Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?
Electronic Access:
Free Download. Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view this PDF file
Summary:
This study analyzes panel data for 61 countries during 1980–97 and concludes that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. Also, the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger when the coverage offered to depositors is extensive, when the scheme is funded, and when it is run by the government rather than by the private sector.
Series:
Working Paper No. 2000/003
Subject:
Bank deposits Bank soundness Banking Banking crises Deposit insurance Financial crises Financial sector policy and analysis Financial services Moral hazard
English
Publication Date:
January 1, 2000
ISBN/ISSN:
9781451841893/1018-5941
Stock No:
WPIEA0032000
Pages:
29
Please address any questions about this title to publications@imf.org