Moral Hazard: Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders?

May 3, 2002

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Format: Chicago

Steven T Phillips, and Timothy D. Lane Moral Hazard: Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders?, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2002) accessed December 22, 2024

Summary

Examines the issue of moral hazard inrelation to IMF loans to countries in financial difficulties. Concerns about moral hazard have had a prominent place in recent discussions on how the architecture of the international financial system should be reformed and what the IMF’s role should be.

Subject: Emerging and frontier financial markets, Financial crises, Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial sector policy and analysis, Financial services, Moral hazard, Systemically important financial institutions, Yield curve

Keywords: Asia and Pacific, EI, Emerging and frontier financial markets, Financial support, Financing, Financing package, IMF action, IMF guarantee, IMF press, Investor, Lending, Liquidity position, Market, Moral hazard, Systemically important financial institutions, Yield, Yield curve

Publication Details

Pages:

20
Volume:

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DOI:

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Issue:

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Series:

Economic Issues No. 2002/003
Stock No:

EIIEA028
ISBN:

9781589060883
ISSN:

1020-5098

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