

# Institutional Models for Financial Regulation

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#### Outline



International Best Practices with Pros and Cons


**Building Blocks & Designs** 

Impact of Global Crisis

A preferred model?

#### **Design options**






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
#### **United Kingdom**





### Growth of integrated supervisory authorities





#### **Clarity of Mandates**





Ensure clarity

Address tensions and conflicts

### Case for a single national financial services authority




- Market developments blur the financial boundaries
- Economies of scope and scale
- Clear and coherent objectives
- Accountability

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#### Integrated model - ideal vs reality?





#### Central Bank as a supervisor



Independence – institutionally often stronger

Monetary Policy – proximity to supervision


Knowledge of the market

Financial stability perspective


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#### **Financial Crisis**









### Crisis Coordination










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### Considerations for a post crisis architecture





#### Macro-Micro Cohabitation Prudential tensions



Contribution of Risk from the Firm

Risk to the Firm

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#### Cohabitation - Scope



#### Highly concentrated systems


When the firm is the system

#### Individual instruments

 When the instrument deals with aspects of idiosyncratic and systemic risk

#### Cohabitation- assignment





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
### Architectural issues for macroprudential mandate



- Single body or diffuse responsibilities
- · Central Bank
- Ministry of Finance
- Microprudential supervisors

### Mandates for financial system stability must be allocated clearly





### What institutional models have developed









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#### Ability to Act





#### Institutional Planning



Powers

Coordination Framework

Data

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### Why change the model: Trigger event, Opportunity, Need?



Reputation – Financial Crisis

Synergy and flexibility - Conglomerates

Market developments – funding model

## Why change the model: Ancillary reasons





**Accountability** 

Professional staff

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
#### Transitional issues -Legislative basis





### Transitional issues - Change management





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
#### **Effective Supervisory Function needs:**






### Supervisory Prerequisites – are not dependent on structure





#### Vary the recipe but not the ingredients






#### Conclusions



Complementary objectives



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