IMF Executive Board Concludes 2022 Article IV Consultation with Oman
November 15, 2022
Washington, DC : The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation [1] with Oman and considered and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting. [2]
Strong vaccination efforts have allowed for the relaxation of all social distancing restrictions, and the economic recovery is gaining traction. Overall GDP growth rebounded from -3.2 percent in 2020 to 3.0 percent in 2021, and is projected at 4.3 percent in 2022, supported by increased hydrocarbon production and continued recovery of non-hydrocarbon economic activity. Rebounding economic activity and elevated global inflationary pressures are expected to push up average inflation to 3 percent in 2022. Direct spillovers on the Omani economy from the war in Ukraine have been limited.
High oil prices and fiscal consolidation under the authorities’ Medium-Term Fiscal Plan (MTFP), have improved fiscal and external balances considerably. The overall central government balance improved by 12.8 percentage points of GDP to a deficit of 3.2 percent in 2021, largely due to higher hydrocarbon revenue, expenditure restraint, and the introduction of VAT. Fiscal and external surpluses are expected in 2022 and over the medium term. Central government debt declined to 62.9 percent of GDP in 2021 and it is expected to decline to about 44 percent of GDP in 2022.
The banking system has weathered the recent shocks relatively well. Financial soundness indicators appear healthy, benefiting from prudent oversight of the Central Bank of Oman and the strong buffers before entering the crisis. However, private sector credit growth has remained subdued.
Uncertainties continue to cloud the outlook, with downside risks dominating in the short run. On the upside, the outlook could be bolstered by higher-than-expected hydrocarbon windfalls, accelerated implementation of structural reforms under Vision 2040, and the realization of investment projects from regional partners. On the downside, risks stem particularly from uncertainty about the war in Ukraine and its impact on the global economy and oil prices, a renewed flare-up of COVID-19 infections, tighter-than-expected global financial conditions, increased inflationary pressures from higher global food and energy prices, more persistent disruption in global supply chains, pressures to spend the hydrocarbon windfalls, and climate-related events.
Executive Board Assessment [3]
In concluding the 2022 Article IV consultation with Oman, Executive Directors endorsed the staff’s appraisal, as follows:
The economic recovery is gaining traction. Strong measures helped mitigate the health and socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic. Non-hydrocarbon growth is expected to strengthen over the medium term, supported by the oil price outlook, planned investments, and structural reforms. Fiscal and external buffers have increased, supported by increased hydrocarbon revenues and substantial fiscal consolidation. Nevertheless, downside risks, notably from global sources, dominate in the short run.
The authorities remain committed to fiscal consolidation notwithstanding oil revenue windfalls and social pressures. Significant fiscal adjustment is being implemented in 2022, which has allowed for increased social spending while still generating a substantial surplus due to the oil windfall. However, reinforcing fiscal sustainability over the medium term, as envisaged under the MTFP, and creating space for social safety net reforms and higher capital expenditure require additional measures. Thus, efforts to strengthen tax administration and implement a PIT are welcome. The phased withdrawal of untargeted energy and water subsidies should be a priority. Intensive public outreach is essential to sustain support for fiscal consolidation amid rising oil windfalls.
Establishing strong fiscal frameworks with clear objectives and a long-term anchor would help achieve fiscal sustainability. Fiscal frameworks would lay the foundation for adopting a fiscal rule. A rule based on the non-hydrocarbon structural primary balance, which is robust to hydrocarbon price volatility and economic fluctuations, could be appropriate. Ongoing reforms to improve public financial management and transparency are welcome and developing a sovereign asset and liability management framework should be a priority.
The exchange rate peg remains appropriate. The peg has provided a credible monetary anchor, helping to deliver low and stable inflation. Official foreign reserves, fiscal prudence, and structural reforms would continue to reinforce the peg. Better coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities, improved liquidity management, and deeper financial markets would improve the capacity for a more independent monetary policy.
Financial system risks are low, but the CBO should continue its close monitoring of bank asset quality and its efforts to strengthen regulatory frameworks. Restoring prudential rules to pre-pandemic levels should be a priority. Enacting the new Banking Law would align the legislation with international best practices. Careful coordination is needed to ensure that banking system liquidity remains adequate as plans to enhance the liquidity management framework and establish the TSA are implemented. Progress in developing capital markets is welcome.
Steadfast implementation of structural reforms under Vision 2040 is paramount to secure more inclusive, diversified, and sustainable growth. Strengthening the social safety net would help facilitate reforms to improve labor market flexibility. Advancing SOE reforms should also be prioritized to promote competition, strengthen governance, and stimulate private sector participation in the economy. To facilitate the digital economy transformation, worker skills will need to be upgraded. Pressing ahead with addressing climate challenges should be a priority.
Staff proposes that the next Article IV consultation with Oman follow the standard 12-month cycle.
[1] Under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country's economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.
[2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.
[3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country's authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm .
Table 1. Oman: Selected Economic Indicators, 2019–27 |
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Prel. |
Proj. |
||||||||||||||||||
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
2022 |
2023 |
2024 |
2025 |
2026 |
2027 |
|||||||||||
Oil and Gas Sector |
|||||||||||||||||||
Total production of oil and gas (US$ billions) |
27.1 |
18.0 |
24.3 |
42.1 |
37.0 |
35.1 |
33.6 |
32.5 |
31.6 |
||||||||||
Average crude oil export price (US$/barrel) |
63.6 |
46.0 |
64.3 |
95.0 |
85.5 |
80.2 |
76.2 |
73.3 |
71.0 |
||||||||||
Crude oil production (in millions of barrels/day) |
0.97 |
0.95 |
0.97 |
1.06 |
1.13 |
1.13 |
1.13 |
1.14 |
1.14 |
||||||||||
National Accounts |
|||||||||||||||||||
Nominal GDP (US$ billions) |
88.1 |
74.0 |
85.9 |
108.9 |
111.0 |
110.7 |
111.4 |
113.4 |
116.2 |
||||||||||
Nominal GDP (in billions of Omani rials) |
33.9 |
28.4 |
33.0 |
41.9 |
42.7 |
42.6 |
42.8 |
43.6 |
44.7 |
||||||||||
Real GDP |
-1.1 |
-3.2 |
3.0 |
4.3 |
4.1 |
1.9 |
2.3 |
2.5 |
2.7 |
||||||||||
Real hydrocarbon GDP 1/ |
-1.5 |
-0.9 |
3.7 |
8.5 |
6.4 |
0.5 |
0.5 |
0.4 |
0.4 |
||||||||||
Real nonhydrocarbon GDP |
-0.9 |
-4.5 |
1.8 |
2.6 |
2.6 |
2.9 |
3.4 |
3.9 |
4.0 |
||||||||||
Consumer prices (average) |
0.1 |
-0.9 |
1.5 |
3.0 |
2.5 |
2.2 |
2.0 |
2.0 |
2.0 |
||||||||||
GDP Deflator |
-2.7 |
-13.2 |
12.7 |
21.6 |
-2.1 |
-2.1 |
-1.6 |
-0.8 |
-0.2 |
||||||||||
Investment and Saving |
|||||||||||||||||||
Gross capital formation |
26.9 |
28.3 |
23.0 |
23.2 |
23.5 |
23.8 |
24.0 |
24.1 |
24.2 |
||||||||||
Public |
11.9 |
12.5 |
7.5 |
10.7 |
10.6 |
10.6 |
10.6 |
10.6 |
10.5 |
||||||||||
Private |
17.1 |
19.9 |
18.8 |
12.5 |
12.9 |
13.2 |
13.4 |
13.5 |
13.7 |
||||||||||
Gross national savings |
22.4 |
3.9 |
15.3 |
27.3 |
26.0 |
25.5 |
25.3 |
25.3 |
25.4 |
||||||||||
Public |
8.8 |
-0.1 |
7.0 |
15.5 |
11.7 |
12.0 |
10.9 |
9.9 |
9.3 |
||||||||||
Private |
13.5 |
4.0 |
8.4 |
11.8 |
14.2 |
13.5 |
14.4 |
15.4 |
16.1 |
||||||||||
Central Government Finances |
|||||||||||||||||||
Revenue and grants |
33.9 |
29.6 |
33.9 |
36.9 |
33.6 |
34.1 |
33.4 |
32.4 |
31.8 |
||||||||||
Hydrocarbon |
25.8 |
22.3 |
26.6 |
30.5 |
27.1 |
26.8 |
25.8 |
24.5 |
23.8 |
||||||||||
Nonhydrocarbon and grants |
8.1 |
7.4 |
7.3 |
6.5 |
6.6 |
7.3 |
7.6 |
7.9 |
8.0 |
||||||||||
Expenditure |
38.8 |
45.7 |
37.1 |
31.7 |
32.0 |
31.6 |
31.8 |
31.3 |
30.8 |
||||||||||
Current |
30.9 |
37.2 |
33.6 |
29.0 |
29.4 |
29.0 |
29.2 |
28.7 |
28.2 |
||||||||||
Capital |
7.9 |
8.5 |
3.5 |
2.7 |
2.6 |
2.6 |
2.6 |
2.6 |
2.5 |
||||||||||
Overall balance (Net lending/borrowing) |
-4.8 |
-16.1 |
-3.2 |
5.3 |
1.6 |
2.5 |
1.6 |
1.1 |
1.0 |
||||||||||
Overall balance (adjusted) 2/ |
0.3 |
-9.9 |
-0.9 |
5.3 |
1.6 |
2.5 |
1.6 |
1.1 |
1.0 |
||||||||||
Non-hydrocarbon primary balance
|
-35.9 |
-38.3 |
-34.3 |
-35.9 |
-34.7 |
-31.4 |
-29.6 |
-27.5 |
-25.8 |
||||||||||
Central government debt, of which: |
52.5 |
69.7 |
62.9 |
43.7 |
42.5 |
41.7 |
40.2 |
38.5 |
36.8 |
||||||||||
External debt |
39.3 |
51.7 |
47.2 |
31.3 |
30.3 |
29.7 |
28.6 |
27.4 |
25.8 |
||||||||||
Public debt, of which: |
79.1 |
111.0 |
107.6 |
||||||||||||||||
SOEs debt |
26.7 |
41.3 |
41.8 |
||||||||||||||||
Net financial assets |
-11.2 |
-28.5 |
-25.5 |
-13.7 |
-12.5 |
-10.9 |
-9.0 |
-7.3 |
-5.6 |
||||||||||
Monetary Sector |
|||||||||||||||||||
Net foreign assets |
-3.6 |
-28.4 |
31.2 |
13.1 |
25.8 |
-3.8 |
-10.9 |
1.0 |
2.8 |
||||||||||
Net domestic assets |
4.4 |
23.4 |
-1.4 |
2.8 |
-4.1 |
6.0 |
8.9 |
4.6 |
4.6 |
||||||||||
Credit to the private sector |
2.8 |
1.1 |
2.4 |
3.0 |
3.5 |
3.7 |
4.1 |
4.3 |
4.4 |
||||||||||
Broad money |
2.0 |
8.9 |
4.6 |
5.2 |
3.3 |
3.0 |
3.3 |
3.7 |
4.2 |
||||||||||
External Sector |
|||||||||||||||||||
Exports of goods |
38.7 |
33.5 |
44.6 |
64.0 |
59.3 |
58.2 |
57.6 |
57.5 |
57.7 |
||||||||||
Oil and gas |
26.5 |
18.2 |
26.1 |
44.5 |
39.2 |
37.2 |
35.6 |
34.5 |
33.5 |
||||||||||
Other |
12.2 |
15.3 |
18.5 |
19.5 |
20.0 |
21.0 |
22.0 |
23.0 |
24.2 |
||||||||||
Imports of goods |
-20.5 |
-25.8 |
-28.0 |
-32.8 |
-32.3 |
-32.9 |
-33.6 |
-34.6 |
-36.0 |
||||||||||
Current account balance |
-4.0 |
-12.3 |
-4.3 |
4.5 |
2.7 |
1.9 |
1.5 |
1.3 |
1.4 |
||||||||||
Percent of GDP |
-4.6 |
-16.6 |
-5.0 |
4.1 |
2.5 |
1.7 |
1.3 |
1.2 |
1.2 |
||||||||||
Central Bank gross reserves |
16.7 |
15.0 |
19.7 |
21.6 |
25.5 |
25.1 |
23.7 |
24.2 |
25.1 |
||||||||||
In months of next year's imports of goods and services |
5.9 |
4.9 |
5.3 |
5.8 |
6.6 |
6.4 |
5.9 |
5.9 |
6.0 |
||||||||||
Total external debt |
72.0 |
72.8 |
79.8 |
76.9 |
79.8 |
80.3 |
80.5 |
80.3 |
80.9 |
||||||||||
Percent of GDP |
81.8 |
98.4 |
93.0 |
70.6 |
71.9 |
72.5 |
72.2 |
70.9 |
69.7 |
||||||||||
Memorandum Items: |
|||||||||||||||||||
Non-hydrocarbon structural primary balance 3/ |
-24.6 |
-22.4 |
-20.2 |
-17.7 |
-18.8 |
-18.0 |
-17.8 |
-17.2 |
-16.7 |
||||||||||
Non-hydrocarbon structural primary balance
|
-36.3 |
-35.9 |
-32.6 |
-32.6 |
-34.1 |
-31.2 |
-29.6 |
-27.5 |
-25.8 |
||||||||||
Nominal effective exchange rate (2010=100) |
115.9 |
116.6 |
119.5 |
… |
… |
… |
… |
… |
… |
||||||||||
Real effective exchange rate (2010 = 100) |
106.7 |
105.1 |
107.8 |
… |
… |
… |
… |
… |
… |
||||||||||
Exchange rate (rial per dollar; period average) |
0.38 |
0.38 |
0.38 |
… |
… |
… |
… |
… |
… |
||||||||||
Sources: Omani authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections. |
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1/ Includes crude oil, refining, natural gas, and LNG production. |
|||||||||||||||||||
2/ Data prior to 2022 were adjusted by taking out expenditures on gas and oil that were hived off to Energy Development Oman in 2021. |
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3/ Adjusted by the economic cycle. |
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