|
Table 1. Cameroon: Consistency with Code of Good
Practices on
Transparency
| Section
|
Practice
|
Full
|
Part
|
NC
|
Comments
|
| Monetary
Policy |
|
Clarity of roles, responsibilities, and objectives
|
Objectives, institutional framework, relationship between
monetary and fiscal operations, and agency roles are clearly defined in the
statutes of the BEAC and in the international treaties on the Central African
Monetary Union.
|
X
|
|
|
The rules that determine how the BEAC can intervene in the
rest of the economy are not made public.
|
|
Open process for formulating and reporting policy decisions
|
The monetary policy framework and decision making process
are defined in broad terms in the statutes of the BEAC. Policy changes are
promptly communicated and clearly explained. Fundamental modifications are,
in practice if not in law, preceded by consultations with the parties concerned.
|
|
X
|
|
The monetary policy framework could be better explained to
the public, and the monetary policy decisions should be explained better within
the context of that framework.
There is a tendency to limit the communication of policy
measures to the affected parties, instead of to the public at large.
|
|
Public availability of information
|
Implementation of the GDDS is in process. The BEAC has a
broad range of publications as well as a network of local branches to inform
the public. Emergency assistance to banks is kept secret.
|
|
X
|
|
The publications suffer from sometimes long delays.
|
|
Accountability and assurances of integrity
|
Governor is accountable to the Board, a Ministerial Committee
and the Heads of State of the CEMAC. Financial statements are audited by an
internal committee of censors. The code of conduct for BEAC staff is partially
published in the BEAC statutes.
|
|
X
|
|
Financial statements will be audited by external auditors
from FY2000 onwards. The elaborate version of the code of conduct for BEAC
staff is an internal document. BEAC staff do not enjoy special judicial protection.
|
| Banking Supervision and
Payment System Oversight
|
|
Clarity of roles, responsibilities, and objectives
|
Objectives, institutional framework, relationship between
financial agencies are clearly defined in the Convention creating COBAC.
|
X
|
|
|
In the area of payment system oversight, BEAC could increase
its efforts in communicating general policy principles to participants in
the payment system.
|
|
Open process for formulating and reporting policy decisions
|
Overall conduct of policies is transparent. Fundamental modifications
are, in practice if not in law, preceded by consultations with the parties
concerned, and communicated in a timely manner. There is regular reporting
on the achievement of its objectives.
|
X
|
|
|
The consultation process that currently takes place could
be formalized.
|
|
Public availability of information
|
COBAC issues periodic reports on progress in achieving objectives
and regulatory initiatives. A compendium of regulations has been issued recently.
|
|
X
|
|
Delays in the publication of reports hinders the availability
of information. A public information service would be useful to correct this
problem..
|
|
Accountability and assurances of integrity
|
The President of COBAC is also Governor of BEAC, and is accountable
to the Board of Governors, a Ministerial Committee and the Heads of State
of the CEMAC.
|
X
|
|
|
|
A. Monetary
Policy
2. Monetary policy in Cameroon is conducted by the BEAC, and aims to maintain the
external and internal value of the currency. Foreign reserves function as an intermediary monetary
target, while the operational target consists of a series of BEAC refinancing limits for each
country of the union. The interest rates charged on these refinancing operations are used as
instruments. A maximum degree of transparency in such a policy framework can be beneficial, but
is not crucial, especially not given the nascent stage of financial market development and the
limited monetization of the CEMAC economies. As a result, transparency towards the general
public has traditionally not been a top priority for the BEAC. However, the BEAC has ensured a
high degree of transparency towards the governments of its member states.
3. For the four broad areas covered in the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in
Monetary and Financial Policies (clarity of roles, responsibilities, and objectives; the process for
formulating and reporting of policy decisions; public availability of information; and accountability
and assurances of integrity), the BEAC overall demonstrates a fairly high degree of transparency.
4. The roles, responsibilities and objectives of the BEAC, are clearly defined in its
statutes, in the Treaty on the Central African Monetary Union and in the Treaty on Monetary
Cooperation between the member states of the BEAC and the Republic of France. The only
practice that is not fully observed is the requirement that central bank involvement in the rest of
the economy should be conducted in an open and public manner (1.2.4). The rules for such
involvement are kept internal.
5. There is room for improvement in the area of open process for formulating and
reporting monetary policy decisions. In particular, the BEAC could better communicate the
monetary policy framework (instruments and final, intermediary, and operational targets as well as
the relationships between those), and explain its general monetary policy stance and specific
decisions within that framework. The publication of a reference paper explaining and motivating
that framework in detail could be a useful tool to enhance the transparency of the monetary policy
decision making process. Some practices are not fully implemented (advance publication of the
calendar of Board meetings, publication of practical rules and procedures regarding monetary
instruments and relations with counterparties). An evaluation of progress towards the realization
of monetary policy objectives is completed only once a year, in the annual report. It would be
useful if the BEAC could increase the frequency of these evaluations, and, for example, publish
one after every Board meeting is held. The current practice of organizing consultations prior to
substantive technical changes in the structure of monetary regulations could be formalized.
6. With regard to the public availability of information, the BEAC has an
appropriate range of publications, but some of these publications have been issued with lengthy
delays in the recent past, and thus have not been very useful as a means of providing the public
with timely information. To avoid unnecessary delays, the BEAC should establish firm deadlines
for the monthly bulletin. Consideration could be given to separating the monthly statistics from
the research papers. To avoid that overdue research papers delay the publication of statistics. The
BEAC should also consider publication of its accounting guidelines, to the extent possible without
releasing confidential information. Communication with the general public could be enhanced by
introducing sessions in the parliaments of the member states for the governor to explain monetary
policy and developments.
7. There are some areas for improvement with regard to accountability and public
assurances of integrity. In general, the BEAC could make available non-sensitive parts of its
internal regulations for public scrutiny. This would reinforce confidence in the BEAC, and would
give an incentive to control the quality of internal regulations. The BEAC member states could
consider granting some kind of immunity to all BEAC staff, for their decisions taken in the
exercise of their duty.
B. Financial
Policies
8. This section provides an overall assessment of transparency practices in financial policies
with respect to banking supervision by the Banking Commission and of payment system oversight
by BEAC. For the four broad areas covered in the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in
Monetary and Financial Policies (clarity of roles, responsibilities, and objectives; the process for
formulating and reporting of policy decisions; public availability of information; and accountability
and assurances of integrity), COBAC overall demonstrates a fairly high degree of transparency.
Although the Code has only a few explicit references to payment system oversight, BEAC could
implement improvements in transparency practices in this area.
9. The roles, responsibilities and objectives of the COBAC are clearly defined in its
founding convention. With regard to clarity of roles in the payment system oversight area, BEAC
could enhance the communication to and consultation with payment system participants, in
particular concerning risk management features of the payment system.
10. Similarly, COBAC has an open process for formulating and reporting financial policy
decisions. The current practice of organizing consultations prior to substantive technical
changes in the structure of financial regulations could be formalized.
11. With regard to the public availability of information, COBAC has an
appropriate range of publications. However, some of these publications have been issued with
lengthy delays, and thus have not been very useful as a means of providing the public with timely
information. To avoid unnecessary delays, COBAC should establish firm deadlines for its bulletin
and annual report. The upcoming move to new headquarters could provide an opportunity to
improve its public information services, including a website.
12. COBAC displays overall observance of the Code with regard to accountability and
public assurances of integrity. Its president, who is also Governor of the BEAC, is
accountable to the Board of Directors of BEAC and the Council of Ministers of the CEMAC.
Codes of conduct regarding financial affairs of staffs are made public. COBAC does not maintain
separate accounts from BEAC.
1This module was prepared in consultation with the Cameroonian authorities, the
BEAC, and the COBAC in the context of an FSAP mission conducted in Cameroon in March
2000. The work of the FSAP mission was coordinated by a joint IMF-World Bank team led by
Mr. Durand (IMF) and Ms. A.C. Rennie (World Bank). The main contributors were
Mr. Driessen and Mr. Fonteyne (both IMF).
|
