Macroeconomic Conditions and Pressures for Protection Under Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws: Empirical Evidence from the United States

IMF Working Papers, August 1, 1996

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Antidumping and countervailing duty procedures require both injury (by reason of imports) and dumping/subsidies.
Despite these specific rules, the paper investigates whether domestic macroeconomic conditions are connected to pressures for protection under antidumping and countervailing duties.
The evidence suggests that pressures for protection under these measures since the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade talks have advanced during periods of macroeconomic weakness and receded during periods of macroeconomic strength.

Geographic focus: United States.
Timeframe context: since the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade talks.
Published as an IMF Working Paper and also in Staff Papers, Vol. 44, No. 1, March 1997.
Author: Michael P. Leidy.
Publication date on the IMF landing page: August 1, 1996.

Subject: Antidumping, Foreign exchange, Imports, International trade, Labor, Real effective exchange rates, Trade barriers, Unemployment rate.
Keywords: Antidumping, constant term, countervailing duty case, CVD duty, CVD measure, CVD petition, dumping, escape clause petition, Imports, petition, Real effective exchange rates, subsidy, Trade barriers, Unemployment rate, WP.

Procedural safeguards in antidumping and countervailing duty laws do not fully insulate trade remedy activity from macroeconomic cycles.
Policymakers and analysts should consider macroeconomic conditions as a factor influencing the frequency and intensity of antidumping and countervailing duty petitions and measures.

IMF Working Paper by Michael P. Leidy (August 1, 1996); content as presented on the IMF landing page.