Banking Supervision: Quality and Governance

By Alessandro Gambini, Salim M. Darbar, Marco Arnone

April 1, 2007

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Alessandro Gambini, Salim M. Darbar, and Marco Arnone. Banking Supervision: Quality and Governance, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2007) accessed December 22, 2024

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

This paper examines the relationship between the quality of banking supervision and governance of the supervisory agency, based on assessments of the Basel Core Principles and the IMF Code on Transparency in Financial Policies, covering 116 and 53 countries, respectively, with 51 common to both. We find a positive correlation between the transparency of the supervisor and the effectiveness of banking supervision; moreover, better accountability and integrity practices of the banking supervisors are associated with higher independence, which in turn is associated with better compliance with the Basel Core Principles. These results are largely robust to different stages of financial development.

Subject: Bank supervision, Banking, Basel Core Principles, Financial sector development, Personal income

Keywords: Banking supervision, Independence, Practice, WP

Publication Details

Pages:

30
Volume:

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DOI:

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Issue:

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Series:

Working Paper No. 2007/082
Stock No:

WPIEA2007082
ISBN:

9781451866469
ISSN:

1018-5941

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