**Fiscal Affairs Department** 

# The 5<sup>th</sup> IMF-Japan High-Level Tax Conference for Asian Countries Energy (and Related) Taxes and Charges



#### Michael Keen

#### International Monetary Fund

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# **PRINCIPLES...**

# Why tax energy use?

Use for final consumption by households?

 Should be subject to general consumption tax (e.g. VAT) in usual way

Use as **business input**?

- General principle that don't want to distort business decisions...
  - Implies no tax that 'sticks': just usual VAT

...unless:

 Environmental damage from energy use creates case for "corrective" ("Pigovian") price—to ensure polluter takes this harm into account

This should:

- 'Stick' on business use: so not a VAT, but an excise
- Be at same rate whatever the use of the energy
  - Because damage is the same
- Be in specific form (i.e. fixed amount per unit)
  - Because quantity, not value, determines damage

## Preferred energy tax system

- Usual VAT (at standard rate)
  - Though some countries restrict input tax credit on gas/diesel because final consumption may be disguised as business use

#### and

- Specific excise, on all use, that reflects environmental damage
  - levied before the VAT
    - So VAT changes do not affect relative price of energy

# What environmental damage?

#### Mainly:

- Climate change
   CO<sub>2</sub> emissions
- Local pollution
  - Fine particulates (SO<sub>2</sub> (coal); NO<sub>x</sub> (all fossil fuels)), noise
- Vehicle externalities
  - Congestion
  - Accidents
  - Road damage

## Tax or Regulation?

Why price rather than e.g. limit access to city center by license plate, emission standards?

- Achieves given pollution reduction at least cost
- Can often be better targeted to source of harm

   unlike e.g. rebound effect with standards
- Relatively efficient source of revenue

But in some cases regulation needed: e.g. where threshold effects important

## Climate

Carbon price = charge on carbon content (at the same specific rate) of all fuels (gas, coal...)

Can be implemented as either:

• Carbon tax

-straightforward extension of straightforward excises

• Cap-and-trade

—Issue licenses to emit up to some level, and allow companies to buy and sell them

Broadly equivalent—if permits auctioned



• Some differences—e g. price volatility under cap-and-trade—but either can be effective

# What is the right carbon price?

 Many uncertainties, but US government puts at \$35 per ton CO<sub>2</sub>

– About \$13 per barrel of oil, 70% of coal price

- Damage is the same wherever emissions occur
- So should carbon price be the same in all countries?
  - Leave aside historical responsibility

Not necessarily, given lesser ability to pay

# Local pollution

Appropriate charge depends on:

- Inhalation of emissions
- Link with mortality
- Valuation of health effects

#### Administration?

- Reflect in fuel excises
- Rebate/credit for power stations using control technologies

# Vehicle Externalities

#### Congestion

- Ideally time-varying charges for road use
   Could even allow a cut in gas prices
- Simple variant a charge on city entry
  - Singapore a pioneer
  - Useful source of local finance for mega-cities?
- In the meantime, reflect in price of gasoline

#### Accidents

• Charge to reflect uninsured risks

### Diesel versus gasoline

Diesel is:

- More polluting, per liter
- Used more by trucks that congest and harm roads

But:

 Truck's lower fuel efficiency means marginal liter of diesel adds less to km.s traveled and hence congestion

Diesel tax should not be substantially below gas

## What role for vehicle taxes?

-in addition to sales (and/or wealth) tax?

- With efficient charges on gasoline use, no further taxation needed
- Failing that, annual charge on capacity/age may be warranted but is blunt
- Charge by emissions per mile (on annual inspection) better targeted

#### Example: Corrective Motor Fuel Taxes (€/liter)

	Gasoline (cars)		Diesel (trucks)	
	US	Chile	US	Chile
Total	0.25	0.47	0.26	0.42
Contribution of:				
local pollution	0.02	0.12	0.07	0.11
carbon	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
congestion	0.10	0.13	0.07	0.11
accidents	0.08	0.19	0.02	0.08
noise	0	0	0.01	0.01
road damage	0	0	0.04	0.08
Current tax	0.08	0.21	0.09	0.07
Revenue from tax reform	US		Chile	
(% of GDP)	0.9		0.8	

Source. IMF (2012), Parry (2011).

# Some pitfalls to avoid

- Earmarking
  - Over-constraining if it bites, non-transparent if it does not
  - But last resort?
- Excessively blunt instruments
  - E.g. electricity tax does not encourage switch to cleaner fuels
- Subsidizing good things instead of taxing bad

# In practice...

#### Many countries subsidize fuels

#### ...with 'pass through' of less than 100 percent



## ... including in the region

#### 'Implicit tax rates' (retail - world prices) for gas of:



#### Comparing with other regions





## Diesel often favored over gas

Excess of gasoline implicit tax over diesel (US\$ per liter)



# Problems with subsidies well-known:

# They cause environmental damage...

 Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies in developing and emerging might reduce global GHG emissions (relative to BAU) by 6% in 2050

• And would reduce local pollution, too though subsidies for dirtiest fuel (coal) relatively modest

#### ...are hugely expensive...

#### Globally, \$492 billion —which is 0.7% of GDP, of 2.1% of revenues)



# ...and benefit mainly the better off



- Poor's gain may still large relative to their income
- ...but are usually better targeted ways to help them

### Implicit ("post-tax") subsidies even larger

Reflecting also failure to charge for external damage:

- \$1.90 trillion (2.7% GDP, 8.1% revenues
- With coal much more important from this perspective
- And largely local damage as above





- Energy taxes among easiest to implement
- Key to addressing environmental concerns
- Taxes on fossil fuels too low in many countries
  - Even where not outright subsidized
- And that is often true even ignoring global climate damage...
- ...So case for raising many such charges need not rely on climate concerns

#### For more

#### Energy Subsidy Reform

Lessons and Implications



Benedict Clements, David Coady, Stefania Fabrizio, Sanjoev Gupta, Trever Alleyne, and Carlo Sdralevich

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