Policy Papers

July 31, 2009

Crisis-Related Measures in the Financial System and Sovereign Balance Sheet Risks

Description: This paper examines the fiscal and financial risk implications of support measures in a sovereign balance sheet framework, making the point that the ultimate fiscal cost will depend on how balance sheets are managed—both in the near-term and as governments develop unwinding strategies. It suggests some key principles for efficient and transparent management of new assets, liabilities, and associated risks, and for moving toward an orderly disengagement.

Notes: Prepared by a staff team supervised by Adrienne Cheasty and Udaibir S. Das and comprising Luis Cortavarria, Vincenzo Guzzo, Allison Holland, Philippe Karam, Daehaeng Kim, Ian Lienert, Edouard Martin, Michael Papaioannou, Iva Petrova, Abdourahmane Sarr, Mark Stone, and Mauricio Villafuerte.

July 29, 2009

Borrowing Agreement with the Government of France

Description: In light of the multilateral effort to ensure the adequacy of the financial resources available to the International Monetary Fund , and with a view to supporting the Fund’s ability to provide timely and effective balance of payments assistance to its members, France agrees to lend to the Fund an SDR-denominated amount up to the equivalent of EUR 11.06 billion, on the terms and conditions set out in this report.

July 27, 2009

Macro Policy Lessons for a Sound Design of Fiscal Decentralization

Description: Fiscal decentralization has been, and remains high on the policy agenda of many countries. It is mainly driven by political pressures, which tend to be especially evident in countries with multiple ethnicities, and/or wide regional disparities in incomes or resource endowments. More generally, decentralization pressures frequently reflect a desire for more participatory government and greater voice of local constituents in the allocation of budgetary resources. Regardless of its motivation, fiscal decentralization can have important macroeconomic implications. Therefore, Fund advice to member countries (whether in the context of surveillance, program design, or technical assistance) has often focused on the design and implementation of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. This paper distills the main lessons from the Fund’s engagement with member countries in this area, drawing in particular, (but not exclusively) on technical assistance (TA) provided by the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) to ten countries which are broadly representative of the range of members that have requested assistance in this area.

July 27, 2009

Macro Policy Lessons for a Sound Design of Fiscal Decentralization-Background Studies

Description: This paper provides background to the Board paper on Macro Policy Lessons for a Sound Design of Fiscal Decentralization. It summarizes the findings and recommendations of the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) for ten countries to which it provided advice on fiscal decentralization. The selected countries (Bolivia, People’s Republic of China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Kosovo, Liberia, FYR Macedonia, Mexico, and Nigeria) represent different regions, varying institutional arrangements, and diverse stages of the decentralization process.

July 1, 2009

IMF Governance-Summary of Issues and Reform Options

Description: This paper summarizes the main governance challenges and reform options facing the IMF, drawing together the analysis and reform proposals in the reports of the Eminent Persons Group (headed by Trevor Manuel), the IEO, and a range of other recent work on Fund governance. Lest the wide scope of these inputs result in a laundry list, judgment has been exercised in selecting key issues and proposals, and in laying out some of the pros and cons. With reform of quotas/voting power on a separate track, the focus here is on the institutional framework through which members express voting power, weaknesses in which are seen by many to have eroded the Fund’s legitimacy and effectiveness, thereby displacing the debate and initiative to outside entities. While an overall reform package would have to include quota shares, the key proposals discussed here aim to: increase political engagement and oversight; enhance Executive Board effectiveness and representation; modify voting rules; better delineate responsibilities; open up management selection; and tackle problems with mandate and institutional culture that limit the issues and approaches taken.

Civil society has expressed a range of concerns related to IMF governance, including with regard to accountability at all levels (IMFC, Executive Board, management, and staff), mechanisms for responding to complaints and feedback from the broader public, and transparency. Given the diversity of their interests, and to provide unfiltered access to CSO views, the supplement: Fourth Pillar Recommendations from Civil Society; Preliminary Summary of Principles, Issues and Recommendations; has been prepared by CSO groups.

June 26, 2009

A New Architecture of Facilities for Low-Income Countries

Description: This paper proposes a new facilities architecture for Low-Income Countries. It is based on "Option 2" set out in the framework paper discussed by the Executive Board on March 20, 2009. The new architecture provides a unified facilities framework for LICs under a new Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). The facilities are distinguished primarily by the duration of the financing and adjustment needs and the conditionality standard.

Supplement

Decision

June 22, 2009

The 2007 Surveillance Decision - Revised Operational Guidance

Description: The adoption of the 2007 Decision on Bilateral Surveillance was a landmark for the Fund. Unlike its predecessor, which was focused exclusively on exchange rate policies, the Decision mapped out the full scope of surveillance, including domestic policies. It set out external stability as the organizing principle for surveillance, and was thus expected to promote focus on issues central to the Fund’s mandate, including monetary, fiscal, and financial sector policies and increased attention to exchange rate issues. Surveillance under the Decision was intended to promote candor through clear assessments of the economic situation, outlook, and vulnerabilities of members and clear policy recommendations in pursuit of domestic and external stability.

June 17, 2009

A Framework for the Fund's Issuance of Notes to the Official Sector

Description: On July 1, 2009, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund discussed the Managing Director's proposal for a framework for issuing notes to the official sector. The framework approved by the Executive Board was adapted on the basis of these discussions, as reflected in supplement 2 of the paper. It enables members to invest in IMF paper under note purchase agreements approved by the Board, without any pre-specified limit on the cumulative amount committed under note purchase agreements. The actual issuance of notes will occur should the IMF need additional resources at the time of a loan disbursement to a member. The notes would have similar financial terms to the IMF’s recent bilateral borrowing agreements.

June 17, 2009

Borrowing by the Fund - Operational Issues

Description: An increase in the Fund’s resources available to assist its members represents an important part of the multilateral response to the global crisis. To this end, the IMFC agreed in April that there should be an increase in the resources available to the Fund through immediate financing from members of $250 billion, subsequently incorporated into an expanded and more flexible New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB), increased by up to $500 billion. Recognizing that IMF is, and shall remain, a quota-based institution, the IMFC also called for the completion of the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas by January 2011. This is consistent with borrowing being a temporary arrangement to supplement Fund resources to address the current crisis.

June 12, 2009

Debt Bias and Other Distortions: Crisis-Related Issues in Tax Policy

Description: Tax distortions are likely to have encouraged excessive leveraging and other financial market problems evident in the crisis. These effects have been little explored, but are potentially macro-relevant. Taxation can result, for example, in a net subsidy to borrowing of hundreds of basis points, raising debt-equity ratios and vulnerabilities from capital inflows.

This paper reviews key channels by which tax distortions can significantly affect financial markets, drawing implications for tax design once the crisis has passed.