Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Supervisory Architecture, Financial Structure and Market View

February 1, 2008

Preview Citation

Format: Chicago

Marc G Quintyn, and Donato Masciandaro. Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Supervisory Architecture, Financial Structure and Market View, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2008) accessed November 17, 2024

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

The literature stresses the importance of financial market characteristics in determining the supervisory architectures. In the real world it is not always clear to what extent market features are taken into account. We present two complementary approaches to gain insights in the above relationship. First, an empirical test of two theories-the helping and the grabbing hand view of government-seems more consistent with the latter, presuming the market demonstrates a preference for consolidation of supervisory powers. Second, a survey among financial CEOs in Italy confirms a preference for a consolidated supervisory regime and reveals only weak consistency between the views of the policymakers and the market operators.

Subject: Banking, Financial regulation and supervision, Financial sector, Government asset management, Securities markets

Keywords: Market factor, Market participant, Market preference, Market view, WP

Publication Details

Pages:

46
Volume:

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DOI:

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Issue:

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Series:

Working Paper No. 2008/047
Stock No:

WPIEA2008047
ISBN:

9781451869095
ISSN:

1018-5941

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