

Impact Evaluation of Infrastructure: Case Studies of Japan and the Philippines

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IMF-Japan High-Level Tax Conference

Tokyo, Japan, 7 April 2015

Outline

- 1, Micro data-based Evaluation of the effect of Infrastructure – Philippine case**
- 2, Tax revenues and Non-tax Revenues**
- 3, Business Tax, Property Tax**
- 4, Affected region vs non-affected region**
- 5, Macroeconomic effect of infrastructure**
- 6, Community based infrastructure**
Hometown Investment Trust Funds

Micro Case Study - Philippine micro data

Objectives:

- 1, Evaluation of **the ‘highway effect’ on tax and non-tax revenues** using as case study the Southern Tagalog Arterial Road (STAR) in Batangas Province, Philippines
- 2, Evaluation is carried out using a quasi-experimental approach via **a difference-in-difference (DiD) analysis**

Affected or treatment group (D = 1)

Affected group:

Lipa City,
Ibaan and
Batangas City



Unaffected or Control groups ($D = 0$)

Control group (1):

San Jose
San Pascual
Padre Garcia
Rosario
Taysan



Control group (2):

Cuenca
Alitagtag
Bauan
Lobo
San Juan



Control group (3):

Agoncillo
Lemery
San Nicolas
Taal
San Luis
Mabini



Control group (4):

Nasugbu
Lian
Tuy
Balayan
Calaca
Calatagan




Method: Difference-in-Difference (DiD) Analysis

$$\text{Outcome} = \alpha + \beta_0 D + \sum_{t=4}^{t-2} \beta_1 D \times T + \varepsilon$$


where: $D = 1$ (Affected or treatment group)

$D = 0$ (Unaffected or control group)


$T = \text{Affected period}$



Property tax data



Business tax data



Tax variables and Non-tax variables

- We employ data on **property tax revenues, business tax revenues, regulatory fees and user charges** of the cities and municipalities comprising Batangas Province, Philippines.
- The tax and non-tax revenues data were obtained from the Philippine Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF)

Difference-in-Difference Regression: Control Group 1

	(1) Property tax	(2) Property tax	(3) Business tax	(4) Business tax	(5) Regulatory fees	(6) Regulatory fees	(7) User charge	(8) User charge
Impact D	1.370 (1.473)	1.466 (1.478)	0.819 (0.869)	0.776 (0.885)	0.932 (0.763)	0.929 (0.779)	0.513 (1.012)	0.612 (1.125)
Impact D × Period _{t-2}	0.210** (0.099)	0.095 (0.100)	1.570*** (0.502)	1.616** (0.626)	0.186 (0.121)	0.162 (0.118)	0.651*** (0.132)	0.453*** (0.105)
Impact D × Period _{t-1}	0.210** (0.096)	0.254** (0.104)	1.689*** (0.517)	1.978*** (0.585)	0.507** (0.225)	0.610*** (0.191)	0.502*** (0.151)	0.330 (0.277)
Impact D × Period _{t0}	0.342*** (0.125)	0.293** (0.126)	1.849*** (0.519)	1.995*** (0.616)	0.609** (0.292)	0.637** (0.253)	0.740*** (0.175)	0.553 (0.292)
Impact D × Period _{t+1}	0.373*** (0.128)	0.060 (0.161)	1.799*** (0.536)	1.541** (0.803)	0.774* (0.475)	0.591 (0.458)	0.836*** (0.289)	0.604 (0.470)
Impact D × Period _{t+2}	0.471** (0.203)	0.183 (0.210)	1.739*** (0.589)	1.520* (0.831)	0.949** (0.430)	0.786* (0.412)	0.803*** (0.267)	0.576 (0.442)
Impact D × Period _{t+3}	0.376*** (0.123)	0.136 (0.144)	1.968*** (0.479)	1.821** (0.692)	1.162*** (0.290)	1.037*** (0.282)	1.023*** (0.275)	0.804* (0.424)
Impact D × Period _{t+4,} forward	1.247*** (0.344)	0.939*** (0.348)	2.610*** (0.280)	2.360*** (0.556)	1.548*** (0.231)	1.369*** (0.272)	1.321*** (0.456)	1.090* (0.603)
Construction		0.709** (0.278)		1.085 (0.920)		0.567 (0.399)		0.118 (0.580)
Constant	16.18*** (0.504)	10.34*** (2.45)	15.25*** (0.516)	6.290 (8.038)	14.84*** (0.272)	10.19*** (3.13)	14.26*** (0.265)	13.39*** (4.85)
N	98	90	98	90	98	90	97	90
R ²	0.24	0.25	0.36	0.37	0.42	0.42	0.20	0.21

Clustered standard errors, corrected for small number of clusters; * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%.

Difference-in-Difference Regression: Control Group 2

	(1) Property tax	(2) Property tax	(3) Business tax	(4) Business tax	(5) Regulatory fees	(6) Regulatory fees	(7) User charge	(8) User charge
Impact D	2.283 (1.479)	2.383 (1.486)	1.221 (0.947)	1.078 (0.889)	1.414 (0.843)	1.508* (0.863)	0.775 (1.207)	1.084 (1.30)
Impact D × Period _{t-2}	0.210** (0.099)	0.109 (0.095)	1.570*** (0.501)	1.686*** (0.614)	0.186 (0.121)	0.101 (0.111)	0.651*** (0.132)	0.319*** (0.076)
Impact D × Period _{t-1}	0.210** (0.095)	0.248** (0.102)	1.689*** (0.516)	1.930*** (0.580)	0.507** (0.225)	0.652*** (0.188)	0.502*** (0.151)	0.422 (0.272)
Impact D × Period _{t0}	0.342*** (0.125)	0.297** (0.126)	1.849*** (0.518)	2.017*** (0.614)	0.609** (0.292)	0.619** (0.252)	0.740*** (0.175)	0.513 (0.291)
Impact D × Period _{t+1}	0.373*** (0.128)	0.101 (0.129)	1.799*** (0.535)	1.760** (0.722)	0.774* (0.475)	0.404 (0.440)	0.836*** (0.289)	0.191 (0.411)
Impact D × Period _{t+2}	0.471** (0.203)	0.221 (0.191)	1.739*** (0.589)	1.720** (0.766)	0.949** (0.430)	0.615 (0.396)	0.803*** (0.267)	0.199 (0.390)
Impact D × Period _{t+3}	0.376*** (0.123)	0.168 (0.125)	1.968*** (0.478)	1.986*** (0.638)	1.162*** (0.289)	0.896*** (0.266)	1.023*** (0.274)	0.493 (0.388)
Impact D × Period _{t+4,} forward	1.247*** (0.343)	0.980*** (0.334)	2.610*** (0.279)	2.575*** (0.445)	1.548*** (0.230)	1.185*** (0.246)	1.321*** (0.455)	0.683 (0.572)
Construction		0.608** (0.145)		0.554 (0.409)		1.021*** (0.258)		1.120*** (0.192)
Constant	15.27*** (0.529)	10.25*** (1.380)	14.85*** (0.640)	10.30*** (3.596)	14.36*** (0.450)	5.92*** (1.952)	14.00*** (0.712)	4.78** (1.89)
N	102	94	102	94	100	94	100	94
R ²	0.41	0.42	0.44	0.45	0.46	0.47	0.18	0.21

Clustered standard errors, corrected for small number of clusters; * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%.

Difference-in-Difference Regression: Control Group 3

	(1) Property tax	(2) Property tax	(3) Business tax	(4) Business tax	(5) Regulatory fees	(6) Regulatory fees	(7) User charge	(8) User charge
Impact D	2.883** (1.424)	2.941** (1.425)	1.608* (0.850)	1.528* (0.787)	1.824** (0.765)	1.947** (0.805)	1.517 (1.025)	1.879* (1.148)
Impact D × Period _{t-2}	0.210** (0.097)	0.118 (0.095)	1.570*** (0.489)	1.634*** (0.591)	0.186 (0.118)	0.058 (0.117)	0.651*** (0.130)	0.290*** (0.082)
Impact D × Period _{t-1}	0.210** (0.093)	0.238** (0.098)	1.689*** (0.504)	1.966*** (0.571)	0.507** (0.219)	0.681*** (0.185)	0.502*** (0.148)	0.442* (0.266)
Impact D × Period _{t0}	0.342*** (0.122)	0.30** (0.123)	1.849*** (0.507)	2.0*** (0.596)	0.609** (0.285)	0.606** (0.246)	0.740*** (0.171)	0.504* (0.283)
Impact D × Period _{t+1}	0.373*** (0.125)	0.131 (0.135)	1.799*** (0.523)	1.597** (0.684)	0.774* (0.463)	0.271 (0.449)	0.836*** (0.282)	0.099 (0.409)
Impact D × Period _{t+2}	0.471** (0.198)	0.248 (0.195)	1.739*** (0.575)	1.571** (0.728)	0.949** (0.419)	0.495 (0.404)	0.803*** (0.260)	0.115 (0.387)
Impact D × Period _{t+3}	0.376*** (0.120)	0.190 (0.128)	1.968*** (0.468)	1.864*** (0.607)	1.162*** (0.283)	0.797*** (0.280)	1.023*** (0.268)	0.424 (0.385)
Impact D × Period _{t+4,} forward	1.247*** (0.336)	1.009*** (0.331)	2.610*** (0.273)	2.415*** (0.412)	1.548*** (0.225)	1.055*** (0.277)	1.321*** (0.445)	0.593 (0.569)
Construction		0.537** (0.167)		0.949** (0.387)		1.342*** (0.388)		1.342*** (0.260)
Constant	14.67*** (0.451)	10.27*** (1.359)	14.46*** (0.505)	6.64** (3.378)	13.95*** (0.317)	2.88 (3.416)	13.26*** (0.376)	2.18 (2.30)
N	128	118	128	118	128	118	125	118
R ²	0.50	0.50	0.47	0.48	0.54	0.57	0.39	0.42

Clustered standard errors, corrected for small number of clusters; * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%.

Difference-in-Difference Regression: Control Group 4

	(1) Property tax	(2) Property tax	(3) Business tax	(4) Business tax	(5) Regulatory fees	(6) Regulatory fees	(7) User charge	(8) User charge
Impact D	1.252 (1.434)	1.491 (1.326)	0.889 (0.865)	0.896 (0.765)	1.326* (0.727)	1.353** (0.692)	1.351 (0.985)	1.789* (0.992)
Impact D × Period _{t-2}	0.210** (0.098)	0.061 (0.092)	1.570*** (0.495)	1.593** (0.625)	0.186 (0.120)	0.210 (0.137)	0.651*** (0.130)	0.397*** (0.144)
Impact D × Period _{t-1}	0.210** (0.094)	0.201*** (0.069)	1.689*** (0.509)	1.775*** (0.607)	0.507** (0.222)	0.610*** (0.191)	0.502*** (0.149)	0.474** (0.194)
Impact D × Period _{t0}	0.342*** (0.124)	0.052** (0.155)	1.849*** (0.512)	1.808*** (0.651)	0.609** (0.288)	0.554** (0.223)	0.740*** (0.172)	0.260 (0.233)
Impact D × Period _{t+1}	0.373*** (0.126)	-0.230 (0.203)	1.799*** (0.528)	1.617** (0.777)	0.774* (0.468)	0.543 (0.481)	0.836*** (0.285)	-0.150 (0.401)
Impact D × Period _{t+2}	0.471** (0.200)	-0.071 (0.171)	1.739*** (0.581)	1.584** (0.807)	0.949** (0.424)	0.752* (0.447)	0.803*** (0.263)	-0.084 (0.383)
Impact D × Period _{t+3}	0.376*** (0.121)	-0.129 (0.164)	1.968*** (0.472)	1.829*** (0.688)	1.162*** (0.286)	0.985*** (0.240)	1.023*** (0.271)	0.193 (0.343)
Impact D × Period _{t+4,} forward	1.247*** (0.339)	0.595 (0.386)	2.610*** (0.276)	2.354*** (0.776)	1.548*** (0.227)	1.258*** (0.107)	1.321*** (0.449)	0.266 (0.425)
Construction		1.327** (0.497)		0.60 (0.619)		0.745*** (0.270)		2.137*** (0.641)
Constant	16.30*** (0.440)	5.359 (3.959)	15.18*** (0.521)	10.24** (4.911)	14.45*** (0.184)	8.308*** (2.239)	13.43*** (0.206)	-4.235 (5.14)
N	114	104	114	104	114	104	111	103
R ²	0.21	0.23	0.37	0.36	0.56	0.55	0.36	0.44

Clustered standard errors, corrected for small number of clusters; * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 13

Affected and Unaffected group - Spillover effect (outside of the province)

AFFECTED
group:

Lipa City,
Ibaan and
Batangas City

Unaffected:
*(municipalities
belonging to
neighboring
Quezon
province)*

Candelaria
Dolores
San Antonio
Tiaong



Difference-in-Difference Regression: Spillover

	(1) Property tax	(2) Property tax	(3) Business tax	(4) Business tax	(5) Regulatory fees	(6) Regulatory fees	(7) User charge	(8) User charge
Impact D	1.55535 (1.263)	0.736 (0.874)	1.067 (1.316)	0.438 (1.407)	1.372 (1.123)	0.924 (1.046)	0.990 (1.095)	0.364 (1.028)
Impact D × Period _{t-2}	0.421** (0.150)	-0.083 (0.301)	1.189*** (0.391)	0.991** (0.450)	0.248*** (0.084)	-0.019 (0.248)	0.408*** (0.132)	-0.010 (0.250)
Impact D × Period _{t-1}	0.447** (0.160)	0.574*** (0.118)	1.264*** (0.415)	1.502*** (0.542)	0.449** (0.142)	0.515*** (0.169)	0.317** (0.164)	0.434** (0.167)
Impact D × Period _{t0}	0.497*** (0.128)	0.570** (0.223)	1.440*** (0.417)	1.641*** (0.482)	0.604** (0.183)	0.642*** (0.181)	0.350 (0.271)	0.422 (0.158)
Impact D × Period _{t+1}	1.294** (0.674)	0.387 (0.728)	2.256** (0.957)	1.779** (0.470)	1.318** (0.649)	0.838* (0.448)	0.959 (0.714)	0.197 (0.560)
Impact D × Period _{t+2}	1.163* (0.645)	0.336 (0.594)	2.226** (0.971)	1.804** (0.531)	1.482** (0.634)	1.044** (0.413)	0.941 (0.704)	0.247 (0.531)
Impact D × Period _{t+3}	1.702* (0.980)	0.450 (0.578)	2.785** (1.081)	2.070*** (0.544)	1.901*** (0.630)	1.238*** (0.369)	1.732*** (0.598)	0.676 (0.515)
Impact D × Period _{t+4,} forward	2.573*** (0.900)	1.100 (0.758)	3.428*** (0.928)	2.560*** (0.350)	2.288*** (0.563)	1.509*** (0.452)	2.030*** (0.607)	0.787 (0.745)
Construction		2.283** (1.172)		1.577 (1.196)		1.207 (0.855)		1.942* (1.028)
Constant	14.69*** (0.408)	-2.499 (8.839)	14.18*** (0.991)	2.230 (9.094)	13.66*** (0.879)	4.597 (6.566)	13.08*** (0.649)	-1.612 (7.84)
N	80	73	79	73	80	73	77	73
R ²	0.29	0.41	0.37	0.44	0.43	0.50	0.26	0.39

Clustered standard errors, corrected for small number of clusters; * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%.

Alternative Difference-in-Difference – Distance of municipality from STAR Tollway

- The adjacency of a municipality to the municipality/city in which the STAR Tollway directly pass through was used as the criterion for a municipality to be included in the control group
- We take a different strategy this time by using the estimated distance of a municipality/city from the STAR Tollway
- The difference-in-difference regression is now expressed as:

$$\text{Outcome} = \alpha + \beta_0 \text{Distance} + \sum_{t=4}^{t-2} \beta_1 \text{Distance} \times \text{Treatment Period} + \varepsilon$$

- Inclusion of leads and lags as before

Difference-in-Difference Regression: Distance from the STAR Tollway


	(1) Property tax	(2) Property tax	(3) Business tax	(4) Business tax	(5) Regulatory fees	(6) Regulatory fees	(7) User charge	(8) User charge
Distance	-0.691*** (0.227)	-0.683*** (0.224)	-0.753*** (0.156)	-0.718*** (0.159)	-0.708*** (0.097)	-0.752*** (0.101)	-0.583*** (0.120)	-0.546*** (0.124)
Distance × Period _{t-2}	0.073*** (0.010)	0.064*** (0.009)	0.166*** (0.010)	0.117*** (0.011)	0.034* (0.018)	0.047** (0.019)	0.107*** (0.016)	0.033** (0.016)
Distance × Period _{t-1}	0.056*** (0.019)	0.049*** (0.018)	0.205*** (0.013)	0.213*** (0.014)	0.155*** (0.015)	0.173*** (0.013)	0.036 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.025)
Distance × Period _{t0}	0.103*** (0.011)	0.095*** (0.011)	0.247*** (0.012)	0.222*** (0.012)	0.196*** (0.018)	0.211*** (0.019)	0.120*** (0.029)	0.059** (0.028)
Distance × Period _{t+1}	0.100*** (0.023)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.230*** (0.015)	0.111*** (0.014)	0.234*** (0.027)	0.241*** (0.025)	0.131*** (0.024)	0.018 (0.027)
Distance × Period _{t+2}	0.140*** (0.012)	0.130*** (0.015)	0.238*** (0.014)	0.128*** (0.018)	0.292*** (0.022)	0.300*** (0.023)	0.149*** (0.030)	0.042 (0.031)
Distance × Period _{t+3}	0.111*** (0.020)	0.101*** (0.018)	2.261*** (0.019)	0.168*** (0.023)	0.285*** (0.025)	0.294*** (0.024)	0.181*** (0.023)	0.083*** (0.026)
Distance × Period _{t+4,} forward	0.232*** (0.020)	0.220*** (0.023)	0.322*** (0.021)	0.202*** (0.025)	0.370*** (0.016)	0.377*** (0.016)	0.197*** (0.021)	0.084*** (0.027)
Construction		0.030 (0.101)		0.902*** (0.059)		0.077 (0.075)		0.496*** (0.135)
Constant	19.98*** (0.768)	19.74*** (1.108)	19.66*** (0.532)	12.262*** (0.736)	17.946*** (0.334)	17.427*** (0.752)	16.90*** (0.429)	12.930*** (1.255)
N	960	886	960	886	960	886	960	886
R ²	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.07	0.12	0.13	0.05	0.04

Clustered standard errors, corrected for small number of clusters; * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%.


*** Significant at 1%.

Marginal Productivity of Public Capital

(Regional Disparity in Japan)



Map of Japan from the North to the South



Macroeconomic Effect of Public Capital

$$Y_t = f(Kp_t, L_t, Kg_t)$$

Simultaneous regression of

Translog Production Function and Labor Share Function

$$\ln Y = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \ln Kp + (1 - \alpha_1) \ln E + \alpha_3 \ln Kg$$

$$+ \ln Kp (-\frac{1}{2} \beta_2 \ln Kp + \beta_2 \ln E + \beta_3 \ln Kg)$$

$$+ \ln E (-\frac{1}{2} \beta_2 \ln E - \beta_3 \ln Kg) + \frac{1}{2} \beta_6 - (\ln Kg)^2$$

$$S_E = \frac{wE}{pY} = \frac{\partial \ln Y}{\partial \ln E} = (1 - \alpha_1) + \beta_2 \ln Kp - \beta_2 \ln E - \beta_3 \ln Kg$$

Marginal Productivity of Public Capital Macroeconomic Effects (in Japan)


Period(FY)	1956–60	1961–65	1966–70	1971–75	1976–80	1981–85
Direct Effect	0.696	0.737	0.638	0.508	0.359	0.275
Indirect Effect(Private Capital)	0.453	0.553	0.488	0.418	0.304	0.226
Indirect Effect(Labor Input)	1.071	0.907	0.740	0.580	0.407	0.317
Private Capital	0.444	0.485	0.452	0.363	0.294	0.262

Period(FY)	1986–90	1991–95	1996–00	2001–05	2006–10
Direct Effect	0.215	0.181	0.135	0.114	0.108
Indirect Effect(Private Capital)	0.195	0.162	0.122	0.100	0.100
Indirect Effect(Labor Input)	0.192	0.155	0.105	0.090	0.085
Private Capital	0.272	0.242	0.219	0.202	0.194


Effectiveness of Public Capital Stock

- “Private capital/Public capital ratio” to “Marginal productivity of Public capital” -

Secondary Industry (Industrial Sector)



Explanation of Direct and Indirect Effects



Determinants of Regional Allocation of Public Investment in Japan (Political Power plays a role)


Allocation of Public Infrastructure in Japan: (Pooled data, 47 prefecture)

Coeffcient	Explanatory Variables	Agriculture	Land Conservation	Industrial Infrastructure	Improvement of living standards y
α_0	Constant	-35.44 (-10.46**)	-34.26 (-11.32**)	-61.58 (-11.84**)	52.32 (8.00**)
α_1	Yp (Income)	0.01 (7.21**)	0.01 (13.18**)	0.02 (17.99**)	0.036 (25.86**)
α_2	Sp(AreaSize)	4970 (28.47**)	2090 (13.40**)	3855 (14.39**)	2730 (8.10**)
α_3	Rp(Political Power)	8280 (16.88**)	7274 (16.60**)	10956 (14.55**)	-7434 (-7.85**)
α_4	Dummy1	-23.21 (-6.69**)	-34.27 (-11.06**)	-59.81 (-11.23**)	-36.85 (-5.50**)
α_5	Dummy2	27.43 (9.26**)	-1.65 (-0.62)	65.87 (14.48**)	66.89 (11.70**)
Adj. R^2		0.675	0.486	0.458	0.527

(1) () denotes t-value

(2) ** is significant with 99.0% level,

Rate of Return and the Revenue Bond



To Create Incentive Mechanism

To Avoid Moral Hazard Problem

	Normal Case	Revenue Bond
Normal Case	(50A, r) Management Investors company	(50A, 100B)
Revenue Bond	(100A, r)	(100A, 100B) Management Investors Company

Public Private Partnership (PPP)

- (1) **Risk sharing** between private and public sector
- (2) Incentive to cut costs and to increase revenue
 - Avoid political intervention (transparency)
 - **Bonus payment for employees who run infrastructure (incentive mechanism)**
- (3) Many projects could be started by PPP
 - Utilize domestic savings
 - Life insurance and Pension funds (**long term**)
- (4) **Indirect Effects are important (tourism, manufacturing, agriculture, services)**


Community Infrastructure

- Wind power Generator Funds
- Agricultural Farmer's Trust Fund
- **SME Hometown Trust Fund**
- Local Airport

Large Projects

Pension Funds, Insurance Funds

Infrastructure Bond



Hometown Investment Trust Funds

***A Stable Way to
Supply Risk Capital
(i.e. knowledge
base companies)***

***Naoyuki YOSHINO
Sahoko KAJI (ed.)***



Savings/GDP and Investment/GDP in Asia

Economy	Savings/GDP Ratio (%)			Investment/GDP ratio (%)		
	2007	2010	2011	2007	2010	2011
PRC Mainland	51.9	53.4	53.8	41.7	48.2	48.7
Hong Kong, China	33.3	29.9	29.2	20.9	23.7	23.8
Indonesia	27.3	33.3	31.1	24.9	32.5	32.9
Japan	28.5	23.8	23.9	23.7	20.2	21.4
Republic of Korea	31.5	31.9	29.6	29.4	29.2	28.2
Malaysia	37.5	32.9	33.1	21.6	21.4	21.8
Philippines	22.1	24.8	22.3	16.9	20.5	20.5
Singapore	48.4	46.0	45.8	21.1	23.8	26.0
Thailand	32.8	30.6	30.4	26.4	25.9	25.6

Note: Savings rate = gross national saving/GDP; Investment rate = gross capital formation/GDP.

Source: IMF, *World Economic Outlook Database*.

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