IMF Working Papers

The Role of Institutional Quality in a Currency Crisis Model

By Yi Wu

January 1, 2008

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Yi Wu. The Role of Institutional Quality in a Currency Crisis Model, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2008) accessed December 26, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

This paper is a theoretical study of the impact of institutional quality on currency crises from a public finance point of view. Recent empirical studies leave little doubt that weak institutions, including high levels of corruption, hinder economic performance. After the East Asian crisis, many observers have pointed to widespread corruption and crony capitalism as an underlying cause. Despite the popularity of the claim, there are only limited empirical and especially theoretical studies on the link between institutional quality and currency crises. This paper intends to fill in this void. We model institutional weakness as an inefficiency of the tax collection system. The model derived here shows that institutional weakness generally increases the likelihood of the existence of a self-fulfilling crisis equilibrium, and leads to larger currency devaluation when crises happen. However, this relationship could reverse when institutional weakness is very severe.

Subject: Currency crises, Depreciation, Exchange rates, Expenditure, Revenue administration

Keywords: WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    16

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2008/005

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA2008005

  • ISBN:

    9781451868678

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941