Corruption, Competition, and Contracts: A Model of Vote Buying

January 1, 2006

Preview Citation

Format: Chicago

Felix J Vardy, and John Morgan. Corruption, Competition, and Contracts: A Model of Vote Buying, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2006) accessed November 21, 2024

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We find that vote buying is cheaper when what can be contracted upon coincides with what voters care about. Vote buying becomes extremely costly, or even impossible, when there is no such coincidence. Finally, vote buying is extremely cheap, or even free, when contracts can be contingent upon both individual votes and vote shares.

Subject: Competition, Corruption, Crime, Financial markets, Tax incentives

Keywords: Competition, Contracts contingent, Corruption, Elections, Lobbying, Policy outcome, Vote buying, Vote-buying contract, Vote-contingent contract, Voter behavior, Voters vote, WP

Publication Details

Pages:

23
Volume:

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DOI:

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Issue:

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Series:

Working Paper No. 2006/011
Stock No:

WPIEA2006011
ISBN:

9781451862713
ISSN:

1018-5941

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