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ARTICLE X
Relations with Other International Organizations

The IMF-World Bank Concordat (SM/89/54, Rev. 1)

March 31, 1989

To: Members of the Executive Board

From: The Acting Secretary

Subject: Bank-Fund Collaboration in Assisting Member Countries

The President of the World Bank and the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund have reached agreement on the attached text. This document, jointly prepared by the managements of the Bank and the Fund, reviews the current status of cooperation between the Fund and the Bank and provides for the administrative and procedural steps that are necessary to secure a constructive and stronger collaboration between them.

The purposes and mandates of the Bank and the Fund are defined in their Articles of Agreement, as interpreted by their respective Boards. Operating within the framework of the Articles, the managements of both institutions believe that it is of the utmost importance to ensure the closest possible collaboration and working relations between the two institutions in order to serve member governments with maximum effectiveness in meeting their development needs and in providing support for macroeconomic and structural change.

The guidelines contained in the attached document are intended to achieve this objective and should help avoid administrative friction and facilitate orderly resolution of differences of views. Both of us recognize that the advice, suggestions and support of each institution for the other are essential if they are to discharge their responsibilities effectively and promptly. Smooth and effective working relations between the two institutions have assumed special importance in view of the contribution that both of them are expected to make to policy formulation and sustained economic growth in their member countries.

The staff will be instructed to implement the guidelines embodied in this document in a spirit of close collaboration. This matter will be brought to the agenda for discussion on a date to be announced.

Attachment

Memorandum to the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund and the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank March 30, 1989

FROM: The Managing Director The President

SUBJECT: Bank-Fund Collaboration in Assisting Member Countries

  • 1. Guidelines for collaboration between our two institutions have been in place since 1966. They have been reviewed and strengthened on a number of occasions since then.1 We, and our colleagues in the management of both institutions, have recently reviewed the experience with collaboration under existing policy and practices.

  • 2. The problems faced by our member countries are severe. They are struggling to restore stability, to adjust their economies to a more rapidly changing and less benign international environment, and to restore growth, while they continue to grapple with their massive debt overhangs and limited availability of both concessional funds and commercial capital. The majority of the members of our two organizations face serious problems. Many of them face the urgent need for change in policies, institutions, and the incentive framework. All are entitled, in our view, to the best advice our highly competent staffs can provide—each by drawing on their specialized technical expertise and experience. It is our responsibility, and that of our Boards, to ensure that the procedures in place make possible, to the fullest extent practicable, comprehensive analyses by our staffs, early exchange of views on differences, and a system to refer remaining differences to the appropriate level of management for resolution. Proposals to improve our capacity to achieve these objectives are set forth in this paper.

  • 3. The existing guidelines lay down principles which remain sound and provide a firm basis on which to build. They provide the Bank with “. . .  primary responsibility for the composition and appropriateness of development programs and project evaluation, including development priorities.” The Fund is assigned “. . .  primary responsibility for exchange rates and restrictive systems, for adjustment of temporary balance of payments disequilibria, and for evaluating and assisting members to work out stabilization programs as a sound basis for economic advance.” The guidelines further provide that “in between these two clear-cut areas of responsibility . . .  there is a broad range of matters which are of interest to both institutions. This range includes such matters as the structure and functioning of financial institutions, the adequacy of money and capital markets, the actual and potential capacity of the member to generate domestic savings, the financial implications of economic development programs, both for the internal financial position of the country and for its external situation, foreign debt problems, and so on.”

  • 4. The same guidelines also stipulate that “[on those matters in the area of primary responsibility of the Bank], the Fund, and particularly the field missions of the Fund, should inform themselves of the established views and position of the Bank and adopt those views as a working basis for their own work. This does not preclude discussions between the Bank and the Fund as to those matters, but it does mean that the Fund (and Fund missions) will not engage in a critical review of those matters with member countries unless it is done with the prior consent of the Bank.” Corresponding provisions were made for the Bank and Bank missions.

  • 5. While we reaffirm the principles of these guidelines, the overlap of activities of the two institutions has grown rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s as the Bank and the Fund have attempted to respond to the massive financing and adjustment requirements of members in a more difficult economic environment. In recognition of the longer-term and supply-oriented nature of the adjustment process, the Fund increased its consideration of structural issues in stand-by arrangements; extended the repayment period of extended arrangements to 10 years; and introduced the concessional and relatively long-term Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). In response to the serious balance of payments problems affecting many developing countries stemming from the sharp deterioration of the terms of trade and from the weakness in domestic policies and institutions, the Bank introduced Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) in 1980 that provided financing in support of policies to promote structural, economy-wide changes and, subsequently, Sector Adjustment Loans (SECALs), which focused on structural changes in specific sectors.

  • 6. There is continuous and successful cooperation between the Bank and the Fund. Close contacts between the two staffs contribute to a better understanding of economic problems and policy options, and normally lead to improved and consistent policy advice; better coordination of the amounts, forms, and timing of financial assistance; and a greater effectiveness in mobilizing additional financial support.

  • 7. Yet, given the complexity of the problems faced by our members and the perspectives of the two institutions, it is not unusual that differences of view may sometimes arise. In a few cases, some significant differences about country priorities and policy have emerged. In some cases, they have spilled into discussions by the staff with country authorities. Differences of view have concerned a number of areas, including exchange rate, the level of external assistance sufficient to provide reasonable prospects for sustained and successful adjustment efforts and resumption of growth, the speed of adjustment, and the need to maintain adequate levels of public sector development expenditures. At other times, differences of view between the staffs of the two institutions have centered on the trade-off between efficiency gains from certain structural measures to be accrued over time and balance of payments and budgetary impacts.

  • 8. With the growing contiguity of the activities of the Bank and the Fund, we believe it is essential to strengthen collaboration, to ensure that conflicts of views are resolved at an early stage, do not surface in contacts with country authorities, and do not result in differing policy advice to member countries.

  • 9. The Fund has among its purposes the promotion of economic conditions conducive to growth, price stability, and balance of payments sustainability and is required to exercise surveillance on a continual basis over the performance of its members as defined by Article IV. The Fund is empowered to provide temporary balance of payments financing to members to enable them to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity. Thus, the Fund has focused on the aggregate aspects of macroeconomic policies and their related instruments—including public sector spending and revenues, aggregate wage and price policies, money and credit, interest rates and the exchange rate. The Fund has to discharge responsibilities with respect to surveillance, exchange rate matters, balance of payments, growth-oriented stabilization policies and their related instruments. These are the areas in which the Fund has a mandate, primary responsibility, and a record of expertise and experience.

  • 10. The Bank has the objective of promoting economic growth and conditions conducive to efficient resource allocation, which it pursues through investment lending, sectoral and structural adjustment loans. Thus, the Bank has focused on development strategies; sector and project investments; structural adjustment programs; policies which deal with the efficient allocation of resources in both public and private sectors: priorities in government expenditures; reforms of administrative systems, production, trade and financial sectors; the restructuring of state enterprises and sector policies. Moreover, as a market-based institution, the Bank also concerns itself with issues relating to the creditworthiness of its members. In these areas, except for the aggregate aspects of the economic policies mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Bank has a mandate, primary responsibility, and a record of expertise and experience.

  • 11. While it is important to strengthen the framework for collaboration and to reduce the risk of conflict and duplication, both the Bank and the Fund must be allowed to explore their legitimate concerns with regard to macroeconomic and structural issues and to take them into account in their policy advice and lending operations. The 1966 guidelines stipulate that views on matters clearly within the area of “primary responsibility” of one or the other of the two institutions “should be expressed to members only by or with the consent of that institution.” This provision remains appropriate. The procedures for enhanced collaboration spelled out below are designed to assure resolution of issues. It is, of course, equally important that borrowing countries be aware of the responsibility of the institution for policy advice in the areas of its primary responsibility.

  • 12. The objective of the enhanced collaboration procedures is to avoid differing policy advice, but this does not mean that one institution should not engage in analyses in the areas of primary responsibilities of the other institution. On the contrary, the institutions and borrowing members normally stand to benefit from analyses from different perspectives, and thorough discussions between the two staffs are encouraged. In the event differences of view persist at the staff level even after a thorough common examination of them, and should the differences not be resolved by the management, the institution which does not have the primary responsibility would, except in exceptional circumstances, yield to the judgment of the other institution. In those cases, which are expected to be extremely rare, the managements will wish to consult their respective Executive Boards before proceeding. Also, in the interest of efficiency of staff resource use, each institution should rely as much as possible on analyses and monitoring of the other institution in the areas of primary responsibilities of the latter, while safeguarding the independence of institutional decisions.

  • Procedures for Enhanced Collaboration

    • 13. Given the complexity of the problems handled, the differences in the mandates of the Bank and the Fund and the unique perspectives brought to bear on the assessment of country situations by the staffs of the two institutions, it is expected that differences of view will sometimes arise. Existing procedures and practices of Bank-Fund collaboration are designed to ensure the quality of analysis and policy advice, as well as thorough explorations of any differences of view that may emerge between the staffs. Typically, differences are worked out at the working level and are resolved satisfactorily in the large majority of cases. However, in order to further strengthen existing procedures on Bank-Fund collaboration and to facilitate the resolution of any remaining differences of view, new or more formal steps have been agreed in the following areas:

      • I. Strengthening Collaboration

        • 14. The daily interactions and ad hoc contacts involving managements and staffs (and monthly, as well as ad hoc, meetings between the Managing Director and the President) will be supplemented with regular meetings of the senior staff of each institution. In particular, there should be regular meetings between Bank Regional Vice Presidents and the corresponding Fund Area Department Directors to review current operational concerns. These meetings should anticipate and thus reduce the differences of view between staffs of the two organizations. In addition, meetings would be held at the senior level as required to review the strategies of each institution for countries of common concern. These meetings would normally be chaired by the Deputy Managing Director of the Fund and the Senior Vice President, Operations, of the Bank supported by a few senior staff on each side.

        • 15. Whenever conditionality or advice to countries on major issues is involved, agreement should be sought promptly, beginning with working level staffs sharing information and views at the earliest possible stages, and involving their respective superiors when resolution at the working level cannot be achieved. It will be the responsibility of the managers to seek a resolution of any major differences of view between the institutions before the matter is discussed with the member, and before either staff makes proposals to the member. The Deputy Managing Director of the Fund and the Senior Vice President, Operations, of the Bank will meet to discuss any issues not resolved at the Fund Director/Bank Regional Vice President Level and advise, if necessary, the Managing Director and the President if any differences remain.

        • 16. Existing procedures should be strengthened by a more systematic exchange of information on future country work and mission plans by country. Area Departments and Regions would be expected to maintain a forward-looking calendar of at Least one year that would be updated periodically. Deviations from the work plan or calendar would be communicated to the other institution without delay.

        • 17. We also stand ready to establish, under the direction of the Fund’s Director of Research and the Bank’s Vice President, Development Economics, ad hoc study groups to examine analytical issues which may arise in the areas of common work between the two institutions.

        • 18. In the low-income countries, PFP discussions should continue to be handled jointly and, whenever possible, with a single mission chief at an appropriate rank, on the basis of pre-agreed terms of reference. The decision on whether the chief of such joint missions should be from the Bank or from the Fund will be determined on a case-by-case basis. When parallel missions are in the field, they would be expected to cooperate fully and meet jointly with the country authorities, following positions clearly agreed on in advance. Assuming members agree, the Fund management could issue an invitation for one or more Bank staff to be attached to missions involving the use of Fund resources in SAF/ESAF-eligible countries where the Bank was also financially active. Comparable provisions would be made to invite Fund staff to participate in Bank appraisal missions for SALs or SECALs in the same countries.

      • II. Improved Collaboration to Support Adjustment Programs

        • 19. Under existing procedures, the Bank staff includes a discussion of the Fund’s financial relations, the status of any negotiations for the use of Fund resources, and the results of any recent Fund reviews in the President’s Report to the Bank’s Executive Board on a proposed adjustment loan, since adjustment lending operations are not normally undertaken unless an appropriate Fund arrangement is in place. In the absence of a Fund arrangement, the Bank staff should ascertain whether the Fund has any major outstanding concerns about the adequacy of macroeconomic policies prior to formulating its own assessment in connection with the approval of the draft loan documents.2 The Fund’s assessment of macroeconomic policies is also taken into account in the Bank’s assessment of its conditions prior to the release of subsequent tranches.

        • 20. While the existing procedure functions well in most cases,3 it is desirable to strengthen the coordination between the two institutions in this area. Such a need is particularly strong in the context of providing the Fund’s assessment of macroeconomic policies for member countries where there are no existing Fund arrangements. Nonetheless, the economic situation or policies of the member may have changed significantly between consultations. In these cases the Bank will ask the Fund’s views, leaving time for consultations with the country authorities as needed. In comparable circumstances, the Fund management will ask the Bank’s staff views prior to recommending approval of an adjustment program involving the use of Fund resources.

      • III. A PFP-Like Document for Middle-Income Countries

        • 21. Some Directors have suggested that consideration be given to preparing PFP-like documents for some middle-income countries requesting the use of Fund resources, particularly those requesting arrangements under the EFF.4 While the preparation of medium-term plans could be useful for non-SAF-eligible countries where the member seeks a multi-year commitment of resources from its creditors or where structural changes are prominent in the programs (e.g., under the EFF), this matter would be presented to the Executive Boards for consideration after further consultations between the two staffs and managements.

      • IV. Collaboration in the Context of the Debt Strategy

        • 22. In the context of the debt strategy, the Fund is looked to by the commercial and official financing communities for an assessment of balance of payments prospects and financing requirements of member countries undertaking stabilization programs. Bank views are sought with respect to Longer-term external resource requirements and growth prospects. In certain cases menu items play an important role in providing financing and contributing to a viable debt service profile over the medium term. Both institutions have an interest in this aspect of the member’s external position as it affects the member’s medium-term balance of payments prospects and creditworthiness. Therefore, in order to better coordinate our assistance to debtor countries faced with the need to develop financial menu items and other innovative forms of financing, including those aimed at debt reduction, we will establish a task force to promote cooperation, analysis, and the exchange of information on the financing techniques by our institutions.

      • V. Collaboration in the Presence of Overdue Obligations

        • 23. Both the Bank and the Fund urge members with overdue obligations to one or both institutions to become current with both. In practice, if a member country has overdue obligations to one institution, this will affect the other institution’s assessment of the justification for extending its own financial assistance. Each institution’s policies require that it review the ability of a member to meet its financial obligations in light of that member’s discharge of its obligations to the other; Fund management would find it difficult to present a request for a Fund arrangement to the Executive Board for a member with overdue obligations to the Bank, both because of its implications for ability to meet Fund obligations and because continued access to Bank or IDA Lending is often necessary to ensure that an adjustment program is adequately financed. Fund management, therefore, proposes to seek the views of the Bank in all cases where the use of Fund resources was requested by a member with overdue obligations to the Bank, and would not be prepared to support such a request when arrears to the Bank were an indication that the resources of the Fund would not be safeguarded. Similarly, Bank management would advise its Board with regard to countries with overdue obligations to the Fund and would not be prepared to recommend approval of an IBRD or IDA loan, if the overdue obligations to the Fund were an indication that the resources of the Bank would not be safeguarded. Furthermore, the two managements will act in the full spirit of solidarity when one of the institutions is confronted with arrears, as such arrears constitute a major challenge to the cooperative nature of the institutions. They will, in such instances, provide their good offices and support to help eliminate those arrears.

      • VI. Independence of Institutional Decisions

        • 24. The Executive Directors of the Bank and the Fund have stressed repeatedly the need to avoid cross-conditionality: each institution must continue to proceed with its own financial assistance according to the standards laid down in its Articles of Agreement and the policies adopted by its Executive Board. Thus, although the Bank’s assessment of structural and sectoral policies will continue to be an important element in decisions regarding Fund lending, the ultimate decision on whether to support the program rests with the Fund’s Executive Board. Similarly, although the Fund’s assessments will continue to be an important element in decisions regarding Bank adjustment lending, the ultimate decision rests with the Bank’s Executive Directors.

        • 25. Nevertheless, in the event that Fund management were to decide to submit a program for approval in spite of the Bank’s reservations about structural policies or in the presence of arrears to the Bank, Fund management would present the case to an informal meeting of the Fund’s Executive Board for discussion prior to communicating its decision to the member concerned. Bank management would adopt the corresponding procedure.

      • VII. Dealing with Other Institutions

        • 26. Not only have the activities and roles of the Fund and the Bank expanded in relation to their members, coordinating activities to assist member countries in mobilizing resources have grown rapidly, as has the interest of other groups (the OECD, DAC, UN) in matters of debt and the resumption of growth. To avoid conflicting views from being expressed in reports to such organizations, to the maximum extent feasible, the draft reports prepared by either institution will be sent to the other well in advance of the circulation date for review and comments. This will provide an additional opportunity to identify possible problems and to resolve them.

      • VIII. Longer-Term Promotion of Mutual Understanding

        • 27. To better acquaint staff of the two institutions with the thinking practices and constraints within which each institution operates, we propose to initiate an exchange of staff on two- to threeyear secondments at the senior professional levels. During the period of the secondment, staff members would be wholly integrated into the regular staff of the institution to which they have been seconded. For administrative reasons, there might need to be some limit on the number of secondments at any one time.

        • 28. While the measures set out above should go a long way toward resolving emerging differences of view and limiting potential areas of conflict, both the Fund and the Bank remain committed to a process of strengthening their collaboration in a longer-term perspective.

1 Additional collaboration procedures were added to the original guidelines in 1970, and guidelines, as expanded, were reviewed and affirmed by managements of both institutions in 1980, and by the Fund in 1984 and the Bank in 1985.

2 SM/88/249 (11/14/88), pp. 4–6.

3 Both the staff reports and summings up of Article IV consultations are made available to the Bank staff. Between consultations, the Bank staff is kept aware of the Fund staff’s views and the results of other relevant Executive Board discussions on a continuous basis.

4 See BUFF/88/92 (5/13/88), pp. 2–3; and “Proposals for Extending the Policy Framework Paper (PFP) Process to Middle-Income Debtors” (EBD/88/144, 5/31/88).

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