A.
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and Financial Sector Stability
Assessments (FSSA)
6. The FSAP/FSSA
is a major initiative undertaken by the IMF, in collaboration with the
World Bank, in response to the crises of the late 1990s. It is designed
to strengthen bilateral surveillance of member countries and contribute
to crisis prevention by helping to identify financial sector vulnerabilities
and generate policy recommendations to overcome them. The experience under
this initiative was last reviewed by the Executive Board in March 2003,
based on an internal joint assessment by IMF and World Bank staff. Approximately
70 assessments are expected to be completed by the end of FY 2004. An
independent evaluation of this important, and resource-intensive, activity
is therefore timely.
7. The proposed
evaluation could focus on areas of broad program design and integration
with surveillance functions, as well as implementation aspects, including:
Program
design
- How has
the Fund's involvement in financial sector stability issues aligned
with its core macro-stability mandate? What has been the overarching
framework guiding the design of the FSSA/FSAP and its integration into
the Fund's surveillance function?
- What has
been the role of the Fund in financial sector surveillance vis-à-vis
other IFIs? What has been the division of labor, including on leadership
for LDCs, emerging countries, and advanced economies; and on development,
and soundness and stability issues?
Implementation
- Risk Assessment:
How well has financial sector assessment under the FSAP and associated
FSSAs identified the major risk factors in a country's financial system?
Are best approaches to diagnose vulnerabilities being used?
- Addressing
Vulnerabilities: Have FSSAs proposed appropriate and feasible measures
to address vulnerabilities? Are recommendations articulated as a coherent
"blueprint" for reform with proper regard to suitability,
sequencing, and implementation capacity? Have actions/reforms been effectively
carried out? How has the Fund operated to induce countries to address
financial sector vulnerabilities in its surveillance and UFR operations?
Has the exercise led to a better understanding of TA needs in the context
of strengthening the financial sector, and has this led to appropriate
IMF response in the provision of TA?
- Assessment
of Value Added: How do country authorities assess the FSAP/FSSA exercise?
Has it deepened the quality and coverage of discussions with authorities
on financial sector issues? Have authorities perceived an effective
reduction of vulnerabilities? How has the private sector reacted to
the new information published in FSSAs and how has it impacted their
activities and risk perceptions?
- How effective
has been the coordination efforts with the World Bank? Is there an appropriate
balance between industrialized and developing countries covered, given
resource requirements and potential benefits? Does the FSAP/FSSA achieve
its goals in a cost effective manner? Is the current degree of transparency
(which involves voluntary publication of FSSAs) appropriate? What has
been the role of the FSAP and FSSAs in recent crisis intervention cases?
8. The evaluation
would likely have to be conducted at two levels. Some issues would be
examined on the basis of a cross country assessment of experience in all
the FSAP cases. This cross-country assessment would have to be supplemented
by in-depth study of a sample of country cases.
9. Since
the FSAPs are undertaken jointly with the World Bank, it would be desirable
to undertake the study in parallel with an evaluation by the World Bank's
Operations Evaluation Department of the Bank's experience in this regard.
Preliminary discussions with OED have been held to this end.
B.
A Case Study of Turkey
10. Turkey
provides another example of a capital account crisis involving large access,
similar in some ways to the cases in Korea, Indonesia, and Brazil already
studied by IEO and the study of Argentina which is currently under way.
The country experienced severe financial instability in 1999 leading to
the request for a stand-by arrangement for SDR 9.3 billion (US$12.7 billion)
at the end of 1999, to protect the fixed exchange rate which was viewed
as an essential nominal anchor. The amount under the arrangement was subsequently
augmented, but the effort to maintain the exchange rate peg proved unsustainable
and was abandoned in February 2001 when the lira was floated. The 1999
arrangement, with SDR 3.3 billion undrawn, was cancelled in February 2002,
and a new SBA for SDR 12.8 billion was put in place. This program is expected
to end in December 2004.
11. An evaluation
of Turkey's experience, including the process by which key decisions on
IMF-supported programs were taken, should provide additional lessons on
the effectiveness of Fund surveillance in crisis prevention and the Fund's
approach to crisis resolution. It would be most useful if the study could
cover a longer period after the initial crisis than was possible in the
earlier IEO studies of crisis cases, as this would enable the IEO to focus
on the post-crisis period in greater depth. The exact period to be covered
under the evaluation will be chosen so as to avoid interfering with ongoing
operations. The experience with the original 1999 arrangement which was
cancelled in February 2002 can be examined without interfering with ongoing
operations. The evaluation could be extended to cover issues relating
to the second 2002, arrangement after December 2004, when the present
arrangement is set to expire.
12. The evaluation
would seek to address several questions related to the adequacy of IMF
diagnosis and policy advice, including:
(i) Surveillance
in the pre-crisis period will be critically examined to assess whether
it identified the problems which surfaced later, especially regarding
inflation stabilization, the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor,
and consideration of vulnerabilities, risks, and exit strategies.
(ii) Were
the programs well designed from the point of view of assessing fiscal
sustainability, both before the crisis and during the period of crisis
management?
(iii) Did program design focus adequately on the structural factors that
have impaired fiscal adjustment and have been a source of financial sector
vulnerability?
(iv) Were
programs designed on the basis of a realistic assessment of the extent
to which the proposed reforms were owned by the authorities, as well as
the authorities' capacity to implement key measures?
(v) Did
crisis management, including the defense of the exchange rate regime,
take adequate account of banking sector problems?
(vi) How
well did IMF policy advice in the post-crisis period cope with the challenges
of stabilization and continuing vulnerabilities, including debt sustainability
and banking soundness? Parallels with Argentina in this respect would
be interesting.
C.
The IMF's Approach to Capital Account Liberalization
13. The issue
of liberalization of the capital account has been the focus of a great
deal of attention and generated considerable criticism of the IMF. Liberalization
of capital account transactions is not an explicit part of the mandate
of the Fund but policies relating to liberalization of the capital account
have figured in Fund surveillance. Critics have argued that the IMF has
encouraged emerging market countries to liberalize capital flows in a
manner that has subjected them to severe stress because of the unexpected
volatility of these flows. Some have argued that rapid liberalization,
with insufficient attention to sequencing and establishing the preconditions
for effective integration with global financial markets, has been responsible
for a great deal of the financial instability and associated economic
distress experienced by many emerging market countries.
14. The IMF
has argued that its approach to capital account liberalization has become
much more pragmatic after the East Asian crisis and there is now a clear
recognition of the need to build strong financial systems as a precondition
for capital account liberalization. The proposed evaluation would assess
whether indeed the Fund's policy advice on the scope, pace and composition
of capital account liberalization has changed after the late 1990s. The
evaluation would be largely based on a selective study of surveillance
and program documents in a representative subset of countries before 1997
and after 1999, supplemented by an examination of other internal documents,
if any.
15. Specific
issues which could be addressed by the evaluation include the following:
- What has
been the motivation behind, and the content of, the IMF's advice regarding
liberalization of the capital account? Have policies towards the capital
account changed in recent years in the light of experience with capital
account crises? More specifically, how is this reflected in IMF advice
to countries that have not undertaken significant liberalization of
their capital account?
- Has the
Fund's policy advice on capital account liberalization across countries
reflected a consistent approach based on a clear recognition of the
two-way linkage between policy towards capital flows and policy towards
the exchange rate regime. What has this implied for policy advice on
the sequencing of reforms, especially vis-à-vis the financial
sector? Have the trade-offs between capital account liberalization and
the benefit from strengthening intermediation been explicitly weighed
against the dangers from heightened vulnerabilities in situations where
the financial sector is not sufficiently strong?1
- Is multilateral
surveillance giving sufficient attention to the risks emanating from
the supply side, especially with regard to the volatility of capital
flows? Has multilateral surveillance helped to identify corrective steps
needed on the supply side and has it been effective in addressing these
issues?2
- Given
that occasional crises are inevitable, has the IMF taken a consistent
and defensible position on the role of temporary capital account restrictions
as part of a crisis response? Has the IMF objectively assessed the usefulness
of these restrictions in situations where they have been imposed?
D.
Structural Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs
16. The IMF
was criticized in many quarters for the widening of both the scope and
the volume of structural conditionality over the last decade. The Managing
Director responded to this criticism by issuing, in the Fall of 2000,
a set of interim guidelines for staff on streamlining conditionality and,
shortly thereafter, launching a thorough review of its conditionality.
This led to the adoption by the Executive Board of revised conditionality
guidelines in September 2002. These guidelines call for streamlining conditionality
to achieve parsimony while ensuring that conditionality covers all policies
critical to the achievement of macro-economic objectives. They recognize
that critical policies would include policies for which other institutions,
notably the World Bank, have primary responsibility. They also emphasize
the importance of ownership for conditionality to be effective.
17. The evaluation
could examine the internal consistency of the new guidelines, including
(a) the possible tension between emphasizing parsimony and also covering
all policies critical to the achievement of macroeconomic objectives,
and (b) the tension between an approach that emphasizes country-owned
adjustment programs but also retains the traditional dependence on conditionality.
It could assess the extent to which the new guidelines have brought about
a significant change in actual practice in focusing on the four core areas
of structural conditionality—fiscal, trade, financial and privatization.
This would require comparison of the situation before September 2002 (as
already documented in a staff review) and the current position reflected
in programs approved after the September 2002 guidelines were issued.
Specific issues to be investigated could include:
- What is
the evidence about the effectiveness of structural conditionality? How
have programs dealt with the issue of ownership and what are the implications
for the design of structural conditionality? In addressing these issues,
and others listed below, the evaluation will need to distinguish between
PRGF and non-PRGF cases and for the former would draw upon any lessons
emerging from the ongoing evaluation of the PRSP/PRGF Initiative.
- How has
the potential conflict between the objective of achieving parsimony
and the objective of ensuring that conditionality cover all policies
critical to achieving macroeconomic objectives of the program been resolved
in practice? Have programs identified core essential elements and non-core
desirable elements while limiting conditionality explicitly to the former?
- How have
staff approached the task of assessing macroeconomic relevance in deciding
whether or not to include particular structural measures in IMF conditionality?
- Has the
concept of division of labor led to a redesign of programs to give greater
emphasis to the areas of conditionality that are within the competence
of the IMF, with less emphasis being given to the others. Where other
areas of conditionality remain important, how is the objective of parsimony
achieved in collaboration with other institutions?
- How has
enhanced collaboration with the World Bank in the design of conditionality
been implemented in practice?
E.
Private Sector Involvement (PSI) in Crisis Resolution
18. The need
to involve the private sector effectively in the resolution of financial
crises in order to contain the size of access and also to create market-based
systems of resolution with the right mix of incentives has been much discussed.
In principle, an evaluation of recent country programs could be undertaken
to address issues such as:
- How are
private market creditors being involved in the resolution of financial
crises and are principles in this respect being applied consistently?
Is debt sustainability/solvency analyzed in a consistent manner? Is
there a tendency to be over-optimistic about the expected return to
normalcy, e.g., expected reductions in risk premia?
- What has
been the catalytic role of Fund-supported programs and official financing
packages in mobilizing private capital (in terms of both volume and
terms of financing)? Why in many cases were private flows less than
assumed in the program?
- How effective
have been the various concerted efforts, short of a standstill, to secure
private sector involvement in major crisis uses? What has been the outcome
in terms of burden-sharing among creditors? Are further institutional
changes required to facilitate PSI?
- What lessons
do the early cases suggest about the impact of concerted PSI on the
real economy on the resumption of voluntary flows, and on the availability
of financing to other countries?
While these
are important issues, an argument against undertaking an evaluation at
this stage is that policy in this area is currently being discussed and
there are significant differences within the official community on how
the issues should be handled. The management initiative on introducing
a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism was potentially an important
element of private sector involvement but there is no agreement on this
proposal as yet. There is general agreement on the usefulness of Collective
Action Clauses (CAL), but too little experience.
G.
An Additional Country Case Study
20. The IEO
could undertake an in-depth examination of a recent country program with
the focus on the effectiveness of program design and conditionality. The
primary goal would not be to assess whether the IMF's actions were right
or wrong in a particular case (although that would be an additional outcome),
but to investigate in some detail what the case suggests about the IMF's
recent approach to program design as well as the structure and focus of
its conditionality. Programs chosen could be from either 2000 or 2001,
allowing evaluation of outcomes in the post-program period. Two possible
options could be considered:
(i) An investigation
of program design in a middle-income country, but not one of the major
"capital account crisis" cases, which are being examined in
other evaluations. Possibilities would include Bulgaria, Peru, Romania,
Sri Lanka, or the Ukraine.
(ii) A low-income
country that has not been able to advance to the PRSP stage owing to weak
policy formulation processes, fragile institutions, and a variety of governance
and other political problems, including post-conflict situations4.
An in-depth examination of the IMF's role in one such case could help
generate lessons on what the IMF's role and approach should be in such
cases.
- The focus
would be on the relevance and effectiveness of the IMF's role in such
cases, including whether the traditional approach to program design
and conditionality is well-suited to situations where weak governance
and institutions are the core problems to be addressed.
*
* * * *
Comments
are invited from all interested parties on the priority that should be
attached to the seven topics discussed in this paper in choosing 4 topics
for the IEO work program for FY 2005. Suggestions for including topics
not discussed in the paper are also invited.
The deadline
for submitting comments is Monday, December 22, 2003. Comments can be
submitted through the IEO website www.imf.org/ieo.
The final work program will be determined after taking account of comments
received and will be posted on the IEO website sometime in January 2004.
1Capital
Account Liberalization and Financial Sector Stability—Considerations
for Sequencing (SM/01/186, 6/25/2001).
2There is some potential overlap between this
issue and an evaluation of multilateral surveillance (see topic F).
3The 1999 External Evaluation of IMF Surveillance
identified an inadequate cross-fertilization between multilateral and
bilateral surveillance as a problem and made a number of recommendations
for improvements. The study could also assess the impact of these recommendations
4The ongoing evaluation of the IMF's role in
the PRSP and the PRGF is focusing on those countries that have completed
"full" PRSPs. This evaluation is expected to be completed in
Spring-2004 and will include six background case studies. However, only
32 of the 77 countries eligible for IMF concessional lending through the
PRGF have actually completed PRSPs as of end-September 2003.
Proposed
Medium-Term Work Program1
|
FY
2002/2003 |
|
1. |
Prolonged
use of IMF resources |
|
2. |
The
role of the IMF in three recent capital account crises, Indonesia,
Korea, and Brazil |
|
3. |
Fiscal
adjustment in IMF-supported programs |
|
|
|
FY
2004 |
|
4. |
An
evaluation of the PRGF/PRSP experience(to be undertaken jointly with
the World Bank's OED) |
|
5. |
Argentina
case study (In the original medium-term program, this item indicated
Argentina and Turkey as alternative possibilities) |
|
6. |
IMF
technical assistance |
|
|
|
Remaining
topics |
|
7. |
The
IMF's advice on financial sector restructuring after a crisis |
|
8. |
Structural
conditionality in Fund-supported programs. |
|
9. |
The
role of IMF surveillance in crisis prevention |
|
10. |
The
IMF's advice on exchange rate policy |
|
11. |
FSAP/FSSA |
|
12. |
Private
Sector Involvement (PSI) |
|
13. |
The
IMF's approach to capital account liberalization |
|
14. |
The
role of multilateral surveillance |
|
15. |
Low-income
country case |