Competition among Exchanges and Enforcement Policy

February 1, 2013

Preview Citation

Format: Chicago

Cecilia Caglio, and Andrea Pescatori. Competition among Exchanges and Enforcement Policy, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2013) accessed December 22, 2024

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

In this paper, we explore how competition among stock exchanges, operated as self-regulatory organizations (SROs), affects the design of their members' surveillance. We develop a model where two for-profit SROs compete for trading volume, while brokers execute transactions on behalf of the investors and may misreport the true cash flow. The SROs can deter a fraud by announcing an investigation and imposing a monetary penalty.The success of the investigation depends upon both the amount of resources devoted to monitoring and the efficiency of monitoring technologies. We show that when contracts are incomplete and investors do not have perfect information about the monitoring efficiency, competition among exchanges induces a race to the bottom in enforcement policy and a reduction in total welfare, compared to the case of a monopolist SRO.

Subject: Competition, Currencies, Tax incentives

Keywords: Cash flow, Expected return, WP

Publication Details

Pages:

31
Volume:

---
DOI:

---
Issue:

---
Series:

Working Paper No. 2013/037
Stock No:

WPIEA2013037
ISBN:

9781475516784
ISSN:

1018-5941

FACTSHEETS

RESOURCES

TOPICS

Flagship Publications

Other Publications

IMF reports and publications by country

Regional Offices

All News

See Also

For Journalists

Press Center

RESOURCES

FLAGSHIPS

KEY SERIES

IMF NOTES

IMF Working Papers