The Role of State-Contingent Debt Instruments in Sovereign Debt Restructurings
November 19, 2020
Download PDF
Preview Citation
Format: Chicago
Disclaimer: This Staff Discussion Note represents the views of the authors and does not necessarily represent IMF views or IMF policy. The views expressed herein should be attributed to the authors and not to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management. Staff Discussion Notes are published to elicit comments and to further debate.
Summary
Subject: Asset and liability management, Bonds, COVID-19, Debt restructuring, Environment, Financial crisis, Financial institutions, Financial instruments, Health, Natural disasters, Public enterprises, Securities, Sovereign debt defaults, Sovereign debt restructuring
Keywords: Bonds, Caribbean, COVID-19, Debt contract, Debt restructuring, Debt stock, Debt sustainability, Eurobond investor, GDP-linked debt, Global, Global financial crisis, GLW payment, Investor appetite, Investor participation, Investor preference, Natural disaster clauses, Natural disasters, Natural disasters clauses, Pandemic, Reference variable, Sector debt suspension, Securities, Sovereign debt default, Sovereign debt restructuring, State-contingent debt instruments, Trading partner, Upside payout, Value recovery instruments, VRI payout
Publication Details
-
Pages:
---
-
Volume:
---
-
DOI:
---
-
Issue:
---
-
Series:
Staff Discussion Notes No. 2020/006
-
Stock No:
SDNEA2020006
-
ISBN:
9781513556482
-
ISSN:
2617-6750
