Working Papers
January 1, 0001
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January 1, 0001
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1992
March 1, 1992
Contacts, Credibility and Common Knowledge: Their Influenceon Inflation Convergence
Description: In this paper three possible reasons are examined for a sluggish inflation response to a hard currency peg. Models of overlapping wage contracts are analyzed and shown to generate little inertia. This contrasts with the effects of government credibility and the speed of private sector learning, which are shown to have a major impact on the speed of inflation adjustment. But even if individual agents believe the government will not devalue, it is shown that inflation inertia can still arise if these expectations are not common knowledge.
Notes: Also published in Staff Papers, Vol. 40, No. 1, March 1993.
March 1, 1992
Sovereign Debt Relief Schemes and Welfare
Description: This paper shows that concerted debt reduction may be welfare-improving even when the investment disincentive effect of a debt overhang is not large enough to place the debtor country on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve. Whether the appropriate relief scheme involves debt reduction or new money, however, depends on whether investment disincentives or liquidity constraints dominate. It is shown that, except under very special circumstances, mixed policy packages involving both debt and liquidity relief may not yield the desired results.
March 1, 1992
Can the Release of a Monetary Overhang Trigger Hyperinflation?
Description: It is widely feared that, once prices are decontrolled in the formerly centrally–planned economies, households’ release of previously accumulated money will trigger a hyperinflation. This paper finds, instead, that whether a country’s fiscal, monetary, and labor market policies are destabilizing typically does not depend on the money stock. However, the release of a monetary overhang can precipitate a large initial real wage shock. To the extent such a shock is not feasible politically, there is a motive for monetary reform, which must be weighed against the cost of reduced public confidence in money.
March 1, 1992
Fiscal Revenue, Inflationary Finance and Growth
Description: This paper analyzes the optimal rate of monetary expansion when government resorts to inflationary finance to generate additional investment for enhancing growth. If there are lags in tax collection, an increase in inflation erodes real fiscal revenue, thereby worsening the current balance while reducing government investment. This impedes capital accumulation as well as increases the welfare cost of inflation. As such, the optimal rate of monetary expansion, equilibrium capital-labor ratio and output are lower while the marginal cost of inflationary finance is higher than they would be without collection lags. Simulations are performed to highlight empirical implications.
March 1, 1992
Target Zones and Forward Rates in a Model with Repeated Realignments
Description: This paper studies the implications of the imperfect credibility of an exchange rate target zone on the term structure of forward premia. The relationship between spot and forward exchange rates of different maturities reflects the possibility of repeated realignments of the exchange rate band. The credibility of the commitment to the target zone implicit in forward market data can be extracted by estimating the model. Application to French/German data indicates that the model is capable of matching observed patterns of interest rate differentials during the EMS, while yielding estimates of the credibility parameters that accord with the experience of the FF/DM exchange rate during the 1980s.
March 1, 1992
A Noteon Burden Sharing Among Creditors
Description: This paper presents a framework for evaluating the relative contributions of different creditors in cases where only partial payments can be made by the debtor country. A methodology is developed to calculate partial payments—or alternatively put—determine residual financing. By focusing on the relative seniority of creditors and expectations of the debtor’s ability to repay, alternative sharing rules are quantified. The measure is based on the expected present value of payments. Creditors earning a below-market rate of return suffer a burden; creditors earning the same rate of return are said to share the burden equally.
Notes: Also published in Staff Papers, Vol. 40, No. 1, March 1993.
March 1, 1992
Theories of Policy Accommodation: The Persistence of Inflation and Gradual Stabilizations
Description: Persistent inflation and slow stabilization are usually the result of policy accommodation resorted to in an attempt to avoid the recessionary costs of a sharp reduction of inflation. This paper reviews three explanations for why policymakers, despite their dislike of inflation, may nevertheless choose to adopt accommodative policies. It emphasizes the role of indexation, uncertainty about policymakers’ preferences, and the existence of fixed costs associated with the implementation of a stabilization program. The paper also presents some evidence on the extent of persistence of inflation across countries.
March 1, 1992
From the Debt Crisis toward Economic Stability: An Analysis of the Consistency of Macroeconomic Policies in Mexico
Description: This paper uses a simple framework based on the government budget constraint to analyze the consistency of macroeconomic policies undertaken in Mexico during the period 1978 to mid-1991. It was found that the interaction between the actual implementation of economic policies and economic agents’ perceptions about the sustain-ability of those policies can account, to a large extent, for the behavior of key macroeconomic variables during the period under study. The paper also highlights the costs of adjustment involved in the most recent Mexican stabilization program arising from concerns about the sustainability of the announced policies.