About F&D
Subscribe
Back Issues
Write Us
Copyright Information
Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view a pdf file of this article
Free Email Notification
Receive emails when we post new
items of interest to you.
Subscribe or
Modify your profile
|
|
|
|
Are Currency Boards a Cure for All Monetary
Problems?
Charles Enoch and Anne-Marie Gulde
Currency board arrangements may be coming back into fashion. What recent successes have
countries had with currency boards and in what circumstances are they most likely to be effective?
Currency board arrangements, under which domestic currency can be issued only to the
extent that it is fully covered by the central bank's holdings of foreign exchange, were long
generally dismissed as throwbacks to the colonial era. (See box for an explanation of what
currency boards are and how they work.) It was argued that such a rigid, rule-based arrangement
was not well suited to diversified economies in many of which the authorities had developed
sophisticated skills in monetary management. Instead, currency boards were seen as desirable and,
indeed, workable only in very special circumstances, such as the small, open economies of
city-states and small islands. In 1960, 38 countries or territories were operating under a currency
board. By 1970, there were 20 and, by the late 1980s, only 9.
What is a currency
board?
|
A currency board combines three elements: an exchange rate that is fixed to an "anchor
currency," automatic convertibility (that is, the right to exchange domestic currency at this fixed
rate whenever desired), and a long-term commitment to the system, which is often set out directly
in the central bank law. The main reason for countries to contemplate a currency board is to
pursue a visible anti-inflationary policy.
A currency board system can be credible only if the central bank holds sufficient official
foreign exchange reserves to at least cover the entire narrow money supply. In this way, financial
markets and the public at large can be assured that every domestic currency bill is backed by an
equivalent amount of foreign currency in the official coffers. Demand for a "currency board
currency" will therefore be higher than for currencies without a guarantee, because holders know
that "rain or shine" their liquid money can be easily converted into a major foreign currency. In
the event of a "testing of the system," a currency board's architects contend, automatic stabilizers
will prevent any major outflows of foreign currency. The mechanism works through changes in
money supply within the currency board country—a contraction in the case of a flight into
the anchor currency—which will lead to interest rate changes that, in turn, will induce
investors to move funds. While this is essentially the same mechanism that also operates under a
fixed exchange rate, the exchange rate guarantee implied in the currency board rules ensures that
the necessary interest rate changes and the attendant costs for the economy will be lower.
Economic credibility, low inflation, and lower interest rates are the immediately obvious
advantages of a currency board. But currency boards may prove limiting, especially for countries
that have weak banking systems or are prone to economic shocks. With a currency board in place,
the central bank can no longer be an unlimited lender of last resort to banks in financial trouble.
At most, it may make loans from an emergency fund that is either set aside at the time the
currency board is designed or, over time, funded from central bank profits. Another cost could be
the national authorities' inability to use financial policies, such as adjustments of domestic interest
or exchange rates, to stimulate the economy; instead, under a currency board, economic
adjustment will have to come by way of wage and price adjustments, which can be both slower
and more painful.
|
|
The renewed interest in currency boards has come in several waves, raising the number of
countries currently using them to 14 (see table). Following the successful use of a currency board
to stabilize the economy in the aftermath of Argentina's hyperinflation in 1991, additional
attributes of currency boards became evident as a result of the successful efforts made by two
transition economies—Estonia and Lithuania—to achieve credibility quickly for their
newly established currencies. In 1997, a currency board was introduced to end the economic
chaos in Bulgaria. In view of the favorable outcome, and given that to date no currency board has
had to be abandoned as a result of a crisis, the discussion about potential candidates has recently
been broadened further. In early 1998, there was serious discussion of whether a currency board
would be an appropriate anchor to use in efforts to halt the Indonesian currency crisis. Most
recently, there have been calls to study the possibility of stabilizing the Russian ruble under a
currency board.
Currency boards in
operation
|
Country/region |
Years
in operation |
Peg
currency |
Special
features |
|
Antigua and
Barbuda |
32 |
U.S.
dollar |
Member of
East Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) |
Argentina |
6 |
U.S.
dollar |
One-third of
coverage can be in U.S. dollar-denominated government bonds |
Bosnia and
Herzegovina |
1 |
deutsche
mark |
|
Brunei
Darussalam |
30 |
Singapore
dollar |
|
Bulgaria |
1 |
deutsche
mark |
Excess
coverage in banking department to deal with banking sector weaknesses |
Djibouti |
48 |
U.S.
dollar |
Switched peg
currency from French franc to U.S. dollar |
Dominica |
32 |
U.S.
dollar |
Member of
ECCB |
Estonia |
6 |
deutsche
mark |
Excess
coverage for domestic monetary interventions |
Grenada |
32 |
U.S.
dollar |
Member of
ECCB |
Hong Kong
SAR |
14 |
U.S.
dollar |
|
Lithuania |
4 |
U.S.
dollar |
Central bank
has the right to appreciate the exchange rate |
St. Kitts and
Nevis |
32 |
U.S.
dollar |
Member of
ECCB |
St.
Lucia |
32 |
U.S.
dollar |
Member of
ECCB |
St. Vincent
and the Grenadines |
32 |
U.S.
dollar |
Member of
ECCB |
|
Sources: Bali�o and others
(1997); and Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (1998). |
|
Currency boards and inflation
Ultimately, the relative merits of currency board arrangements and other forms of exchange
rate pegs cannot be resolved by theory alone. Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (1998) have undertaken an
empirical investigation, extending the existing literature on inflation performance under fixed
exchange rates. Given the empirically verified anti-inflationary capability of fixed exchange rate
systems, it can be argued that instituting a currency board arrangement makes sense only if the
regime delivers even better inflation performance. By using a data set containing all IMF member
countries over more than twenty-five years, the study attempted to isolate the inherent effects of a
currency board arrangement regardless of the many country-specific challenges facing countries
where such arrangements are in operation—for example, hyperinflation (Argentina and
Bulgaria), transition to a market economy (Bulgaria, Estonia, and Lithuania), volatile terms of
trade (Eastern Caribbean Currency Board), post-conflict situations (Bosnia), or the presence of an
international financial center (Hong Kong SAR).
Comparative statistics and more formal econometric analysis confirm that, historically,
currency board arrangements have done better than even other fixed exchange rate regimes. For
example, the presence of a currency board arrangement is found to lower annual inflation by
about 3.5 percentage points—the result of a "confidence effect" that essentially arises from
the faster growth of money demand made possible by the greater institutional certainty associated
with a currency board. In contrast to fears often raised by opponents of currency boards, Ghosh,
Gulde, and Wolf (1998) did not find that existing currency boards had any negative effects on
growth.
Creating an operating environment
Even if economic arguments favor a currency board arrangement, its operational feasibility
will depend on whether the attendant legal and institutional issues are effectively addressed. Their
importance should not be underestimated: although a currency board is a simple monetary
arrangement, a range of important decisions must be made about its specific nature, including
changes needed in the institutional framework for financial management in the economy and,
especially, in the legal environment in which central banking is carried out. Unless these
adjustments—which tend to be more time-consuming than those involved in carrying out
other exchange regime shifts and in many countries will have to be resolved in full public view
(for instance, in parliamentary debates)—are completed satisfactorily, a currency board
cannot be established in a way that will enable a country to achieve the necessary improvement in
the credibility of its monetary policy.
The basic decisions that need to be made when a country establishes a currency board
arrangement include choosing the peg or anchor currency, setting the level of the peg, and
determining whether or not to include a "safety margin" for the financial sector. Changes are also
required to the legal system and the government's relations with the central bank.
- Obvious criteria to use in choosing an anchor include the strength and international
usability of a currency, which generally rule out all but a handful of moneys. In fact, the 14
currency board arrangements currently in operation involve pegs to only three currencies: the
U.S. dollar (10 countries), the deutsche mark (3 countries), and the Singapore dollar (1 country).
In choosing from among this much narrower field, a country should carefully consider its current
and prospective trade flows, as well as other economic links, with the country issuing the currency
to which a country's currency is pegged. A country's choice can get more complicated if its
economy is characterized by widespread "currency substitution," where the currency used is not
that of its major trading partner. In this case, or where the values of a country's trade with two
dominant currency blocs are roughly equal, a currency basket is a theoretical option. In practice,
however, all countries that have introduced currency board arrangements so far have opted for the
simplicity of a single currency.
- Setting the exchange rate would appear straightforward, given that a currency board
arrangement by definition has to cover a monetary aggregate, usually the full amount of reserve
money but sometimes narrower definitions of money. Yet the rate at which the central bank's
available international reserves cover the monetary aggregate in question varies depending on the
exact definition of reserves used. Choosing the appropriate definition most likely involves a
trade-off: although a narrow definition of foreign reserves, such as "net reserves," might signal
strong discipline and possibly improve the credibility of the system, it might also require an
up-front devaluation that would prove politically and economically infeasible.
- In a "pure" currency board arrangement, the currency board has no margin to intervene
as lender of last resort on behalf of a bank in difficulties or to engage in open market operations.
A country weighing the option of establishing a currency board may, however, seek a "safety
margin" of some excess coverage, holding reserves of 100+x percent of the monetary
base. In this case, interventions of up to x percent of base money would be possible
without violating the currency board rules. While most operating arrangements do allow for some
form of limited intervention, the decision to include this feature should not be taken lightly. Room
for maneuver in case of unexpected difficulties is possible only at a more depreciated exchange
rate than would have been necessary under other exchange arrangements. Intervention may also
limit the transparency—and, thereby, the credibility—of the system.
- A sound legal basis is essential, because a currency board arrangement derives much of
its credibility from the changes required in the central bank law concerning exchange rate
adjustments. Countries seriously considering establishing a currency board may therefore wish to
incorporate some, or all, of the above-mentioned principles into the central bank law. The law
must define both the exchange rate and reserves, as well as specify the limited powers of the
managing institution under the system. It is sometimes argued that the rules governing a currency
board could be asymmetrical, permitting the central bank to appreciate the exchange rate but
requiring legal action before depreciation can be undertaken. For example, the rules governing
Lithuania's currency board contain such provisions. The period needed to set up the necessary
legal process will obviously differ across countries, depending on the availability of technically
skilled lawyers who can draw up a draft bill and the minimum parliamentary requirements for its
enactment into law. In most countries, the process will take time owing to parliamentary
discussion about the merits of the proposed arrangement, which may itself require the relevant
authorities to carry out an intensive information campaign.
- Finally, establishment of a currency board arrangement will require the redefinition of
the financial relationships within the country's government. More often than not, the initial
inflationary impetus that is to be eliminated by moving to a currency board has been created
through extensive central bank financing of the government. Rules for a currency board
arrangement therefore need to prohibit new central bank loans to the government. What financial
links there are to be between the central bank and the government, and how these are to
function—most important, how the central bank will handle government deposits—will
also need to be worked out. Although the central bank continues to handle government accounts
under some currency board arrangements, doing so may decrease the arrangement's transparency.
Further difficulties may arise from the fact that government deposits are callable at short notice,
and consistency with currency board arrangement rules can be achieved only if such accounts are
fully covered by foreign reserve holdings. For these reasons, some economies with currency
boards—most notably Hong Kong SAR—have moved all government accounts to
commercial banks. Other economies with currency board arrangements, including some transition
economies, have felt that the commercial banking sector was not yet able to handle the
government's accounts and, hence, have opted to keep them with the monetary authority. In this
case, however, interest on these accounts can be paid only to the extent that the currency board
has a flow income from its foreign reserve holdings that exceeds its operating costs. In addition,
transparency is likely to be enhanced if the public debt management function, an auxiliary service
provided by many central banks, is clearly placed outside the domain of the currency board,
possibly by creating an independent agency under the ministry of finance.
Transition to a currency board
The rules laid down in the new central bank law will serve as guideposts for reorganizing the
central bank into a currency board. In a number of countries that have recently adopted currency
board arrangements, this has involved setting up separate banking and issue departments, each
with distinct functions and coming under the authority of different deputy governors. Other
countries with currency board arrangements, such as Argentina, have retained a unified structure
for the monetary authority. In either case, a reorganization has to take place to allow easy
identification of the central bank's key activities and to ensure that maintenance of the relevant
currency cover ratios will be clearly visible. To that end, the currency board arrangement will have
to publish a well-defined set of statistics (including, for instance, the balance sheet of the issue
department or statistics on selected assets and liabilities included in that balance sheet) in a form,
and according to a calendar, that are consistent with the currency board arrangement law.
Establishing a currency board arrangement will also generally involve reviewing how the
central bank will carry out its new core functions, the most important of which is reserve
management. The added importance of reserve management under a currency board arrangement
is obvious, given that the board's earnings from foreign exchange holdings will probably be its
major source of income and because even a small violation of the cover requirement, which could
arise from technical problems in reserve management, might cause serious trouble for the
arrangement.
Finally, conducting a review of the banking sector and prudential standards and deciding on
the location of banking supervision will generally also be necessary during the transition to a
currency board arrangement. The review and, if required, a streamlining of the banking sector are
important because of the elimination of, or reduction in, the central bank's ability to function as a
lender of last resort under such an arrangement. During this period, the authorities may decide to
transfer banking supervision, which has often been carried out by the central bank, to an
independent agency to avoid possible circumvention of currency board arrangement rules in case
of banking sector difficulties. If, for reasons of timing or organization, banking supervision
functions cannot be performed outside the central bank, it has to demonstrate clearly that any
support it provides to banks in difficulty will not breach the currency board arrangement rules.
Conclusion
Currency boards in many countries have achieved impressive economic results, both in
achieving lower inflation than other exchange rate regimes and in stabilizing expectations after
prolonged hyperinflation. There have thus been calls for such arrangements to be established in a
rather diverse group of other countries, many of which are in crisis. Such calls should be viewed
warily by national governments, for at least three reasons. First, the success stories largely reflect
the experiences smaller countries have had with currency boards, whose applicability to larger
countries has yet to be fully demonstrated. Second, and equally important, the successful
establishment of a currency board arrangement requires time for building consensus, as well as for
careful planning and implementation of important legal and institutional changes. Third, countries
with one or several weak banks may have to rehabilitate them before changing their monetary
regimes. These prerequisites to establishing a currency board may, in many cases, be too involved
and take too much time to make it advisable for a country to attempt to do so during a
macroeconomic crisis.
Suggestions for further reading:
Tom�s Bali�o, Charles Enoch, Alain Ize, Veerathi Santiprabhob, and Peter
Stella, 1997, Currency Board Arrangements: Issues and Experiences, IMF Occasional
Paper 151 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Charles Enoch and Anne-Marie Gulde, 1997, "Making a Currency Board Operational," IMF
Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment 97/10 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Atish R. Ghosh, Anne-Marie Gulde, and Holger C. Wolf, 1998, "Currency Boards: The
Ultimate Fix?" IMF Working Paper 98/8 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
Charles Enoch is an Assistant Director and Chief of the Banking Supervision and
Regulation Division of the IMF's Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department.
Anne-Marie Gulde is a Senior Economist in the Monetary and Exchange Policy Review
Division of the IMF's Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department.
|
|