As announced in a recent News Brief, the IMF is inviting public comment on its ongoing review of conditionality in IMF-supported programs. Please send comments on the following papers or the overview to conditionality@imf.org. All comments received by June 30, 2001, will be conveyed to the IMF's Executive Board as background information for a Board discussion in June and will also be taken into account in further work by IMF Staff on streamlining and focusing conditionality. Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs--Overview
February 20, 2001

Structural Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs
February 16, 2001

Trade Policy Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs
February 16, 2001

Public Information Notice: IMF Executive Board Discusses Conditionality
March 21, 2001

See also:

Key Decisions of the Executive Board Concerning Conditionality March 21, 2001

Streamlining Structural Conditionality
(382 kb pdf file)

Transcript of a press briefing on IMF Conditionality by Masood Ahmed, March 21, 2001

The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues
Guidance Note

How Does the IMF Lend? -- A Factsheet

Pamphlet No. 45: Financial Organization and Operations of the IMF

Pamphlet No. 46: The Unique Nature of the Responsibilities of the IMF

Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs—Policy Issues
Prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department
February 16, 2001

Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view the full text (426 Kb PDF file).

Contents

I. Introduction

II. Conditionality and Ownership: General Principles and Issues

    1. Purposes of Conditionality
    2. Principles of Program Monitoring
    3. Monitoring Tools
    4. Conditionality and Ownership

III. Recent Experience with Conditionality

IV. Streamlining Conditionality and Strengthening Ownership

    1. Narrowing the Scope of Structural Conditionality
    2. Reducing the Detail of Program Monitoring Greater Focus on Outcomes Rather Than Actions?
        Clarifying Monitoring Tools and the Boundaries of Conditionality
    3. Flexibility and Inclusiveness in Program Negotiations
    4. Conclusions

Text Figures

    1. Average Number of Macroeconomic Performance Criteria per Program by Country Type
    2. Average Number of Structural Conditions per Program Year
    3. Average Number of Structural Conditions per Program Year by Type of Condition
    4. Average Number of Structural Conditions per Program Year by Type of Country
    5. Distribution of Structural Conditions by Economic Sector

Text Boxes

    1. Guidelines on Conditionality
    2. The Legal Basis of Fund Conditionality
    3. Streamlining Structural Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs Interim Guidance Note

Annexes

    1. The Results of Fund-Supported Programs
    2. Ownership and Program Implementation
    3. Proposals for Greater Country Selectivity and Preconditions

References