On December 15, 2017, the Executive Board of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the annual discussions
with the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) on
Common Policies of Member Countries and Common Policies in Support of
Member Countries Reform Programs.[1]
The sharp decline in oil revenues since 2014 continues to impair the
regional economic situation. Growth has sharply declined since 2014 to
-1 percent in 2016, reflecting a deterioration in oil production (-6
percent) and subdued non-oil GDP growth (around 1 percent). This
stemmed from a sizeable reduction in public spending by most countries
and the large accumulation of budget arrears over that period. The
short-term outlook for the region continues to be weak, with growth
projected to remain negative at -½ percent in 2017, due to reduced
public spending and further declining oil production. Inflation remains
low as economic activity is weak.
Reflecting the continuation of fiscal consolidation efforts, the
average non-oil primary fiscal deficit would continue to decline to
about 8 ½ percent of non-oil GDP in 2017 from 13 ½ percent in 2016. The
estimated total public debt-to GDP ratio for the region has been
revised upwards to just above 50 percent of GDP at end-2016, up from 28
percent at end-2014. The current account deficit is projected to
decline from 10 percent of GDP in 2016 to about 5 percent of GDP in
2017, due to larger oil and non-oil exports and compression in imports.
Following a rapid decline in the external reserves coverage ratio from
5.8 months of imports at end-2014 to 2.2 months at end-2016, external
reserves have stabilized and picked up in the third quarter of 2017,
reflecting a combination of IMF disbursements and underlying fiscal
adjustment by member countries. Meanwhile, the financial sector
continues to show signs of weaknesses, with declining bank deposits,
flat credit to the economy and increasing non-performing loans.
CEMAC’s national authorities and regional institutions have taken
initial steps to restore external and fiscal stability following the
sharp drop in oil prices. They have resolved to put in place a strong
and coordinated policy response by all member countries and each agreed
to seek IMF support for implementing this strategy. Three countries
(Cameroon, Chad, and Gabon) have adopted new IMF-supported programs,
while CAR has adjusted an existing one. The regional central bank
(BEAC) and the regional banking supervisor (COBAC) have started
implementing supportive policies to help rebuild regional reserves and
ensure financial sector stability, as part of a comprehensive package
of policy commitments. In particular, the BEAC has pursued tighter
monetary policy, with an increase in its policy rate in March 2017 and
a strict control on bank refinancing, and decided to eliminate
statutory advances by end-2017. COBAC has taken initial steps to
enhance risk-based supervision and address several banks in difficulty.
The medium-term outlook remains challenging. It foresees a gradual
improvement in the economic and financial situation in the region,
assuming full implementation of policy commitments by CEMAC member
states and regional institutions. It assumes continued fiscal
consolidation (about 6 percent of GDP improvement in the overall fiscal
balance from 2016 to 2019), initially through cuts in non-priority
public investment and a gradual increase in non-oil budget revenue.
Policies to diversify the economies by improving the business
environment, including through enhanced governance and transparency,
would support higher growth in the medium term. The monetary policy
stance would be kept tight as needed to support external stability and
reserves accumulation. This outlook entails important risks related to
the global economic developments and its impact on oil prices, possible
weaker-than-expected policies owing to constraints and/or lack of
political support, possible delays in concluding programs with the
remaining CEMAC countries, and still difficult security conditions.
Executive Board Assessment
[2]
Executive Directors noted that the sharp decline in oil revenues since 2014
continues to impair the region, with regional economic growth turning
negative, and fiscal and external imbalances widening in the past two
years. While the acute phase of the crisis has somewhat lessened, the
outlook will continue to face substantial risks. Directors stressed that
full implementation of policy commitments by CEMAC member states and
regional institutions would be essential to support a gradual improvement
in the regional economic and financial situation over the medium term.
Directors welcomed the initial steps taken by CEMAC countries’ national
authorities and the regional institutions to avert a crisis and restore
external and fiscal stability. They noted that the implementation of
national budget policies under Fund‑supported programs has been broadly
satisfactory and, along with BEAC’s tighter monetary policy and financial
support from development partners, have contributed to a recovery in BEAC’s
foreign exchange reserves.
Directors urged CEMAC countries’ national authorities to fully implement
their commitment to steadfast fiscal adjustment to restore the external
sustainability of individual members. Continued efforts to diversify the
economy, including in the context of the regional program for economic and
financial reforms, would also help reduce vulnerabilities to oil price
shocks and pave the way for sustained and inclusive growth. Directors noted
that the regional strategy remains incomplete until all CEMAC members have
embarked on reform programs that could be supported by development
partners. In this context, they encouraged BEAC to continue to mitigate
risks of undue pressure on regional reserves from some member countries.
Directors commended BEAC’s resolve to support the regional strategy and
implement reforms to enhance its effectiveness. They supported the monetary
policy tightening in 2017 and welcomed the early decision to eliminate
statutory advances. They welcomed BEAC’s commitment to consider a further
monetary policy tightening should reserves accumulation fall short of
BEAC’s objectives. Directors noted that the modernization of the monetary
policy framework will help strengthen monetary policy transmission, and
welcomed the steps taken to implement the outstanding safeguards
recommendations. Continued efforts to strengthen implementation of foreign
exchange regulations will also be important.
Directors welcomed the initial actions taken by the regional banking
supervisor to mitigate risks to the financial sector. They encouraged COBAC
to implement more forcefully its measures to address weaknesses in the
banking sector, in particular to work with banks on reducing nonperforming
loans, enhance enforcement of prudential rules, and resolve insolvent
banks. They also welcomed the shift to risk‑based supervision.
Directors noted that the new regional convergence framework could help
strengthen macroeconomic policies in member countries but would need to be
better enforced. They urged the regional institutions to continue to
enhance their macroeconomic management capacity and address shortcomings in
regional statistics.
Directors considered that BEAC and COBAC have implemented the policy
assurances provided in the June 2017 Letter of Policy Support, and endorsed
the actions outlined in the follow‑up letter from the BEAC Governor. They
emphasized the importance of regularly assessing the union‑level policy
actions and seeking additional union‑level policy assurances if material
policy or reform changes were to become necessary. They welcomed staff’s
intention to report regularly on their discussions with the regional
authorities on their policies in support of CEMAC countries’ reform
programs.
The views expressed by Directors today will form part of the Article IV
consultation discussions on individual members of the CEMAC that take place
until the next Board discussion of CEMAC common policies. It is expected
that the next discussion of CEMAC common policies will be held on the
standard 12‑month cycle.
|
CEMAC: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators,
2014-21
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014
|
2015
|
2016
|
2017
|
2017
|
2018
|
2019
|
2020
|
2021
|
|
|
|
|
|
Est.
|
CR4 17/176 4
|
Proj.
|
Proj.
|
Proj.
|
Proj.
|
Proj.
|
|
|
|
(Annual percent change)
|
|
|
National income and prices
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
GDP at constant prices1
|
4.6
|
1.6
|
-1.0
|
0.7
|
-0.6
|
1.6
|
3.2
|
3.8
|
3.7
|
|
|
Oil GDP1
|
3.6
|
2.5
|
-6.2
|
-1.6
|
-3.7
|
7.0
|
1.7
|
0.3
|
-3.7
|
|
|
Non-oil GDP1
|
4.3
|
0.9
|
1.1
|
1.8
|
1.3
|
1.9
|
3.9
|
4.6
|
5.0
|
|
|
Consumer prices (period average) 2
|
2.7
|
2.8
|
1.3
|
1.2
|
1.1
|
1.5
|
1.8
|
2.2
|
2.3
|
|
|
Consumer prices (end of period) 2
|
2.4
|
1.9
|
0.4
|
1.3
|
1.3
|
1.7
|
1.8
|
2.3
|
2.4
|
|
|
|
(Annual changes in percent of
beginning-of-period broad money)
|
|
|
Money and credit
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Net foreign assets
|
-7.6
|
-17.7
|
-28.4
|
0.5
|
-1.1
|
2.3
|
2.2
|
…
|
…
|
|
|
Net domestic assets
|
17.0
|
15.6
|
23.5
|
3.4
|
-2.4
|
4.8
|
3.9
|
…
|
…
|
|
|
Broad money
|
9.4
|
-2.2
|
-4.9
|
3.9
|
-3.5
|
7.1
|
6.2
|
…
|
…
|
|
|
|
(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise
indicated)
|
|
|
Gross national savings
|
28.9
|
13.8
|
12.6
|
17.4
|
15.6
|
16.8
|
17.8
|
19.3
|
20.2
|
|
|
Gross domestic investment
|
30.4
|
26.8
|
22.5
|
22.5
|
20.6
|
21.0
|
23.0
|
21.9
|
21.7
|
|
|
Of which: public investment
|
13.0
|
9.0
|
7.3
|
7.3
|
5.1
|
4.9
|
4.9
|
4.9
|
4.9
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Government financial operations
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total revenue, excluding grants
|
23.2
|
19.1
|
16.1
|
17.5
|
15.8
|
16.5
|
16.8
|
17.0
|
17.0
|
|
|
Government expenditure
|
28.3
|
27.2
|
24.4
|
21.4
|
20.2
|
18.9
|
18.4
|
17.9
|
17.7
|
|
|
Primary fiscal basic balance 3
|
-1.7
|
-5.0
|
-4.3
|
0.2
|
-0.2
|
1.6
|
2.4
|
3.0
|
3.2
|
|
|
Overall fiscal balance, excluding
grants
|
-5.2
|
-7.2
|
-7.9
|
-4.0
|
-4.8
|
-2.9
|
-1.8
|
-1.2
|
-0.7
|
|
|
Primary fiscal balance
|
-4.0
|
-6.5
|
-6.2
|
-1.4
|
-1.9
|
-0.1
|
0.6
|
1.2
|
1.2
|
|
|
|
(Percent of non-oil GDP, unless
otherwise indicated)
|
|
|
Non-oil overall fiscal balance,
excluding grants
|
-25.6
|
-18.3
|
-15.5
|
-11.7
|
-12.0
|
-9.8
|
-8.1
|
-7.0
|
-5.9
|
|
|
Non-oil primary fiscal balance,
including grants -23.9
|
-17.4
|
-13.5
|
-8.5
|
-8.5
|
-6.4
|
-5.2
|
-4.2
|
-3.7
|
|
|
Total Public Debt (percent of GDP)
|
28.3
|
42.7
|
50.4
|
46.7
|
52.1
|
52.5
|
51.4
|
49.2
|
46.7
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
External sector
|
(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise
indicated)
|
|
|
Exports of goods and nonfactor services
|
43.5
|
34.5
|
30.2
|
36.4
|
32.2
|
31.4
|
30.8
|
31.0
|
30.7
|
|
|
Imports of goods and nonfactor services
|
40.4
|
43.2
|
35.0
|
35.9
|
32.8
|
31.9
|
32.6
|
30.4
|
29.1
|
|
|
Balance on goods and nonfactor services
|
3.1
|
-8.7
|
-4.7
|
0.5
|
-0.6
|
-0.5
|
-1.8
|
0.6
|
1.6
|
|
|
Current account, including grants
|
-1.5
|
-13.0
|
-9.9
|
-5.1
|
-5.0
|
-4.3
|
-5.2
|
-2.6
|
-1.5
|
|
|
External public debt
|
19.4
|
28.1
|
29.9
|
26.9
|
32.6
|
34.2
|
35.6
|
35.2
|
34.2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Gross official reserves (end of period)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Millions of U.S. dollars
|
15,823
|
10,344
|
4,969
|
5,610
|
5,890
|
7,199
|
8,422
|
10,003
|
10,770
|
|
|
Months of imports of goods and services
(less intra-
|
5.8
|
4.8
|
2.2
|
2.7
|
2.7
|
3.0
|
3.6
|
4.2
|
4.5
|
|
|
intraregional imports)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Percent of broad money
|
71.5
|
54.1
|
28.2
|
30.4
|
31.1
|
35.4
|
38.8
|
42.5
|
44.3
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Memorandum items:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nominal GDP (billions of CFA francs)
|
51,590
|
46,449
|
45,093
|
45,323
|
46,206
|
47,633
|
49,990
|
52,861
|
55,825
|
|
|
CFA francs per U.S. dollar, average
|
494
|
591
|
593
|
…
|
…
|
…
|
…
|
…
|
…
|
|
|
CFA francs per U.S. dollar, end-of-year
|
532
|
603
|
622
|
…
|
…
|
…
|
…
|
…
|
…
|
|
|
Oil production (thousands of barrels
per day)
|
902.2
|
941.1
|
879.0
|
854.0
|
828.4
|
884.5
|
889.7
|
881.6
|
827.7
|
|
|
Oil prices (US dollars per barrel)
|
96.2
|
50.8
|
42.8
|
55.0
|
50.3
|
50.2
|
50.5
|
51.1
|
51.9
|
|
|
Sources: Authorities' data; and IMF
staff estimates and projections.
|
|
|
1
Absent a common base year for all
countries, regional growth rates are
derived as weighted averages of
national growth rates (with weights
corresponding to the previous year
nominal GDPs, estimated in PPP terms
for total GDP and in non-PPP terms for
oil and non-oil GDP).
|
|
|
|
|
2
Using as weights the shares of member
countries in CEMAC's GDP in purchasing
power parity in US dollars.
|
|
|
3
Excluding grants and foreign-financed
investment and interest payments.
|
|
|
4
Refers to the projections published in
the IMF Report No 17/176.
|
|
[1]
Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds
bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. In the
context of these bilateral Article IV consultation discussion,
staff hold separate annual discussions with the regional
institutions responsible for common policies in four currency
unions – the Euro Area, the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, the
Central African Economic and Monetary Union, and the West African
Economic and Monetary Union. For each of the currency unions, staff
teams visit the regional institutions responsible for common
policies in the currency union, collects economic and financial
information, and discusses with officials the currency union’s
economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the
staff prepares a report, which forms the basis of discussion by the
Executive Board. Both staff’s discussions with the regional
institutions and the Board discussion of the annual staff report
will be considered an integral part of the Article IV consultation
with each member.
[2]
At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as
Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors,
and this summary is transmitted to the country's authorities. An
explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found
here:
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm
.