The Case for (and Against) Asset Management Companies in Banking Crises

Author/Editor:

Miguel A Otero Fernandez ; Jaime Ponce ; Marc C Dobler ; Tomoaki Hayashi

Publication Date:

July 9, 2024

Electronic Access:

Free Download. Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view this PDF file

Disclaimer: This Technical Guidance Note should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Note are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

Summary:

This technical note explores the advantages and disadvantages of establishing state-sponsored centralized asset management companies (AMCs) to address high levels of bank asset distress during financial crises. AMCs may offer potential benefits like mitigating downward price spirals or achieving efficiency gains by consolidating creditor claims and scarce expertise. However, significant risks and costs warrant careful consideration. These include extreme uncertainties in asset valuation and substantial operational and financial risks. Past international experiences highlight the dangers of underestimating these risks, potentially turning the AMC into a mechanism for deferring losses to taxpayers, rather than minimizing them, and ultimately increasing long-term public costs and moral hazard. This technical note emphasizes these trade-offs and discusses crucial design elements for effective AMCs: a clear mandate, transfer pricing that prudently reflects asset values and disposal costs, strong governance with independent management, and efficient operational processes promoting transparency and accountability.

Series:

Technical Notes and Manuals No. 2024/004

Subject:

Frequency:

occasional

English

Publication Date:

July 9, 2024

ISBN/ISSN:

9798400275517/2075-8669

Stock No:

TNMEA2024004

Format:

Paper

Pages:

74

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