IMF Working Papers

Social Versus Individual Work Preferences: Implications for Optimal Income Taxation

By Zhiyong An, David Coady

March 25, 2022

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Zhiyong An, and David Coady. Social Versus Individual Work Preferences: Implications for Optimal Income Taxation, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2022) accessed December 21, 2024

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Summary

The benchmark optimal income taxation model of Mirrlees (1971) finds that the optimal marginal income tax rate (MIT) is always non-negative. A key model assumption is the coincidence between social and individual work preferences. This paper extends the model to allow for differences in social and individual work preferences. The theoretical and simulation analyses show that under this model, when the government places a higher social weight on work than individuals, the optimal MIT schedule is shifted downwards, introducing the possibility for optimal wage subsidies at the bottom of the income distribution. This implies lower revenues, demogrants, and overall progressivity.

Subject: Employment subsidies, Income, Income tax systems, Labor, Labor supply, Marginal effective tax rate, National accounts, Tax policy, Taxes

Keywords: Employment subsidies, Income, Income tax systems, Income taxation, Labor supply, Marginal effective tax rate, MIT schedule, Model of Mirrlees, Optimal Income Taxation, Preference difference, Preference Differences, Progressivity, Taxation model, Wage Subsidies

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    28

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2022/062

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA2022062

  • ISBN:

    9798400204036

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941