Working Papers
2004
January 1, 2004
Interest Rate Volatility and Risk in Indian Banking
Description: The easing of controls on interest rates has led to higher interest rate volatility in India. Hence, there is a need to measure and monitor the interest rate exposure of Indian banks. Using publicly available information, this paper attempts to assess the interest rate risk carried by a sample of Indian banks in March 2002. We find evidence of substantial exposure to interest rates.
January 1, 2004
Foreign Exchange Market Volatility in Eu Accession Countries in the Run-Up to Euro Adoption: Weathering Uncharted Waters
Description: The paper analyzes foreign exchange market volatility in four Central European EU accession countries in 2001-2003. By using a Markov regime-switching model, it identifies two regimes representing high- and low-volatility periods. The estimation results show not only that volatilities are different between the two regimes but also that some of the cross-correlations differ. Notably, cross-correlations increase substantially for two pairs of currencies (the Hungarian forint-Polish zloty and the Czech koruna-Slovak koruna) in the high-volatility period. The paper concludes by discussing the policy implications of these findings.
January 1, 2004
The Late 1990's Financial Crisis in Ecuador: Institutional Weaknesses, Fiscal Rigidities, and Financial Dollarization At Work
Description: This paper stresses three factors that amplified the 1990s financial crisis in Ecuador, namely institutional weaknesses, rigidities in public finances, and high financial dollarization. Institutional factors restricted the government's ability to respond in a timely manner and efficiently enough to prevent the escalation of the banking crisis and spurred the adoption of suboptimal policy decisions. Public finance rigidities limited the government's capacity to correct existing imbalances and the deteriorating fiscal stance associated with the costs of the financial crisis. Financial dollarization increasingly reduced the effectiveness of financial safety nets, fostered foreign currency demand, and accelerated a currency crisis, thereby further worsening the solvency of banks. These three factors reinforced each other, exacerbating costs as the economy went through a triple banking, currency, and fiscal crisis.
January 1, 2004
Banking Competition, Risk, and Regulation
Description: In a dynamic theoretical framework, commercial banks compete for customers by setting acceptance criteria for granting loans, taking regulatory requirements into account. By easing its acceptance criteria a bank faces a trade-off between attracting more demand for loans, thus making higher per period profits, and a deterioration of the quality of its loan portfolio, thus tolerating a higher risk of failure. Our main results state that more stringent capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set stricter acceptance criteria, and that increased competition in the banking industry leads to riskier bank behavior. In an extension of our basic model, we show that it may be beneficial for a bank to hold more equity than prescribed by the regulator, even though holding equity is more expensive than attracting deposits.
January 1, 2004
Timing of International Bailouts
Description: This paper proposes that international rescue financing should not be provided to a country where a crisis first occurs, but rather to any country that suffers a subsequent crisis. Such a timing-based lending facility can be Pareto-superior to both laissez-faire and existing international crisis lending facilities, when domestic governments have more information on their own economies than does the international lender of last resort. The new facility mitigates moral hazard owing to information asymmetry by not rescuing the first-hit country. At the same time, it limits crisis contagion by rescuing countries in subsequent crises. Even in the presence of common shocks, the timing-based facility can reduce global risks of crisis because it induces countries to undertake greater crisis-prevention efforts so as not to become the first country hit.
January 1, 2004
Fiscal Surveillance in a Petro Zone: The Case of the CEMAC
Description: This paper discusses fiscal surveillance criteria for the countries of the Central African Monetary and Economic Union (CEMAC), most of which depend heavily on oil exports. At present, the CEMAC's macroeconomic surveillance exercise sets as fiscal target a floor on the basic budgetary balance. This appears inadequate, for at least two reasons. First, fluctuations in oil prices and, hence, oil receipts obscure the underlying fiscal stance. Second, oil resources are limited, which suggests that some of today's oil receipts should be saved to finance future consumption. The paper develops easy-to-calculate indicators that take both aspects into account. A retrospective analysis based on these alternative indicators reveals that in recent years, the CEMAC's surveillance exercise has tended to accommodate stances of fiscal policy that are at odds with sound management of oil wealth.
January 1, 2004
Fiscal Sustainability: The Case of Eritrea
Description: The paper examines fiscal sustainability issues for the case of Eritrea but has wider implications for addressing fiscal and debt sustainability. It begins with a formal definition and explanation of analytical sustainability indicators, followed by an assessment of the causes of fiscal deficits and their impact on the usual indicators of fiscal and external debt sustainability. The paper then goes beyond the usual analytical indicators by attempting to identify how and through which channels fiscal and other economic policies have affected the behavior of endogenous variables that in one way or another influence sustainability.
January 1, 2004
Foreign Exchange Market Organization in Selected Developing and Transition Economies: Evidence from a Survey
Description: The foreign exchange market microstructures in developing and transition economies are characterized by the results from the IMF's 2001 Survey on Foreign Exchange Market Organization. The survey found that these markets are usually unified onshore spot markets for U.S. dollars, where transactions are concentrated at the bank-customer level. The trading mechanisms are usually dealer or mixed dealer/auction markets; the degree of transparency is often low; settlement systems remain risky; and the scope for price discovery is variable.
January 1, 2004
Do Macroeconomic Effects of Capital Controls Vary by their Type? Evidence From Malaysia
Description: This paper examines how the macroeconomic effects of capital controls vary depending on which type of international financial transaction they cover. Drawing on Malaysia's experiences in regulating the capital account during the 1990s, it finds, in an error-correction model, that capital controls generally have statistically insignificant effects on the exchange rate. Controls on portfolio outflows and on bank and foreign exchange operations facilitate reductions in the domestic interest rate, while controls on portfolio inflows have the opposite effect, in line with the theoretical priors. Controls on international transactions in the domestic currency and stock market operations have statistically insignificant effects on the interest rate differential.
January 1, 2004
The Gains From International Monetary Cooperation Revisited
Description: This paper examines the issue of whether countries can improve their welfare by coordinating macroeconomic policies. The main purpose is to compute the gains from international monetary cooperation as the difference between the steady state consumption levels associated with the Nash and the cooperative outcomes of the game in which monetary authorities pursue active monetary policy. A numerical second-order approximation makes the solution of the model possible. Contrary to Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), who claim that the gains from international cooperation in monetary policy are negligible, the paper finds that they could be very significant and reach as high as 2.2 percent of steady state consumption. This suggests that individual countries could experience significant welfare losses if they concentrate only on domestic stabilization policies.