IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs
September 1, 2001
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Format: Chicago
Summary
Subject: Central banks, Collateral, Financial institutions, Financial sector policy and analysis, International reserves, Loans, Macrostructural analysis, Moral hazard, Structural reforms
Keywords: Adjustment program, Africa, Borrowing country, Borrowing government, Collateral, Conditionality, Country authorities, Country ownership, Country preference, Country undertaking, Democratized country environment, Government's responsibility, IMF lending, IMF resource, IMF staff, IMF-supported programs, International reserves, Loans, Moral hazard, Moral-hazard, Negotiating position, Ownership, Ownership of program, Principal-agent, Structural reforms, Venture capitalist, WP
Publication Details
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Pages:
32
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Volume:
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DOI:
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Issue:
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Series:
Working Paper No. 2001/142
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Stock No:
WPIEA1422001
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ISBN:
9781451856255
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ISSN:
1018-5941