Do Fiscal Rules Cause Fiscal Discipline Over the Electoral Cycle?
December 27, 2019
Preview Citation
Format: Chicago
Disclaimer: IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
Summary
Subject: Budget planning and preparation, Expenditure, Fiscal policy, Fiscal rules, Government asset and liability management, Public financial management (PFM)
Keywords: Balanced budget rule, Baseline result, Budget planning and preparation, Budgetary outcome, Developing Countries, Election, Election index, Election year, Elections data, Expenditure rule, Fiscal Discipline, Fiscal Rules, Global, Government asset and liability management, Low income, OLS estimate, Political Budget Cycles, Right wing, WP
Publication Details
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Pages:
36
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Volume:
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DOI:
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Issue:
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Series:
Working Paper No. 2019/291
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Stock No:
WPIEA2019291
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ISBN:
9781513523736
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ISSN:
1018-5941