IMF Working Papers

The Role of Board Oversight in Central Bank Governance: Key Legal Design Issues

By Wouter Bossu, Arthur D. P. Rossi

December 27, 2019

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Wouter Bossu, and Arthur D. P. Rossi The Role of Board Oversight in Central Bank Governance: Key Legal Design Issues, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2019) accessed December 21, 2024

Disclaimer: IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

Summary

This paper discusses key legal issues in the design of Board Oversight in central banks. Central banks are complex and sophisticated organizations that are challenging to manage. While most economic literature focuses on decision-making in the context of monetary policy formulation, this paper focuses on the Board oversight of central banks—a central feature of sound governance. This form of oversight is the decision-making responsibility through which an internal body of the central bank—the Oversight Board—ensures that the central bank is well-managed. First, the paper will contextualize the role of Board oversight into the broader legal structure for central bank governance by considering this form of oversight as one of the core decision-making responsibilities of central banks. Secondly, the paper will focus on a number of important legal design issues for Board Oversight, by contrasting the current practices of the IMF membership’s 174 central banks with staff’s advisory practice developed over the past 50 years.

Subject: Bank supervision, Banking, Central bank governance, Central bank legislation, Central bank mandate, Central bank organization, Central banks, Legal support in revenue administration, Revenue administration

Keywords: Africa, Board oversight, Boards of directors, Central bank Decision-making, Central bank Decision-Making responsibility, Central bank decision-making structures, Central bank governance, Central bank governance, Central bank law, Central bank law provision, Central bank legislation, Central bank mandate, Central bank official, Central bank organization, Decision-making responsibility, Executive management, Global, Legal support in revenue administration, Oversight responsibility, Public policy, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    71

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2019/293

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA2019293

  • ISBN:

    9781513524054

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941

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