Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions

December 1, 2001

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

We study the desirability of reforming fiscal institutions along with the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central

Subject: Central bank autonomy, Expenditure, Fiscal policy, Fiscal rules, Inflation

Keywords: CB governor, CB independence, inflation rate, monetary policy, WP

Pages:
37
Volume:
2001
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451874556.001
Issue:
205
Series:
Working Paper No. 2001/205
Stock No:
WPIEA2052001
ISBN:
9781451874556
ISSN:
1018-5941

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