities across the world are enormous. Urban giants in poor countries are not large using measures such as land area, interior space or value of output. These differences are easily reconciled mathematically as population is the product of land area, structure space per unit land (i.e., heights), and population per unit interior space (i.e., crowding). The first two are far larger in the cities of developed countries while the latter is larger for the cities of developing countries. In order to study sources of diversity among cities with similar population, we construct a version of the standard urban model (SUM) that yields the prediction that the elasticity of city size with respect to income could be similar within both developing countries and developed countries. However, differences in income and urban technology can explain the physical differences between the cities of developed countries and developing countries. Second, using a variety of newly merged data sets, the predictions of the SUM for similarities and differences of cities in developed and developing countries are tested. The findings suggest that population is a sufficient statistic to characterize city differences among cities within the same country, not across countries.

September 20, 2019

One Ring to Rule Them All? New Evidence on World Cycles

Description: We estimate world cycles using a new quarterly dataset of output, credit and asset prices assembled using IMF archives and covering a large set of advanced and emerging economies since 1950. World cycles, both real and financial, exist and are generally driven by US shocks. But their impact is modest for most countries. The global financial cycle is also much weaker when looking at credit rather than asset prices. We also challenge the view that syncronization has increased over time. Although this is true for prices (goods and assets), this not true for quantities (output and credit). The world business and credit cycles were as strong during Bretton Woods (1950–1972) as during the Globalization period (1984-2006). For most countries, the way their output co-moves with the rest of the world has changed little over the last 70 years. We discuss the reasons behind these new findings and their policy implications for small open economies.

September 20, 2019

State-Owned Enterprises in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Assessing Performance and Oversight

Description: Based on a new database of State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) financial statements, we find that SOEs in Bosnia and Herzegovina are mostly in poor financial shape. We estimate the overall size and composition of the SOE sector, and identify individual companies that affect fiscal and macroeconomic performance. Financial analysis suggests that SOEs are not contributing enough to the economy. We also review the SOE governance framework and find that governments do not exercise their ownership function in line with WB/OECD guidelines. Reforms to the governance frameworks are necessary to foster transparency and improve accountability. More fundamental reform of the SOE sector might increase overall GDP by 3 percent per year.

September 20, 2019

How Informative Are Real Time Output Gap Estimates in Europe?

Description: We study the properties of the IMF-WEO estimates of real-time output gaps for countries in the euro area as well as the determinants of their revisions over 1994-2017. The analysis shows that staff typically saw economies as operating below their potential. In real time, output gaps tend to have large and negative averages that are largely revised away in later vintages. Most of the mis-measurement in real time can be explained by the difficulty in predicting recessions and by overestimation of the economy’s potential capacity. We also find, in line with earlier literature, that real-time output gaps are not useful for predicting inflation. In addition, countries where slack (and potential growth) is overestimated to a larger extent primary fiscal balances tend to be lower and public debt ratios are higher and increase faster than projected. Previous research suggests that national authorities’ real-time output gaps suffer from a similar bias. To the extent these estimates play a role in calibrating fiscal policy, over-optimism about long-term growth could contribute to excessive deficits and debt buildup.

September 20, 2019

US vs. Euro Area: Who Drives Cross-Border Bank Lending to EMs?

Description: This paper analyzes the drivers of cross-border bank lending to 49 Emerging Markets (EMs) during the period 1990Q1-2014Q4, by assessing the impact of monetary, financial and real sector shocks in both the US and the euro area. The literature has traditionally highlighted the influence of US monetary policy on driving cross-border bank flows, and more recently the importance of both US and Euro Area (EA) financial/banking sectors’ related variables. Our contribution is the simultaneous analysis of the role of these US and EA drivers, as well as their interactions with real sector shocks. We corroborate the negative impact of US monetary policy tightening on cross-border lending to EMs, but we find that EA monetary policy seems to have an impact mostly on Emerging Europe, reflecting the fact that cross-border lending to most other EM regions is dollar denominated. We also find that real sector shocks in both the US and EA trigger an increase in cross-border lending, but less in EA when modeling the financial sector. Finally, for financial sector shocks, such as those associated with a decrease in bank leverage, our results indicate a broad-based overall contraction of cross-border lending if the shock originates in the US, and heterogenous effects across borrowing regions if the shock originates in the EA.

September 20, 2019

More Gray, More Volatile? Aging and (Optimal) Monetary Policy

Description: The evidence on the inflation impact of aging is mixed, and there is no evidence regarding the volatility of inflation. Based on advanced economies’ data and a DSGE-OLG model, we find that aging leads to downward pressure on inflation and higher inflation volatility. Our paper is also the first, using this framework, to discuss how aging affects the transmission channels of monetary policy. We are also the first to examine aging and optimal central bank policies. As aging redistributes wealth among generations and the labor force becomes more scarce, our model suggests that aging makes monetary policy less effective and in more gray societies central banks should react more strongly to nominal variables.

September 20, 2019

Trinity Strikes Back: Monetary Independence and Inflation in the Caribbean

Description: Monetary independence is at the core of the macroeconomic policy trilemma stating that an independent monetary policy, a fixed exchange rate and free movement of capital cannot exist at the same time. This study examines the relationship between monetary autonomy and inflation dynamics in a panel of Caribbean countries over the period 1980–2017. The empirical results show that monetary independence is a significant factor in determining inflation, even after controlling for macroeconomic developments. In other words, greater monetary policy independence, measured as a country’s ability to conduct its own monetary policy for domestic purposes independent of external monetary influences, leads to lower consumer price inflation. This relationship—robust to alternative specifications and estimation methodologies—has clear policy implications, especially for countries that maintain pegged exchange rates relative to the U.S. dollar with a critical bearing on monetary autonomy.

September 20, 2019

Is Military Spending Converging Across Countries? An Examination of Trends and Key Determinants

Description: This paper studies the evolution of worldwide military spending during 1970-2018. It finds that military spending in relation to GDP is converging, but into three separate groups of countries. In the largest group, responsible for 90 percent of worldwide spending, outlays have remained stubbornly high. Military spending in developing economies reacts to improvements in security conditions and military spending in neighboring countries, suggesting that further increases in the peace dividend are possible. In developing economies, rising social spending tends to crowd out military outlays, but this is not the case in advanced economies. With social outlays projected to rise as developing countries look to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), military spending could come under pressure to fall further.