IMF Working Papers

Economic Announcements and the Timing of Public Debt Auctions

By Marco Rossi

April 1, 1998

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Marco Rossi. Economic Announcements and the Timing of Public Debt Auctions, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 1998) accessed November 21, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

Most treasuries around the world sell their securities at auctions either directly or indirectly through an agent, usually the central bank. Although they can control both the rules and the timing of the auction, they may not be able to control the information and valuations of bidders. The purpose of this paper is to identify those economic indicators whose announcement is likely to have a significant impact on government securities prices and, hence, on bidders’ behavior at auctions of government securities. This information could be used to schedule treasury securities auctions so as to minimize public debt management costs.

Subject: Asset prices, Consumer price indexes, Economic and financial statistics, Monetary aggregates, Money, Price indexes, Prices

Keywords: Abnormal returns, Asset prices, Consumer price indexes, Debt management, Europe, Financial markets efficiency, Gilt, Gilt price, Index-linked gilt, Inflation figure, Monetary aggregate, Monetary aggregates, Price, Price indexes, Public debt auctions, U.K. gilt market, Uniform-price method, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    13

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 1998/044

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA0441998

  • ISBN:

    9781451846386

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941