Auction Quotas with a Foreign Duopoly
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Summary:
This paper uses a partial equilibrium framework to compare the welfare consequences of different methods of quota administration relative to free trade under imperfect competition. It shows that a country importing a good from foreign duopolists may improve its welfare by setting a quota at the free trade quantity and giving a fraction of the quota licenses to the duopolists while auctioning off the rest.
Series:
Working Paper No. 2000/065
Subject:
Asset prices Import licensing Imports International trade Prices Trade barriers Trade liberalization
English
Publication Date:
March 1, 2000
ISBN/ISSN:
9781451848670/1018-5941
Stock No:
WPIEA0652000
Pages:
21
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