IMF Working Papers

Credit Derivatives: Systemic Risks and Policy Options?

By John Kiff, Jennifer A. Elliott, Elias G. Kazarian, Jodi G. Scarlata, Carolyne Spackman

November 1, 2009

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John Kiff, Jennifer A. Elliott, Elias G. Kazarian, Jodi G. Scarlata, and Carolyne Spackman. Credit Derivatives: Systemic Risks and Policy Options?, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2009) accessed December 21, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

Credit derivative markets are largely unregulated, but calls are increasingly being made for changes to this "hands off" stance, amidst concerns that they helped to fuel the current financial crisis, or that they could be a cause of the next one. The purpose of this paper is to address two basic questions: (i) do credit derivative markets increase systemic risk; and (ii) should they be regulated more closely, and if so, how and to what extent? The paper begins with a basic description of credit derivative markets and recent events, followed by an assessment of their recent association with systemic risk. It then reviews and evaluates some of the authorities' proposed initiatives, and discusses some alternative directions that could be taken.

Subject: Central counterparty clearing house, Credit, Credit default swap, Credit risk, Derivative markets

Keywords: Basis point, Counterparty risk, Credit derivative market, Market abuse, Market participant, OTC derivative market, Protection seller, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    35

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2009/254

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA2009254

  • ISBN:

    9781451874006

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941