IMF Working Papers

Implementing Inflation Targeting: Institutional Arrangements, Target Design, and Communications

By Marcel Peter, Scott Roger, Geoffrey M Heenan

December 1, 2006

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Format: Chicago

Marcel Peter, Scott Roger, and Geoffrey M Heenan. "Implementing Inflation Targeting: Institutional Arrangements, Target Design, and Communications", IMF Working Papers 2006, 278 (2006), accessed April 18, 2025, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451865387.001

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

Transparency is a central element in most aspects of the design and operation of inflation targeting regimes. This paper focuses on three elements of inflation targeting most closely associated with transparency: (i) the institutional arrangements supporting inflation targeting; (ii) the specification of the inflation target; and (iii) the central bank's policy communications. The paper is primarily aimed at providing practical advice to countries planning to develop an inflation targeting framework, but many of the issues are relevant for any credible, independent monetary policy.

Subject: Banking, Communications in revenue administration, Inflation, Inflation targeting, Price stabilization

Keywords: Decision-making autonomy, Financial market, Governance arrangement, Inflation target, Instrument autonomy, Management structure, Statistics agency, WP

Publication Details