IMF Working Papers

Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions

By Alberto Alesina, Roberto Perotti

May 1, 1996

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Alberto Alesina, and Roberto Perotti. Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 1996) accessed November 12, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

By discussing the available theoretical and empirical literature, this paper argues that budget procedures and budget institutions do influence budget outcomes. Budget institutions include both procedural rules and balanced budget laws. We critically assess theoretical contributions in this area and suggest several open and unresolved issue. We also examine the empirical evidence drawn from studies on samples of OECD countries, Latin American countries and the United States. We conclude with a discussion of the normative implications of this literature and with some concrete proposals.

Subject: Budget planning and preparation, Fiscal consolidation, Fiscal law, Fiscal policy, Government debt management, Public financial management (PFM)

Keywords: Budget institution, Budget planning and preparation, Budget procedure, Fiscal consolidation, Fiscal law, GNP ratio, Government debt management, Government fragility, Government fragmentation, Government negotiations, Government preparation, Government proposal, Line item, Pork barrel, Power of the executive, Spending minister, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    36

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 1996/052

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA0521996

  • ISBN:

    9781451847208

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941