Transcript

Transcript of Press Briefing: Middle East and Central Asia Department Regional Economic Outlook, October 2024

October 24, 2024

Participants:

• Jihad Azour, Director of Middle East and Central Asia Department, IMF
• Angham Al Shami, Communications Officer, IMF

MS. AL SHAMI: Good morning. Good afternoon to those of you in the region. Thank you for joining us to this press briefing on the Regional Economic Outlook for the Middle east and Central Asia. I'm Angham Al Shami from the Communications Department here at the IMF. If you're joining us online, we do have Arabic and French interpretations on the IMF Regional Economic Outlook page and IMF Press Center. So please join us there and we have interpretations also in the room. I'm joined here today by Jihad Azour, the Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department here at the IMF and he's going to give us an overview of the outlook for the region. Jihad over to you.

MR. AZOUR: Angham, thank you very much. Good morning everyone and welcome to the 2024 Annual Meetings. Before taking your questions, I will make few brief remarks to highlight three key messages regarding the economic outlook for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), as well as the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA). First, regarding the outlook, growth is set to strengthen in the near term in both MENA and the CCA regions. However, exposure to broader geoeconomic developments is adding to uncertainty. Hence, our 2025 forecasts come with important caveats.

Let me start with the Middle East and North Africa. This year has been challenging, with conflicts causing devastating human suffering and economic damage. Oil production cuts are contributing to sluggish growth in many economies, too. The recent escalation in Lebanon has increased uncertainty in the MENA region. The second important issue is on growth. For 2024, growth is projected at 2.1 percent, a downgrade revision of 0.6 percent from the April WEO forecast, and this is largely due to the impact of the conflict and the prolonged OPEC+ production cuts. To the extent that these gradually abate, we anticipate stronger growth of 4 percent in 2025. However, uncertainty about when these factors will ease is still very high.

MENA oil exporters are expected to see growth rise from 2.3 percent this year to 4 percent in 2025, contingent on the expiration of the voluntary oil production cuts. Growth in oil importers is projected to recover from 1.5 percent in 2024 to 3.9 percent in 2025, assuming conflicts ease. Let me now turn to the outlook for Caucasus and Central Asia. The CCA regions continue to show robust growth, which was revised up to 4.3 percent in 2024, with growth of 4.5 percent expected for next year. However, some economies are seeing tentative signs of slower trade and other inflows, especially on the remittance side. Subdued oil production is weighing on the medium-term growth prospect for CCA oil exporters. And for oil importers, growth projects depend on the reform implementation. The disinflation process is continuing and is continuing across both MENA and CCA region with headline inflation coming down significantly compared to the peak levels over the past two years. However, inflation remains elevated in few cases due to country specific challenges.

My second point is on the medium-term growth prospects. Medium-term growth prospects have faded over the past two decades and are now relatively weak in many economies. Changing these dynamics requires steady reform implementation. Priorities are for the MENA and CCA regions include governance improvement, job creation, especially for women and youth, investment promotion and financial development. Achieving stronger and more resilient growth will not only foster job creation and greater inclusion, but will also help reduce elevated debt levels and enable progress toward the development of social spending goals.

My third point is on the uncertainty. High uncertainty means that the economic outlook is fraught with risks. The recent intensification of conflict in Lebanon has increased uncertainty and risks to a further level, and the risk of further escalation in the MENA region is the main issue here in terms of increase in risks. This fluid situation is not yet factored in our analysis, and downside risks could be material depending on the extent of the escalation. We are closely monitoring the situation and assessing the potential economic impacts. Overall, the impact will depend on the severity of any potential escalation. The conflict could impact the region through multiple channels. Beyond the impact on output, other key channels of transmissions could include tourism, trade, potential refugee and migration flows, oil and gas market volatility, financial markets and social unrest.

Concern is also high about the possibility of prolonged conflict in Sudan, increased geoeconomic fragmentation, volatility in commodity prices, especially for the oil exporting countries, high debt and financing needs for emerging markets and recurrent climate shocks. In the CCA, risks are primarily associated with potential financial instability resulting from sudden shift in trade and financial flows, and for both regions, failure to implement sufficient reform could constrain already muted prospects for medium term growth.

Before opening the floor to your questions, let me emphasize the Fund's commitment to supporting economies across the region. Our engagement remains strong in terms of financing and presence. Since early 2020, the Fund has approved $47.7 billion in financing to countries across MENA and CCA and we have carried out capacity development projects for 31 countries only in the last fiscal years. Thank you very much for being here today and I'm now happy to take your questions.

MS. AL SHAMI: So, we'll now turn to your questions. If you're on Webex, please turn on your camera and raise your hand and we will call on you. And if you're in the room, please raise your hand. So let's start with maybe the middle right here, the gentleman.

QUESTIONER: Hello and good morning, Jihad. I wanted to bring you back to your comments about the risks of an escalation in the region. Obviously, the human toll of this would be horrific, but in terms of the impact on the economies in the region, particularly Egypt, which is already suffering from an extreme loss of revenues from the Suez Canal, and then Lebanon, which you've had discussions with in the past, those really never went anywhere because of lack of commitment to do reforms. What are the prospects of having to either redo some of the programs or create new ones if there's an escalation? Thank you.

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you, Dave. Maybe we'll take another question on the conflict. Kyle, second row here.

QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. Thank you for taking my question. Earlier this morning, the Managing Director said the outlook for the MENA is significantly downgraded and she cited mostly the geopolitical conflict. So could you walk us through, like, where exactly the economic impact has been felt since the April release?

MS. AL SHAMI: Maybe we'll take those two questions, Jihad, on the conflict.

AZOUR: Thank you very much. Well, first of all, the conflict is inflicting heavy human toll, and our hearts goes to all the victims and those who were, in their life and livelihoods were affected by the escalation of the conflict. Of course, the impact of the conflict is to be differentiated between countries who are at the epicenter. The group of countries who are severely affected by the conflict, Gaza, West Bank, the whole Palestinian economy has been severely affected. Lebanon also. And the Lebanese economy was severely affected, with more than 1.2 million people displaced, which represent almost 25 percent of the population, destruction of livelihoods in a broad region that is mainly agriculture, and the impact on some key sectors like tourism and trade. Therefore, the severely affected countries are seeing a large drop in their economic activity, and they will face contraction in their economies in the context of high inflation.

The second group I would call the group of partially affected countries. And here we have countries like Jordan, Syria and Egypt. And you have mentioned Egypt. The main channel of impact on Egypt is trade. The reduction in trade volume going through the Suez Canal has affected revenues by more than 60 to 70 percent on average for the Suez Canal, which would represent between 4 and a half to , $5 billion of loss in revenues. For Jordan, the impact is mainly on tourism, which is not the case for Egypt. Those are the two main countries affected. Syria of course, is affected, but we have very little information on that. This second group of partially affected countries, authorities have already started to take actions to protect their economies against that. And we have the indirectly affected countries. And here we have to look at the channels of transmission. Trade is one. The other one is the impact on tourism. The impact on oil and gas has been relatively muted so far, except high volatility in the short term. We did not see a major impact on the oil and gas sector yet. I think one has to recognize that it's a highly uncertain moment and therefore things are changing constantly and we are ourselves updating regularly our assessment of the situation. Our numbers, for example, for the outlook do not report the latest development in the last months or so and therefore we will be updating our numbers. This high level of uncertainty is affecting countries with vulnerabilities. And this is where the Fund is in fact acting in providing support to countries in order to help them go through these severe shocks.

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. We'll go for another round of questions. Maybe we'll go to the first gentleman in the first row, please.

QUESTIONER: Many Arab countries have taken on significant debt to fund infrastructure and economic reforms. What the strategies does the IMF recommend for managing the tracing debt levels, particularly for non-oil economies and taking into consideration what's happening in the region with all the conflicts.

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. We have another question that we received that's also on debt. What are the projections of the Fund concerning the region's debt levels amid the ongoing regional tensions?

MR. AZOUR: Thank you for your questions. Well, of course the high level of debt has been one of the main issues that several economies in the region, especially the middle income and the emerging economies of the region are facing. And here I would address the issue in three levels. The level of debt that constitute a major macroeconomic stability issue. And we recommend countries to address this by having an inclusive but sustained fiscal consolidations in order to reduce the risk level, in order to strengthen their capacity to raise revenues and reduce the overall macroeconomic risk. And when the Fund is asked, the Fund is providing support to many countries on that front.

The second dimension is the financing dimension. The overall financing need for this year are going to be around $286 billion, almost $6 billion higher for the whole region in terms of financing need. Compared to last year, this include not only, I would say all importing middle income countries, but the whole region and therefore securing enough financing is another issue. And the third one that is becoming a challenging issue that requires a combination of measures is the cost of debt service. The cost of debt service because of the increase in interest rate has become one of the main, I would say, fiscal issue that countries are facing.

The last point, I would add, is the fact that recently we were witnessing a greater reliance on local markets when it comes to financing the local debt. Therefore, the nexus between the governor, the government and the market and the local market has increased. And this is why it's important to have a clear medium term reform agenda in order to reduce the weight of the debt, to improve fiscal space, but also to provide more comfort to investors to broaden the finance space.

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. We'll turn now to the online questions, and we have Fatima Ibrahim. Fatima, if you're online, you can come in. Okay. Otherwise we'll take some questions from the floor. We'll start maybe with the gentleman in the middle. Yeah.

QUESTIONER: Good morning, this is Adil from Daily Business Recorder, Pakistan. Thank you for taking my question. So the World Economic Outlook projects Pakistan's growth rate at a higher rate compared to last year, 3.2 percent. The modest growth of 2.4 percent last year was predominantly driven by the agriculture sector, which had its best performance in the last two decades, right. The services sector also benefited from agriculture success while the manufacturing was negative. The agriculture sector faces significant downside risks this time. While manufacturing is also highly constrained by high energy tariffs and weak demand locally. Do you think a higher growth rate can be achieved without fiscal expansion the way Pakistan has primed the pump in the past after securing an IMF program? Or do you think it can happen sustainably? Thank you.

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. Any other questions on Pakistan before we -- any other questions on Pakistan? Okay.

MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much. Yes, the projections are showing that the Pakistani economy will grow at 2.4 percent this year compared to minus 0.2 percent last year and expected for next year to grow at 3.2 percent. This constitutes an improvement at a time where we are seeing also inflation going down from 29 percent last year to 12.6 percent this year and we expect inflation to go down to 10.6 percent next year.

Of course, the reform package that the government of Pakistan has put together has several objectives. One is to achieve fiscal sustainability by addressing some of the long awaited fiscal issues, especially on increasing the share of revenues in order to reduce the deficit, but also to improve the quality of the revenues by addressing some of the issues that existed in terms of tax collection and also in terms of special regimes. Reforming the SOEs is also an important priority that will increase the capacity of Pakistan to provide a greater space for the private sector, level the playing field and increase FDIs by doing so. This will allow the Pakistani economy to be more export driven and also to be ready to attract additional investment.

The monetary policy is also helping by tackling the issue of inflation and also by reducing any construction constraints on capital flows as well as also on the exchange transfers which also with the broad context of reforms will allow additional predictability and will reduce the risks or the constraints on the current account. Therefore, the package of reform that has been set has not only the ambition to strengthen stability in terms of macroeconomic stability and reduced financing risks, but also has the ambition to reform some of the key sectors including the energy and the SOEs, improve the business environment, attract more FDRs and allow the economy to be more export driven which will unleash the potential of the Pakistani economy without having an impact on the current account.

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you Jihad. We'll turn now online. I'm going to read your questions because I have them here. Two questions on Egypt. Question is regarding negotiations that Egypt will start with the IMF regarding the timing of implementing the economic reforms. Does the IMF see that any of these can be delayed? And the second point how does the IMF see the situation of the Egyptian economy in light of the recent developments? And have you tested that during your projections regarding growth and energy prices?

If those that want to ask on Egypt we'll start here -- many hands. Yes, the gentleman here.

QUESTIONER: I will speak in Arabic. It's a technical point, Mr. Jihad. I wanted to ask you about the policies of the Fund that they aim at improving the living standards of the citizens and to reach the most vulnerable population. And during the negotiations, some of those negotiations they contradict with these principles I mean increasing the price of energy. I mean again for floating the price of the pound and adjustment of some prices of the commodities such as power. And this is part of the reform program. Does this apply to the current situation in Egypt in general? Whether I speak about improving the standards of living especially as these put more pressures on the vulnerable population.

MS. AL SHAMI: Please any other questions? We'll take the gentleman please be brief so we can take other questions.

QUESTIONER: My question like Mrs. Georgieva said today that she's going to visit Egypt in like within 10 days for like discussing the maybe reassessment in the program and that came in context with President he said that the economic situation it might lead Egypt to like rethinking about the reform program with the IMF. Can you highlight in which points might like Mrs. Georgieva is going to discuss? Are you going to change the program? Are you going to change your condition for reforming program or it's just going to be trying to convince Egyptian regime that the reform program that you have already agreed is going as usual and as you see like this came in contact with my colleague from Egypt about suffering of increasing price for gas and many other goods and stuff in Egypt. So like what's going on exactly in this meeting between Ms. Georgieva and President Sisi Thank you.

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. We'll take one last question on Egypt and then we'll move on the second, third row please.

QUESTIONER: My question is, is there any possibility of increasing the size of Egypt's long given the widening of the conflict in the Middle east in recent weeks? Thank you.

MS. AL SHAMI: We'll turn to you Jihad.

MR. AZOUR: Okay. In fact there are three levels of the different questions. One is on the economic situation in Egypt. The second is on the program and the relationship between the Fund and Egypt and also on some of the specific measures. Well, first of all, and I will answer part in Arabic and part in English for the question that came from the online audience. Like other countries in the region, Egypt has been subjected to the impact of the increase in tension due to the conflict. I mentioned earlier, Egypt is a country that is partially affected and mainly the impact was on the revenues from the Suez Canal. Luckily, the impact on tourism was almost muted. We did not see any drop for a sector that employs a large part of the population. Therefore, there are two levels of impact. The direct impact of the conflict and the high level of uncertainty that affects Egypt as much as affect other countries in the region, especially in terms of attracting direct investment and attracting inflows.

On the other side, there are certain number of internal issues that the authorities are dealing with. The high level of inflation is one. Inflation has reached last year35 percent and it's important if we want to preserve the purchasing power of the people, especially the low- and middle-income people, is to address inflation. The best way to protect the livelihood of people is by reducing the level of price increase. Therefore, the first pillar of the program was to strengthen stability and also protect the economy from external shocks. This economy has been subjected to external shocks over the last four years Covid and then the war in Ukraine and then the recent conflict in the region. And this is where the importance, for example of the flexibility of the exchange rate. The flexibility of the exchange rate will reduce the impact of external shocks that could destabilize the local economy, would give more predictability in terms of capital flows and will reduce the risk of using other type of measures that would have an impact on economic activity.

Therefore, it's very important to preserve it because it's the best way to reduce the impact of external shocks on the local economy. Of course, it has to go hand in hand with monetary policy that works on addressing inflation. Inflation is going down and I think this is a positive news. We expect it next year to reach 16 percent. Of course, there are some short term hikes when some of the measures are introduced, but those are usually short lived impact. Therefore, monetary policy is also a priority in order to reduce the macro instability, but also reduce the pressure on the low middle income people. Three is we need to create growth. Also, we're happy to see that the growth prospects for next year are improving 4 percent for the fiscal year 2025. But I think we can do more. How to do more is by allowing the private sector to be investing, creating jobs. And the best way to do it is for the state to give more space to the private sector and also for the state to be, I would say allowing them the competition to take place. And this requires to accelerate some of the reforms of the SOEs, including increasing the private sector share in those investments.

The program has been built based on those objectives and when shocks occurred, the Fund responded very quickly. We have increased the size of the program from $3 billion to $8 billion in the last review that took place in April. Taking into consideration that Egypt has been subjected to the shock of the conflict. The other also positive element that FDIs have increased with 35, 34 billion dollars of investment from UAE. I think this provided additional needed investment and also needed inflow. And we hope that this investment will be one of the elements that will bring growth to Egypt. Therefore, in terms of inflows Egypt has been receiving, in addition to what the Fund has provided, what the UAE has provided also additional financing from bilateral and multilateral institutions. The World Bank, the EU have increased their financing to Egypt and therefore, going back to the question, should we revisit the size of the program? I think the macroeconomic conditions today are showing that the program as it's designed and its finance is still appropriate.

On the question of some of the specific. The impact of some of the specific measures here, I think we have to differentiate between two dimensions. There are certain measures who have impact and those need to be countered by some other measures, especially on the social front. And we are happy to see that the various programs that exist, Takaful and Karama and other programs are activated in order to address some of these issues. Whenever you introduce those kind of fiscal measures, you need to protect the most vulnerable. You need to allow the mostly affected and those who have limited capacity to be protected. And therefore, when you do so, it allows you to create fiscal buffers, especially on the revenue side, to make it fairer and more effective i.e.not to have all the tax burden on the low income or middle-income people through consumption tax to increase the progressivity in the tax system, but also on the other hand, to provide more on the social protection level the program has in it.And the Fund team is working with authorities on the way to make sure that what is in the program is sufficient enough and what needs to be done to improve the outreach of the social program. And during the visit of the MD, this will be one of the priority issues that the MD will raise and will discuss is how effective the social protection programs are. Therefore, I think whenever you have to address imbalances that have been there for some time, there are some consolidation. But you want to make sure that this consolidation is growth friendly, is inclusive and also it provides sustainable economic transformation.

This is how the program has been designed. It has been designed to live in a shock prone world. It has been designed in order to allow the economy to be more geared toward growth that is driven by export and create more opportunities. Of course the uncertainty in the region is high. We take this into consideration and earlier I mentioned that we are constantly looking at the impact. We're looking also at the potential escalations and what does it mean for our countries.

But again, I think it's important in the case of Egypt as well as also in Jordan. Those programs provide an anchor of stability at a time of uncertainty. I think there is a great value of those programs. We saw it in Jordan with the upgrade of Jordan in terms of rating. Those programs provide an anchor of stability, and I think what the region needs today is stability. And this is on that premise that we are engaging with countries in the region, and we are in fact we're ready to engage and to provide more support.

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. Let's turn to the room. Maybe we'll go to the gentleman in the back. Yes, right here. Thank you.

QUESTIONER: He will ask the question in Arabic. In light of the environment in the GCC region, what are your projections for growth and specifically the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, your projections for growth?

MR. AZOUR: No doubt, no doubt that the GCC countries have managed over the past years to adapt to a large number of shocks and challenges that are being witnessed in the region and the whole world. Starting from COVID pandemic and oil shocks. And oil countries and GCC countries have maintained a certain level of growth despite the fact that there was the OPEC+ and its agreements.

For 2024, our projections are better than 2023. The growth is about 1.2 percent in 2024 and will improve in 2025 to reach 4.2 percent in 25. And this is very important if we put this in the framework of the fact that the main driving force behind the growth in the GCC countries is the development of non-oil economy. And this is a very important element. The development of non-oil economy was a main leverage for growth and the Gulf countries maintained a good level of growth ranging between 3 to 4 percent for non-oil growth under our investments that are aimed to develop other economic sectors in the future such as renewable energy as well as technology which contribute to increasing the capacity of these countries to increase the revenue, to diversify the sources of revenue for the economy and to adapt to the economic changes all over the world.

With regard to economy of Saudi Arabia, we expect that this year the growth will be 1.5 percent which is an improvement as compared to growth last year which was minus 0.2 percent. And for next year it will be 4.6 percent for Saudi Arabia. What has contributed to this in the first place? The economic development, non-oil economy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and also the production which has been improving and also the unwinding of the OPEC agreement. And again the question.

MS. AL SHAMI: If not, we'll turn to the room. Maybe the -- yes. . Yes, we can hear you now.

QUESTIONER: Good evening. Thank you and good evening. Mr. Jihad, I would like to ask in Arabic my question. What made the IMF expect that the growth will be 2.9 percent for Jordan next year compared to 2.5 percent this year. In light of the continuing war in the Middle East. This is first. Second question. The IMF in its last review has said that the revenue of Jordan have decreased, whereas other estimates would say that the revenue have increased. How would you interpret these different estimates or different numbers? And what can Jordan do to increase its revenues? Thank you,Also a few questions.

MS. AL SHAMI: Please be brief. Thank you.

QUESTIONER: Hello, can you hear me well?

MS. AL SHAMI: Yes, we can hear you.

QUESTIONER: Thank you for this opportunity. First of all, to ask my questions. I would like to ask you about the upcoming COP 29 conference which is scheduled to be held in Azerbaijan very soon. And what are specific initiatives that the IMF plans to support during the conference to promote sustainable development?

MS. AL SHAMI: We lost -- okay, I think we can't hear you, but we'll come back. Maybe we'll take one in the room. Yes, please.

QUESTIONER: I'm from Kazakhstan. So my question is, how do you evaluate the effect of the war in Ukraine on the economies of Central Asian region, specifically my country, Kazakhstan? Because we're located too close to Russia and my country has the same border with it, and we are tied economically.

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. So that was a question on Kazakhstan and we had an earlier question, Azerbaijan. You want to have one final question before we turn to you, Jihad.

QUESTIONER: I have a question about the main obstacles to foreign investment in Saudi Arabia and what the authorities can do in order to improve that. Thank you.

MR. AZOUR: Thank you. The first question I think is about the economic impact in Jordan of the war. Of course, the Jordanian economy is close to the hot area. Jordan was affected in tourism, as I said before. And this impact on tourism also affected the economy in Jordan. Also trade and the Aqaba port. The impact continues, but no doubt the uncertainty and the fluidity is very high. However, last year and this year Jordan managed to maintain economic stability and to achieve an acceptable growth rate, 2.3. This year we expect it to improve to 2.5 percent if the situation continues as it is and there was no more escalation in the region. We attribute this to the measures taken by the government in the previous years in order to improve the performance of the economy and to achieve stabilization.

The Jordanian economy proved to be resilient despite the tensions. The additional good factor is that inflation is low. And the Central bank of Jordan managed to keep low inflation at 1.8 percent this year, which contributes to the easing of monetary policy. With regard to the point about the revenues, the amount of revenues, I'll go back to you when I talk with the team. But what I want to say is that in the past few years Jordan achieved successes in raising revenues which contributed to lower deficits and better stability, which enabled Jordan to secure the main financial needs and to keep stability and to increase investments and financial flows. And we've seen this improvement at the beginning of this year in the form of the higher rating agencies rating for Jordan.

The COP 29 the COP 29 the Fund has been an important partner to Azerbaijan for the preparation of the COP 29. As you know, last year and before, the Fund has been extremely involved and the Fund has scaled up its support to members on the climate side by providing programs to help countries accelerate their transformation and finance long term climate priorities. The Fund is also mainstreaming the climate issues in the surveillance and is providing a wealth of knowledge on the priorities, including for the Caucasus and Central Asia region where the Fund has recently produced a series of analytical pieces about the importance of adaptation for the region as well as also how to tackle the issue of mitigation and climate finance. And I would encourage you and others to look at those. Those are important pieces that will be featured during the COP 29. Of course, we had recently during this week meetings with the authorities and the Fund is looking forward to maintain its active partnership with the authorities and play an important role in COP 29.

The last question was impact of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on CCA countries and in particular on Kazakhstan. Of course, let me say a few words on that. Countries in the CCA in general have been able over the last four years and specifically over the last two years to protect their economies from the negative impact of the war in Ukraine and at the same time they were able to address the other risk that was coming from the increase in inflation or inflationary pressure. When it comes to Kazakhstan, we project growth this year to be at 3.5 percent and we expect it to improve next year and reach 4.6 percent. Of course, part of it is also due to the new investments in energy and in the new the new oil and gas fields, but also to the good performance of the non-oil sector.

Clearly here also the level of uncertainty is high, and we recommend countries to maintain on one hand their reform drive to preserve macroeconomic stability and on the other hand to accelerate structural reforms to regain levels of growth that would be needed in order to allow economic convergence between Central Asia and Caucasus countries with their peers to this gap to widen. And this afternoon we will. Sorry. Tomorrow we will have a special session on the medium-term growth priorities, including the structural reforms. And we will tackle some of the priorities for Kazakhstan as well as also other Central Asian countries.

The last question is obstacles to investment in Saudi Arabia. This is the last question. You want it in Arabic or English? In Arabic. If we look at the past few years under Vision 2030, you will see that there are some reforms that have contributed primarily to the improvement of the investment climate and to increase the growth rate outside of the government scope. There was lower unemployment, especially among the youth, and also an increase in the participation of women. And this has improved things despite all the volatilities and all the oil production cuts. These reforms and investment projects that were adopted improve the size of the economy and make it more able to attract investments in the oil sector and also other like entertainment and technology.

In the past year there was a revisiting of the priorities, and the priority was more priority was given to technology, AI, climate. All of this opens the door for more direct investment from abroad as in Saudi Arabia, also in the region. Direct investment in the past 10 years was not as aspired. There are internal reasons and also regional reasons because of the volatility and also because the global economic development reduced direct investments in the region.

MS. AL SHAMI: Today's briefing. Thank you very much all for joining us today. Jihad, any final words on the launch?

MR. AZOUR: One, I would like to thank you very much again, I would like to ask you to remain tuned. I mentioned in my opening that the volatility of the situation requires from us and the high level of uncertainty to keep ourselves updated and to keep updating you. This afternoon we will. Sorry. Tomorrow afternoon we will have an interesting session that looks into not the short-term where the level of uncertainty is extremely high, but the medium-term. What are the priorities in terms of growth? What are the priorities also in terms of investment? We will launch officially with the details with the tables the outlook in Dubai next week. It will be on October 31st and then immediately also we will launch the outlook for Caucuses and Central Asia.

Tomorrow at 3pm I would like to invite you all for an interesting session where we are going to discuss one of our key analytical chapters that has to focus on medium term growth. With that, thank you very much. I'm sure there are follow up questions. Myself and the team who is here will be ready to provide you with additional answers to your questions.

MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you all. Thank you very much.