Independent
Evaluation Office (IEO)
Issues Paper For An Evaluation Of Technical
Assistance
Provided By The IMF
This
issues paper sets out the direction for an IEO evaluation of technical
assistance (TA) provided by the IMF with the purpose of deriving
operational recommendations that can enhance its contribution
to the overall IMF mandate. It provides a brief background, identifies
the main areas to be examined, and reviews past evaluation efforts,
including recommendations and follow up. In light of the above,
the final section outlines the structure of the proposed evaluation
by the IEO.
I.
Background
The
IMF has historically provided a significant amount of TA to member
countries. In terms of person-years, TA activities in the field
account for about 18 percent of the total resources of area and
specialized functional departments.1
The
stated objectives of the IMF TA has been clearly defined in the
latest policy statement on IMF TA. "In accord with the IMF's
first Article of Agreement, the objective of the IMF's TA program
is to contribute to the development of the productive resources
of member countries by enhancing the effectiveness of economic
policy and financial management. The IMF's TA program works to
achieve this objective in two ways. First, much of the IMF's TA
seeks to support the efforts of members to strengthen their
capacity—in both human and institutional resources—to
formulate and implement sustainable, growth-oriented and poverty-reducing
macroeconomic, financial, and structural policies. Second, the
IMF assists countries in the design of appropriate macroeconomic
and structural policy reforms, taking account of the lessons learned
by other countries in addressing similar economic policy concerns."2
In
pursuing such objectives the pattern of IMF TA activities has
evolved over time. In the early 1990s, a significant share was
allocated to the transition countries to help them develop the
policies and institutions for a market economy. Since the late
1990s a greater share of resources has focused on PRGF countries, including improved governance through capacity
building. Crisis prevention, resolution and management, post-conflict
and regional arrangements have also received increased attention.
Regarding regional patterns at present Asia and Africa receive
each about 25 percent of TA resources, followed by Europe (mostly
transition economies) with 20 percent, and Latin America and the
Middle East, each receiving about 10 percent.
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II.
The Issues
In
examining whether IMF TA is achieving the objectives being stated
and, if necessary, to identify corrective steps, it is useful
to unbundle the stages of the TA process and ask three broad questions:
first, is the allocation of TA resources across countries and
to specific activities within countries consistent with such objectives?
Second, how effectively is TA being delivered during the implementation
period? Third, what has been the impact of TA and how is it being
measured and monitored? What has happened as a result of the program,
both in the short run and in the post delivery period, e.g., after
the program or project funding has ceased and what factors determine
the sustainability of benefits? These three areas are now examined.3
The
relevance and prioritization of TA programs. How is it being allocated?
The
major instruments of the IMF to achieve the institution's objectives
described earlier are lending in support of adjustment, IMF surveillance
and related diagnostic activities such as Reports on the Observance
of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), Financial Sector Assessment Programs
(FSAPs), as well as the provision of TA. A key question is how
TA resources are prioritized (across countries and specific activities
within countries), and how is TA linked to these other instruments
of the IMF in order to contribute most effectively to the broad
objectives of the institution?
Ideally,
a TA program should be derived from the IMF medium term strategy
of support to a member country (jointly developed with the authorities)
in its core areas of responsibility. The organizing principle
(to identify the relevant TA) should be to prevent a lack of knowledge
or know-how from becoming a critical bottleneck in the ultimate
implementation of key reforms under that strategy. This bottleneck
may operate through several channels: in the design of better
policies, the institutions required to implement and sustain them
over time, and the associated legislation and regulations that
allow the institutions to do the job.
Specific
knowhow may be needed to enhance the authorities ability to design
specific reform policies. In these cases TA tends to consist of
highly focused/short-term activities. But it may also be needed,
depending on the degree of institutional development, to support
the implementation of programs and policy advice or in enhancing
countries' own ability to diagnose. These activities are more
in the realm of capacity building, often requiring TA of longer
duration and follow up. The proper mix between short term and
longer-term TA activities, and how they interact with each other
and with the other instruments of the IMF over time becomes a
major challenge in the design of the overall TA program (Figure
1 illustrates the links between TA and other IMF instruments).
A
key question to be addressed is how well is this process working
today. Is TA provided to a country anchored in a medium-term IMF
strategy from which TA priorities can be coherently derived? Is
surveillance providing such an integrated view? Or is TA the result
of a piecemeal process driven by the separate needs of programs,
ROSCs, FSAPs, etc.? How are tradeoffs managed? How well are the
authorities involved in the process?
Effectiveness
and efficiency during the process of TA delivery
Achieving
the final objectives of TA will also depend on the efficiency
and effectiveness during the period of delivery. A good system
of tracking and monitoring—particularly in TA activities
of longer duration—is essential to identify midterm corrections
required by both the IMF and the authorities. Several questions
can be identified: (1) Were intermediate objectives achieved?
(2) How well is the IMF tracking and monitoring during implementation
both inputs and intermediate outputs? (3) Is there sufficient
clarity at the outset concerning these indicators and how success
is to be measured? (4) How effective has been the dialogue with
the authorities in assuring success during implementation?
Ex
post impact assessment
Most
TA activities have, by design or not, benefits beyond the delivery
period. When capacity building is the objective this post delivery
impact becomes the true test for the success of the project. The
ability of the IMF to identify the factors influencing sustainability
of such benefits and tracking these factors systematically becomes
important. Several questions arise: What has been the ex post
impact of TA activities and how well has the IMF assessed that
in the past? What are the factors influencing sustainability and
does the IMF try to identify them? What has been the role of country
ownership? Are there potential longer-term benefits of short term
TA activities that could be realized with modest allocation of
resources by the IMF?
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III.
The Result of Past Evaluations of IMF TA and Follow Up
In
1999, the Office of Internal Audit and Inspection (OIA) carried
out a comprehensive evaluation of IMF TA covering the Fiscal Affairs
Department (FAD), Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department (MAE),
and the Statistics Department (STA) activities.4 Several of the
issues discussed earlier were addressed by the evaluation, which
included an extensive use of questionnaires aimed at IMF staff,
consultants and government authorities and detailed evaluations
of a sample of randomly selected TA projects. Selective missions
were carried out to ascertain the consistency of data provided
by various parties.

Major
findings
The major findings were as follows:
- IMF
TA is highly appreciated by members who want more of it.
- While
IMF TA is rated highly for its advice and recommendations, gaining
country commitment and following-up seem to be the weakest parts
of the IMF's advisory processes; partly as a result, the impact
of TA projects was less than satisfactory in about one-third of
projects.
- In
general, TA provided by staff missions appears more likely to
be successful than that provided by long-term experts.
- While
implementation of advice and impact depend most importantly on
the commitment of the recipient country, the probability of achieving
high impact through can be improved by actions within the control
of the IMF.
- There
is only a weak link between IMF surveillance and IMF TA, the orientation
of which is generally reactive rather than proactive.
- There
is no explicit IMF policy on TA, little evaluation, little reporting
on results to management and the Executive Board, and little public
dissemination of the lessons learned.
The
evaluation of the selected TA interventions suggested that those
with the greatest impact were characterized by strong government
involvement and ownership, excellent communications between TA
providers and recipients, the placement of the project in a broader
policy framework, well-prepared experts, focused and specific
project preparation and recommendations, and special attention
to follow-up. Neither the existence of an IMF supported program
nor having an IMF resident representative in place appeared to
make a statistically significant difference with regard to impact.
Recommendations
The
major recommendations were:
1.
The need to link the assessment of TA priorities and allocation
decisions more closely to IMF surveillance. This should become
particularly important as the IMF works more intensely on the
implementation of international standards and codes relating to
statistics, fiscal transparency, and transparency in monetary
and financial policies. This will require a change in the orientation
of the IMF's TA from being largely curative to being more preventative.
The evaluation recommended that the Executive Board and management
adopt an explicit policy framework, guided by the principle that
the IMF should move beyond the concept of technical "assistance"
toward one of technical "consultation and cooperation".
2.
To integrate technical cooperation more closely with both surveillance
and program work, it was recommended that Article IV missions
should conduct technical consultations (TC) with all members on
their past progress in implementing past technical advice from
the IMF as well as their future needs. For countries requesting
significant volumes of TA, the staff should work with the authorities
in drawing up a "technical cooperation action plan (TCAP)"
that would place this cooperation in a medium-term framework.
3.
TA should be limited to those subject areas for which the IMF
has a comparative advantage. More weight should be given to
projects that are most related to the core objectives of the IMF
and to those demonstrating the strongest commitment by the authorities
to implement the advice they will receive. Where recipient country
commitment is weak despite best efforts by the IMF, technical
cooperation should be withdrawn.
4.
The probability of successful implementation of advice can
be improved by better IMF technical cooperation practices.
IMF practices need to secure a much closer involvement of national
authorities at all stages: defining the project, choosing the
delivery mode, choosing experts, formulating terms of reference,
monitoring the project, following up on implementation of recommendations,
and evaluating the project after its completion.
5.
Future requests for the assignment of long-term experts, and
the quality of the expert, need to be more closely scrutinized
and greater emphasis should be placed on the assignment of short-term
and peripatetic experts. The expert recruitment process should
be broadened with a view to finding more candidates that have
not only the required technical skills but also: excellent teaching,
communications, and language skills; and, experience in working
with countries at similar stages of development to the one to
which they will be assigned.
6.
TA Missions should work more closely with authorities in the
preparation of their work before departure, in the preparation
of their recommendations in the field, and in the follow-up to
recommendations and project evaluation after their return to headquarters.
Directors
supported the recommendations such as better integration of TA
into a country's overall policy framework and surveillance, improved
follow up and implementation of recommendations, strengthened
coordination among TA providers and national authorities, and
improved selection and training of experts. However, Directors
cautioned against over-burdening Article IV consultations. Furthermore,
they were concerned that commitments to medium-term programs of
TA should not undermine the IMF's ability to respond flexibly
to changing circumstances.
Follow
up and the 2002 OTM Review
Several
initiatives were taken in response to the recommendations of the
OIA Report. First, the IMF issued a policy statement on TA in
April 2001.5 It highlighted the importance of strengthening country
ownership of TA. It called for close consultation with the authorities
to ensure that the conditions were right for making good use of
an expert's time. It also called for a review past and current
TA efforts, including a country's track record in the implementation
of TA recommendations, and a consideration of future needs.
Second,
in order to better integrate TA with surveillance, the IMF carried
out pilot TCs in the context of surveillance, including a review
of past TA and agreement on future priorities. For countries with
extensive TA needs, the IMF undertook (also on a pilot basis)
comprehensive medium-term TCAPs to be discussed with the authorities.
Third,
a set of prioritization filters and guidelines were introduced
in 2000 (and revised in the April 2001 Policy Statement) to align
TA with the IMF's main core areas of specialization, main program
areas and key policy initiatives. A country's past track record
in effectively utilizing TA and its commitment to the implementation
of reform efforts were to become a critical filter.6
Fourth,
because the TA provided by the Legal Department (LEG) was not
included in the 1999 evaluation, a special evaluation of that
TA activity was carried out thereafter. The main conclusion was
similar to the 1999 evaluation. Notwithstanding the high quality
of the advice provided, the final implementation of the advice
and hence the overall impact was only moderate due to the authorities'
weak ownership of the project.
Fifth,
in recognition of the importance of TA in pursuing the IMF's core
mandate, IMF management upgraded the former Technical Assistance
Secretariat (TAS) to a separate office under the Office of the
Managing Director in June 2001. This office was expanded and renamed
the Office of Technical Assistance Management (OTM).
OTM
started a series of activities to standardize monitoring and evaluation
activities across the IMF as well as a future program for ex post
evaluations in specific areas/initiatives of TA. In June 2002,
OTM prepared a Board paper on "TA policy and experience,"
reviewing progress since the 1999 evaluation.7
The main findings and recommendations were:
- Prioritization
filters have provided greater transparency in the allocation of
TA resources and have helped to allocate resources in the face
of continuing excess demand.
- A
review of 29 TCs showed disappointing results. TA departments
responded that TCs did not yield sufficient value added to their
own planning process. Area departments reported that the exchange
of views with the authorities were less informative than expected.
In view of these findings—and the already apparent overloading
of Article IV consultations—the report recommended discontinuing
the TC initiative.
- The
"country focus" objective of TCs should be better addressed
through the new prioritization filters to allocate TA, which include
extensive country specific discussions between the area departments
and the TA departments in the context of the annual TA Resource
Allocation Plan (RAP)—the main vehicle to allocate resources
at the country level. (Thus, the main challenge is for RAPs to
provide the strategic focus to justify the rationale for the program.)
- Reflecting
the increased emphasis on monitoring and evaluation discussed
at previous Board meetings, TA departments have strengthened their
activities in this area. These changes have had a positive impact
on their ability to evaluate the effectiveness of TA. Departments
have occasionally carried out thematic, regional and country-specific
evaluations.
A
major development from the Board discussion was a request by Directors
for a more formal assessment of TA effectiveness and impact in
the context of a medium-term program of ex post evaluation. To
address this request OTM and the different TA departments have
recently prepared a 3 year forward looking program of evaluation.
This program includes a mixture of topics ranging from comprehensive
evaluation covering large country samples, focused policy area
studies with small country samples, evaluation of regional TA
centers and country or sector case studies. Specific topics include,
among others: TA in public expenditure management in Sub-Saharan
African countries, evaluation of TA provided through regional
TA centers, TA in anti-money laundering, and TA in support of
countries undergoing trade reform. The amount of TA delivered
in the areas covered by the evaluations is estimated at 150 person
years.
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IV.
Outline of the Proposed Evaluation
The
proposed evaluation will focus on some of the issues raised in
Section II, including assessing the follow up measures since the
1999 evaluation. Specifically, it would focus on the allocation
of TA resources, the delivery of TA to member countries, and considerations
related to ex post evaluation and how this feeds back into the
allocation and management of future TA resources. It will also
examine how the internal incentive system impacts on the effectiveness
of TA. The structure of the evaluation will be as follows:
1.
Trends and patterns in the allocation and delivery of TA
This
part of the evaluation will examine how the IMF allocates its
resources at the aggregate level. Using a database of TA activities
during the last six years it will look at:
- Patterns
over time, by major recipients and regions (including allocation
relative to economic performance).
- Composition
by subject.
- Share
of Post-conflict TA
- Patterns
associated with implementation of the new institutional mandates/filters
issued in FY 2001 to improve prioritization. Have they made a
difference?
- Are
there important discontinuities at the country level that may
signal a response to domestic developments such as reform effort,
ownership, etc.
2.
How are decisions on the allocation of IMF TA resources made?
This
component of the evaluation will look at how decisions are made
on who receives TA and in what areas it is provided. A sample
of (about 20) recent resource allocation plans (RAPS), through
which final decisions are made to allocate resources to a particular
country, will be examined for a group of TA recipients. This will
be supplemented with interviews and a review of internal documents
and Staff Reports, in an effort to better understand how the interaction
between the various players (e.g., area and TA departments, management,
country authorities, and the Executive Board) affects the allocation
and composition of TA resources across the IMF's membership. This
will also include RAPs in countries that receive little TA and
assess why this has been the case.
Some of the specific questions to be addressed are:
How
are the total resources devoted to TA by the main TA providing
departments being determined? What determines the allocation across
countries? How do different departments (area departments, TA
departments, PDR) interact with each other in the process? What
is the sequence?
- How
are TA priorities determined within a country? How much do they
reflect the need of IMF staff to build up their own knowledge?
Is surveillance providing a sufficient medium-term strategy from
which to derive TA needs and priorities? If this is the case,
how often do we observe TA priorities not linked to surveillance?
What were the specific reasons technical consultations (TC) on
TA as part of surveillance—a recommendation out of the 1999
evaluation—were not successful and then abandoned. Are there
alternative modalities to better link TA to surveillance?
- How
are country authorities involved in the process? Is there enough
ownership?
- How
is the allocation of TA determined by objective or policy
area driven by institutional priorities versus country priorities?
Have the "filters" introduced during the last two years
helped in setting priorities? Are there too few or too many?
- What
role do diagnostic instruments and policies introduced by the
IMF in the last several years (e.g., FSAPs, ROSCs, OCF Assessments,
Safeguards Assessments, etc.) play in decisions regarding the
allocation of TA resources?
- How
are decisions made on the modality for delivering TA? (e.g., between
short-term and longer term interventions, links with other TA
providers, etc.)
-
Is TA introduced too prematurely relative to the overall policy
effort? Is TA provided just to maintain a "presence"
in the country or a gesture of goodwill in the absence of a program?
- What
has been the impact on allocation decisions of any past evaluations
of TA provided to a particular country?
3.
The delivery stage
The
focus of this part of the evaluation is on the delivery of IMF
TA. This will require an examination of the relevance of TA in
specific country contexts, as well as the efficiency with which
TA is provided. The perspective taken in this section will largely
be that of the recipient country (i.e., the "client").
A group of 5/6 country case studies will be selected out of the
group of twenty to assess the manner in which TA resources, once
allocated, are delivered. The countries chosen will have received
a significant quantity of TA over the period under study and should
reflect a diversity of circumstances (i.e. PRGF-eligible, non-PRGF-eligible,
transition economy).
This
section will require country visits by members of IEO, possibly
augmented with the assistance of local consultants, to assess
the manner in which TA is delivered "on the ground".
It will require some in depth analysis of specific TA projects
approved during the last two years, including interviews with
recipients and providers of IMF TA as well as IMF staff working
in related areas (e.g., surveillance).
Some
of the questions to be addressed include the following:
- Are
TA interventions structured in such a way as to allow evaluability
over time (of both implementation and of impact)? How clearly
do they define, a priori, criteria with which to assess
implementation and impact? (e.g., intermediate outputs, final
impact indications, initial benchmarks)
- How
are choices on the specific TA provider made? (e.g. IMF staff
vs. external consultants?) What role does the recipient play in
this decision?
- How
does the actual TA delivered compare with the original strategy?
What explains the deviations? Are these deviations internally
or country driven?
- Are
there appropriate understandings between the IMF and the authorities
with respect to the expectations of the TA provider and of the
TA recipient on the manner in which it will be delivered to ensure
maximum impact?
- Do
departments track outcomes and indicators of success during
the lifetime of a project? If so, how? How is the need for mid-course
corrections identified by either the TA departments or by the
country? How has TA identified or adapted to shortcomings or unforeseen
circumstances?
- Does
the IMF take into account alternative sources of TA in order to
provide the maximum benefit to the membership, consistent with
its comparative advantage? How is IMF TA integrated into a wider
framework of country capacity building and/or donor efforts? To
what extent is IMF TA coordinated with that of the World Bank,
other IFIs and/or bilateral donors?
4.
Ex post evaluation and feedback
Drawing
on the subset of TA projects selected for the country case studies
(in Section 3), the following issues will be examined:
(a)
How does the IMF evaluate ex post impact and feed back that information
into future TA decisions?
- What
efforts were made by departments to assess success after completion
of the project? Do these ex post evaluations provide an objective
and easily understandable tool for ensuring accountability and
managing future TA resources? What is the involvement of the country's
authorities?
- What
efforts were made to identify medium-term (i.e., institutional)
impacts of projects beyond short-term technical outputs?
- Does
evaluation provide sufficient opportunity for institutional learning
and feed back into future TA allocation decisions and modalities
for delivery? Is there scope for improvement?
- What
has been the role of IMF resident representatives in this process?
(b)
What happened on the ground? Are there systemic factors impairing/explaining
the success of TA projects?
- What
was the short- and medium-term impact of specific TA activities
measured against the ultimate objective specified originally?
Do we observe effects not stated in the original objectives? Are
there systemic factors explaining successes/failures across projects
within a country or across projects in the same sector/area in
different countries?
- Are
there systemic factors explaining sustainability of impact beyond
the lifetime of the project? Is ownership a major factor affecting
the authorities' commitment to implementation of the advice? Have
these factors been incorporated in the earlier design or in midterm
corrections?
- Is
the internal incentive system geared toward the successful and
sustainable implementation of TA initiatives, particularly those
of long-term nature?
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V.
Scope and Methodology
The
evaluation will focus on TA activities provided and managed directly
from the IMF headquarters in Washington. It will not assess the
activities of the four TA Regional Centers that have been established
in the field. Two of the four are the newly created Regional Technical
Assistance Centers in Sub-Saharan Africa (AFRITAC's), which were
established at the end of 2002. We believe it is too early to
assess their performance. The other two centers (the Caribbean
Regional Technical Assistance Center, CARTAC, and the Pacific
Financial Technical Assistance Center, PFTAC) are being regularly
and independently evaluated.
The
evaluation will not cover the IMF Institute whose activities focus
on training not only for officials of member countries but also
extensively for the IMF own staff. Thus, its mandate is broader
and different than the TA activities to be assessed by this evaluation
and, if warranted, could be evaluated as a separate project.
As
mentioned earlier, the methodology and empirical basis of the
evaluation changes as it evolves across the different sections.
Section 1 (Trends and Patterns) will be based on the universe
of TA activities provided by FAD, MFD, STA, and LEG during the
last six years. Section 2 (How TA is allocated) will focus on
a sample of allocation exercises in the most recent two years,
covering a sample of about 20 countries representative of different
regions and levels of development, including those that have received
both large and small amounts of TA relative to their economic
size. They will include countries with and without programs. That
variability will enrichen the analysis of the determinants of
such allocations. It will examine internal documentation leading
to final allocations of TA resources and interview relevant staff
participating in country specific RAPS.
Section
3 (Delivery) and 4 (Impact and Evaluability) require more in depth
analysis of specific TA activities and country knowledge and will
rely extensively on what happens on the ground. These sections
will be based on a sample of about 5/6 countries from the above
group, focusing in those having received large amounts of TA.
They will rely on country visits and interviews with specific
authorities and country officials having been specifically associated
with the TA activities being examined.
The
evaluation will also consider the possibility of complementary
methodologies based on a broader use of questionnaires. For example,
questionnaires could be sent to a sample of consultants that have
been involved in TA activities in the field so as to elicit their
opinion on some of the issues raised in Sections 3 and 4.
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Footnotes
1
The specialized functional departments include Fiscal Affairs,
International Capital Markets, IMF Institute, Legal, Monetary
and Financial Systems, Policy Development and Review, Research,
Statistics, and Finance. To the extent that some preparatory TA
activity takes place in headquarters this figure may underestimate
the total TA activities undertaken.
2
"Policy Statement on IMF TA" (April 1, 2001), and Annex I.
3
These areas of analysis are consistent with the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) sequence for evaluating development assistance
namely: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and impact.
4
The MAE department was reorganized in 2003 and renamed Monetary
and Financial Systems Department (MFD).
5
Policy Statement on IMF TA," op.cit.
6
These filters are described in the April 2001 policy statement
on IMF TA (Annex I). The filters basically identify specific program
areas and policy initiatives. The specific program areas are crisis
prevention, poverty reduction (PRGF countries), crisis resolution,
post-conflict situations, and regional arrangements. Specific
policy initiatives include follow-up TA for standards and codes,
FSAP, HIPC, safeguard of IMF resources, offshore financial centers
and policy reforms/capacity building.
7
International Monetary Fund (2002), "Review of TA Policy and Experience,"
IMF Memorandum, SM/02/180, available online at www.imf.org/external/np/ta/2002/eng/061202.pdf.
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ANNEX
I. Policy Statement on IMF Technical Assistance
Policy
Statement on IMF Technical Assistance
April
1, 2001
In
accord with the IMF's first Article of Agreement, the objective
of the IMF's technical assistance1
program is to contribute to the development of the productive
resources of member countries by enhancing the effectiveness of
economic policy and financial management. The IMF's TA program
works to achieve this objective in two ways. First, much of the
IMF's TA seeks to support the efforts of members to strengthen
their capacity—in both human and institutional resources—to
formulate and implement sustainable, growth-oriented and poverty-reducing
macroeconomic, financial, and structural policies. Second, the
IMF assists countries in the design of appropriate macroeconomic
and structural policy reforms, taking account of the lessons learned
by other countries in addressing similar economic policy concerns.
In both ways, IMF TA provides a cooperative framework for the
sharing of knowledge and international experience, in a lasting
manner, with member countries.
Scope
and Nature
The
IMF seeks to provide TA as efficiently and effectively as possible
in its core substantive areas of competency, namely:
- macroeconomic
policy formulation and management;
- monetary
policy; central banking; the financial system; and foreign exchange
markets and policy;
- fiscal
policy, public finances, and fiscal management;
- macroeconomic,
external, fiscal, and financial statistics.
The
specific topics covered, and the relative emphasis given, are
very much influenced by the issues that emerge in the course of
the IMF's surveillance and program activities, such as the recent
focus on the links between high-quality growth and poverty reduction.
The
Annex to this Statement describes the TA provided by the functional
departments of the IMF and summarizes the core areas in which
the IMF seeks to concentrate its TA. The IMF's regional (or area)
departments, which are responsible for country-level management
of surveillance and program operations, collaborate closely with
the functional departments in the planning, implementation, monitoring,
and follow-up of TA.
Mode
of delivery. TA is provided in a variety of forms. These include
staff missions from headquarters; the placement of experts for
periods ranging from a few months to a few years (depending on
the nature of the tasks to be done and the capacity and interest
of the countries concerned); the preparation of technical and
diagnostic reports; the delivery of training courses, seminars,
and workshops; and the on-line provision of advice and support
from headquarters. TA and training are also delivered from regionally-based
centers.
Recruitment
of experts. The IMF provides the services of qualified experts,
either directly from its staff or from external sources. These
are often drawn from the staff, or former staff, of member country
ministries, institutions, and agencies. The IMF seeks to expand
and review its roster of experts, in order to ensure an adequate
supply of well-qualified specialists that are conversant with
technical developments in their particular fields of expertise.
The principal approach to identifying candidates is through the
IMF's contacts with central banks, financial supervision agencies,
ministries of finance, tax and customs departments and statistical
offices. Advertising is also occasionally used for highly-specific
scarce skills. The importance of appropriate language, communication,
and pedagogic skills is recognized in the recruitment of staff
and experts. All IMF experts are professionally supervised and
administratively backstopped by technically-qualified IMF headquarters
staff. The IMF's resident representatives also liaise closely
with experts during their assignments. During staff visits, area
departments may follow up on the implementation of TA-related
policy advice and the work of experts.
Collaboration
with other assistance providers. The IMF is committed to cooperate
and collaborate with other providers of TA. The global decline
in Official Development Assistance levels underscores the need
to ensure that duplication and overlap in coverage are avoided
and that TA is delivered by the most appropriate source within
a carefully-coordinated framework. The limited character of the
TA provided by the IMF offers a fruitful basis for such collaboration,
with the IMF's provision of experts usefully complemented by TA-related
services and equipment offered by other TA agencies.
Determining
Technical Assistance Priorities
The
sources of demand for IMF TA. The IMF's TA services are one
of the benefits and rights of membership, and its provision, in
almost all cases, is not related to IMF conditionality (i.e.,
TA would not be a requirement as part of an IMF-supported program).2
Much of the demand by countries for the IMF's TA services arises
from the perception of recipient governments that such assistance
can play an important role in helping them to strengthen their
implementation of macroeconomic policies. As indicated above,
the IMF's surveillance and program activities may also generate
requests for TA from the IMF. Specifically, it is often during
discussions with country authorities during Article IV consultations,
or when designing and monitoring IMF-supported programs, that
the needs for capacity building and policy strengthening are mutually
recognized and the concomitant requirements for TA clearly identified.
Recently, the IMF has given added emphasis to the importance of
a better integration of TA with its surveillance and program activities.
In this regard, it stresses the importance of encouraging countries
to identify their TA needs and priorities well in advance, rather
than waiting for problems to emerge. Working in partnership, the
IMF and governments are thus moving further from a "reactive"
to a more "proactive" stance in the planning, prioritization,
and delivery of TA.
Linking
TA with surveillance. This objective is currently being pursued,
on an experimental basis in two respects. First, Technical Assistance
Consultations (TCs) have been added to the agenda of a selected
number of Article IV missions. A TC provides an opportunity for
discussions on the effectiveness of past IMF TA and on the scope
and direction of future possible assistance from the IMF. Secondly,
for countries facing critical capacity constraints in their efforts
to implement programs of economic and financial reforms, the IMF
initiated a pilot project involving the preparation of medium-term
Technical Cooperation Action Plans (TCAPs). These action plans
are intended to comprise a comprehensive assessment of a country's
or sub-region's macroeconomic and financial management weaknesses
in the core areas of the IMF's work and an elaboration of a TA
program for addressing these. Such exercises are carried out by
IMF staff and the country authorities with the active participation
and support of other interested donors. The preparation of a TCAP
is seen as the beginning of a dynamic process which would involve
a commitment by the authorities, the IMF, and other donors to
provide resources to implement the plan and jointly to monitor
and adjust its implementation over an agreed time period.
Unanticipated
sources of demand. Despite the intention to improve projections
of TA requirements through the Technical Assistance Consultations
and TCAPs, some of the demand for TA from the IMF will still arise
in response to unexpected changes in the policy environment of
a country—a change in government, an unanticipated crisis,
or an external shock. There is thus expected to remain a continuing
element of unpredictability in the demand for TA services, and
an important characteristic of the IMF's TA program will remain
its capacity to respond quickly to such situations.
Prioritizing
requests. TA is provided only when requested by a country's
authorities.3 Since the demand for such assistance normally exceeds
the resources available from the IMF, a number of considerations
are taken into account in prioritizing country requests. Guidelines,
in the form of the following "filters," are used in
considering requests.
Filter
1—Core specialization of the IMF. The assistance
provided must fall within the substantive areas of TA recognized
as being within the IMF's core areas of specialization listed
in the Annex to this report. The IMF provides TA that supports
policy reform and builds institutional capacity.
Filter
2—Main program areas. TA must be clearly directed
towards supporting one of five main program areas.
These
are:
- preventing
or containing crises and their contagion effects in non-program
countries (principally systemically important non-industrial countries
and emerging market economies);
- implementing
sustainable debt relief and poverty reduction programs for low
income countries (encompassing the full range of TA in support
of both poverty reduction initiatives and policies to restore
macroeconomic stability);
- fostering
and maintaining macroeconomic and financial sector stability in
countries not currently using IMF resources (largely middle income
and transition economies);
- promoting
regional capacity building initiatives, including training and,
in some cases, regional integration efforts; and
- rehabilitating
basic economic and financial institutions in post-conflict situations.
Filter
3—Key policy initiatives. Assistance should be
focused on supporting the IMF's key policy priorities and initiatives.
While these will vary over time, at present they are as follows:
- Standards
and codes: follow-up assistance to help countries bring
their fiscal, financial, and statistical practices (including
legal instruments) in compliance with the standards and codes
that are under the auspices of the IMF. This would include TA
to help countries undertake assessments of their compliance with
such standards;
- Financial
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP): follow-up assistance
to help countries address weaknesses identified in an FSAP;
- HIPC
programs: TA for strengthened public expenditure management
systems to track the use of debt relief for poverty reduction
outlays as well as basic economic and financial statistics improvement
under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative;
- Safeguarding
IMF resources: Assistance in support of strengthened public
expenditure management or central bank accounting and reserve
management practices (and associated legal instruments) as well
as addressing data misreporting issues;
- Offshore
financial centers: assessments and introduction of best practices;
and
- Policy
reforms/institutional capacity building in support of achieving
macroeconomic viability: For instance, revenue mobilization
efforts; strengthening sound monetary policy; developing macroprudential
and other statistical indicators.
Filter
4—Impact and commitment. A country's past track
record, and its degree of ownership and commitment, should receive
a large weight in appraising a request for TA. These factors could
be offset by other considerations only in limited set of cases,
such as dealing with systemic countries or crisis situations.
At times, a change in government may result in stronger ownership
and better prospects for successful assistance, even where a poor
track record exists.
Filter
5—Regional diversity. The principle of uniformity
of treatment of members requires that some diversity in TA resource
allocation be maintained, and that small countries' needs, where
TA can often have high impact and where other sources of assistance
may be unavailable, are not ignored.
Filter
6—Availability of external financing. Although
availability of external financing should normally not be a decisive
factor, cooperation with other donors providing funding for IMF
TA and/or to support other elements of assistance which the IMF
cannot easily provide (for example, equipment, in-country training,
systems development, local expertise, etc.) should be positively
taken into account when appraising requests for TA.
Filter
7—Nature of the request. Requests for a policy
or diagnostic mission, or short-term expert, are obviously less
costly than requests for a resident expert. Some of these requests
can be met without significantly impinging on the IMF's overall
TA program resources, irrespective of their priority, unless they
are likely to have implications for longer-term follow-up assistance.
Filter
8—Regional approach. Given the high cost of providing
assistance to small member countries, and in the light of common
problems even among some of the larger countries, the IMF will
actively seek opportunities for using regionally-based approaches
to providing TA. In some situations, regional TA centers may be
an efficient solution (the Pacific Financial Technical Assistance
Center (PFTAC), for example) and will be pursued.
Filter
9—Presence of other TA providers. In deciding
whether to provide assistance, the IMF will consider whether other
providers are actively engaged in similar efforts. Duplication
should be avoided, and where requests are made in such situations,
all efforts at coordination will be made.
Role
of Recipient Governments in Realizing Effective TA
Strengthening
recipient country ownership. The IMF's TA program is based
on the fundamental principle that to be effective and to have
a high impact, it is important to ensure that a partner country
is fully committed to owning the work associated with the assistance
and implementing the recommendations flowing from it. This underscores
the importance of having IMF TA activities planned and implemented
with the full involvement of the recipient authorities at each
of the various stages of the process, from identification of need
through discussion and agreement on terms of reference and project
objectives, to implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. Particularly
when it is intended to field a long-term expert—whether
on a full-time or peripatetic basis—close consultation with
the authorities is critical in order to ensure that the conditions
are right for making good use of an expert's time. Such consultation
should result in reaching agreement on the type of expert required;
the needed qualifications and experience; and, ultimately, on
the individual chosen to provide the TA. A mutual review of the
results of past and current TA efforts, including a country's
track record in the implementation of TA recommendations, and
a consideration of future needs, are important aspects of the
process of enhancing ownership by recipient country authorities.
Charging
policy of the IMF for its TA. In line with the practice of
other bilateral and multilateral agencies, the IMF's TA is generally
provided free of charge. The exception relates to the assignment
of long-term experts (defined as experts residing in a country
for six months or more), for middle- and upper-income countries
which are asked to make a specified financial contribution to
the IMF. The IMF's management determines the precise quantitative
charges within a basic policy framework on country contributions
established by the IMF's Executive Board. Currently, middle-income
countries are expected to make a partial cash contribution and
upper-income countries are expected to reimburse the full cost
of long-term TA. As a cooperative undertaking between the IMF
and the requesting country, the IMF recognizes that successful
TA requires careful preparation and commitment of resources by
the recipient authorities. Important in this regard are the assignment
of counterpart staff and adequate complementary resources (for
example, office space and equipment, administrative support staff,
communications facilities, material supplies, and utilities),
all of which amounts to a considerable real cost for the recipient
government, over and above whatever charges may be levied by the
IMF.
Monitoring
and Evaluation
Development
of a cost-effective and well-integrated system of monitoring and
evaluation. Monitoring and evaluation are essential for ensuring
accountability and transparency in TA activities; for assessing
their relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and impact; and for
drawing lessons on how to strengthen ongoing and future assistance
operations. The size of the IMF's TA program, though still modest
by international standards, has reached a level requiring the
adoption of a systematic approach to TA monitoring and evaluation.
Staff are in the process of preparing proposals in this area,
drawing on the experience and current practices of other agencies.
Monitoring needs to involve both IMF staff and country authorities
in order to ensure that all ongoing TA efforts meet agreed targets
and objectives and produce the required outputs. Monitoring also
inevitably involves the making of evaluative-type judgments during
a project's lifetime, which are then used to improve ongoing implementation
efforts. In contrast, more analytical evaluation exercises generally
take a longer perspective, are often carried out independently
of the directly-involved staff (sometimes by external evaluators),
and focus mainly on completed operations or on completed operations
of an ongoing program.
A
common approach to monitoring and evaluation will be developed
to enable judgments across countries and selected subject areas,
so that lessons can be drawn and used to strengthen future operations.
All monitoring and evaluation activities will require input from
the recipient authorities, at the project and policy level, to
ensure their views on the reasons for success and failure of TA
are fully taken into account. In-depth, thematic evaluation studies
on selected topics are expected to complement routine and comprehensive
monitoring activities by individual TA departments. Such studies
serve as a cross-check on the consistency and quality of the advice
rendered, and allow for an assessment of the policy and capacity-building
impact of the TA provided and of its sustainability. Independent
evaluations will also be undertaken, taking account of budgetary
implications.
External
Dissemination
The
IMF recognizes the importance of disseminating information on
its TA activities of general interest both to the membership and
the public at large. One vehicle for this is the Annual Report
on TA to the Executive Board, which summarizes TA activities and
related policy developments over the previous year, as well as
the outcome of monitoring and evaluation efforts. The report will
also highlight any policy issues on which Board guidance may be
needed.
In
the interests of transparency and a public well-informed on key
economic policy matters, the IMF believes that information on
the lessons learned from the IMF's TA program, as well as on the
assistance provided to individual countries, should be disseminated
as widely as possible. Thus, information on the general substance
of the IMF's technical policy advice in the different functional
areas is disseminated both through IMF research and other publications
(handbooks, occasional papers, and pamphlets, for example), and
increasingly on the IMF's external website. While the IMF recognizes
the public interest would also be served by the provision of information
on the country- specific advice tendered by the IMF, it
is also important to recognize that members may seek the IMF's
technical advice on a confidential basis. It is thus appropriate
that a member country should have the right to decide on whether
to allow publication of this advice. For this reason, individual
TA reports will continue to be circulated on a restricted basis
within the IMF, the World Bank, and other cooperating donor agencies,
with wider distribution contingent upon the permission of the
country concerned.
Internal
Management of Technical Assistance
Although
the management of the IMF's TA program is largely devolved to
individual departments, IMF-wide policies and procedures governing
the financing, planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation,
and reporting are coordinated and developed by a senior-level
Technical Assistance Committee (TAC). Reporting directly to the
Deputy Managing Director responsible for TA matters, the TAC also
acts as a forum for reaching agreement on recommendations to management
on the allocation of TA resources across the different geographic
regions and functional areas. In addition, it serves as the coordinator
for pilot initiatives undertaken by the IMF (such as the recent
experiment with Technical Assistance Consultations and Technical
Cooperation Action Plans) and for the implementation of the reforms
that emanated from the Executive Board's June 1999 review of the
IMF's TA activities. The TAC and its subcommittees are supported
by a small unit, the Technical Assistance Secretariat (TAS), attached
to the Office of Budget and Planning in the Office of the Managing
Director, which also assists in negotiating and administering
TA agreements with other agencies and donors. The TAS compiles
aggregate data on planned and actual TA delivery for internal
and external reporting purposes.
Role
of External Financing
In
recent years, the IMF has sought to expand its range of contacts
and collaboration with other TA providers. For example, the IMF
has cooperated with other donor agencies on a number of large-scale
integrated multi-year assistance projects of administrative and
institutional reform. Equally, the IMF's TA program has benefited
from generous co-financing from a few multilateral and bilateral
agencies, which have supplemented the IMF's own budgetary resources
for these activities. As the IMF intensifies its efforts to help
countries strengthen their economic policy and financial management
capacities, the pressure of demand on its TA resources is likely
to increase further—for work on implementing the new international
codes and standards; for work on strengthening the banking sector
and financial systems; for helping HIPC countries undertake debt
sustainability analyses and managing their debt reduction programs;
and for public expenditure management and statistical TA in connection
with the design and implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers and IMF-supported policy programs under the new Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility. The IMF will seek every opportunity
to cooperate with other agencies in these areas. The Technical
Cooperation Action Plans in particular will require the close
involvement of other donor agencies,4
since effecting and financing their implementation will greatly
exceed the TA resources and instruments available to the IMF.
The
IMF encourages member countries that have not yet done so to consider
providing such complementary financial support in order to enhance
the resources available for TA, preferably in a manner that is
as unrestricted as possible. Meanwhile, the IMF's efforts to deepen
collaboration on TA with its multilateral and bilateral development
partners will continue.
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Footnotes
1
The term "technical assistance" as used here includes training
provided to country officials such as those organized by the IMF
Institute.
2
Eligibility for TA for countries in protracted arrears to the
IMF is restricted in the absence of specific approval of the Executive
Board, which takes account of a country's degree of cooperation
with the IMF in seeking to redress its arrears difficulties.
3
TA may also be provided, at the IMF Board's discretion, to nonmembers
and to international organizations.
4
It will be particularly important to involve the World Bank and
the UNDP, to ensure consistency with the Bank's Comprehensive
Development Framework and the UN system's Country Strategy.
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