IMF Working Papers

Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union

By Elena Carletti, Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Robert Marquez

September 15, 2016

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Elena Carletti, Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, and Robert Marquez. Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2016) accessed December 22, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

We explore the behavior of supervisors when a centralized agency has full power over all decisions regarding banks, but relies on local supervisors to collect the information necessary to act. This institutional design entails a principal-agent problem between the central and local supervisors if their objective functions differ. Information collection may be inferior to that under fully independent local supervisors or under centralized information collection. And this may increase risk-taking by regulated banks. Yet, a “tougher” central supervisor may increase regulatory standards. Thus, the net effect of centralization on bank risk taking depends on the balance of these two effects.

Subject: Balance of payments, Bank supervision, Banking, Commercial banks, Distressed institutions, Financial institutions, Financial regulation and supervision, Financial services, Investment banking, Portfolio investment

Keywords: Bank risk taking, Bank supervision, Capitalized bank, Centralized bank supervision, Commercial banks, Distressed institutions, Europe, Global, Investment banking, Investment portfolio, Limited liability, Optimal portfolio, Portfolio choice, Portfolio investment, Portfolio quality, Price bank risk, Reaction function, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    50

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

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  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2016/186

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA2016186

  • ISBN:

    9781475536751

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941