The Complier Pays Principle: The Limits of Fiscal Approaches toward Sustainable Forest Management

March 1, 2000

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Format: Chicago

Luc E. Leruth, R. Paris, and I. Ruzicka The Complier Pays Principle: The Limits of Fiscal Approaches toward Sustainable Forest Management, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2000) accessed December 22, 2024

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

This paper examines the role and impact of taxation on sustainable forest management. It is shown that fiscal instruments neither reinforce nor substitute for traditional regulatory approaches. Far from encouraging more sustainable forest management, fiscal instruments such as an inappropriate tax policy can actually undermine it. The paper uses the arguments at the root of the Faustmann solution to draw conclusions on the incentives for sustainable tropical forest exploitation. The paper also proposes a bond mechanism as an alternative market-based instrument to encourage sustainable forest logging while reducing monitoring costs.

Subject: Agroindustries, Bonds, Stocks, Tax incentives, Technology

Keywords: Environmental damage, Forest management, Pollution tax, WP

Publication Details

Pages:

28
Volume:

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DOI:

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Issue:

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Series:

Working Paper No. 2000/051
Stock No:

WPIEA0512000
ISBN:

9781451847109
ISSN:

1018-5941

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