Journal Description Editorial Committee How to Subscribe Forthcoming Articles Staff Papers Archive Copyright Information Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view pdf files Free Email Notification Receive emails when we post new
items of interest to you. |
|
|
|
Public Disclosure and Bank Failures By Tito Cordella and Eduardo Levy Yeyati Full Text of This Article (PDF 1,191 K)
Abstract: We study how public disclosure of banks' risk exposure affects banks'
risk taking incentives and assesses the impact of the presence of informed depositors on the
soundness of the banking system. We find that when banks have complete control over the
volatility of their loan portfolio, public disclosure reduces the probability of banking crisis.
However, when banks do not control their risk exposure, the presence of informed depositors
may increase the probability of bank failures. [JEL D28,G14,G21,G28] © 1998 International Monetary Fund |
