Injury Investigations in anti-Dumping and the Super-Additivity Effect: A Theoretical Explanation

August 1, 2001

Preview Citation

Format: Chicago

Poonam Gupta, and Arvind Panagariya. Injury Investigations in anti-Dumping and the Super-Additivity Effect: A Theoretical Explanation, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2001) accessed November 23, 2024

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

Empirical evidence shows that injury investigations in anti-dumping cases conducted by the United States International Trade Commission, the probability of a positive finding is higher when the number of defendant firms is larger, holding constant their total market share. In this paper we offer a theoretical explanation of this finding. We show that the presence of many exporters exacerbates the free-rider problem, which leads every firm to invest less on defense. Thus for the same market share, injury finding is more likely to be positive for many small sellers than a few large sellers.

Subject: Antidumping, Exports, Imports, International trade, Protectionism, Tariffs, Taxes

Keywords: Additivity effect, Antidumping, Anti-dumping, Cumulation, Defendant firm, Dumping charge, Dumping margin, Exports, Imports, Injury investigation, Market share, Protectionism, Representative firm, S. Assuming, Tariffs, WP

Publication Details

Pages:

13
Volume:

---
DOI:

---
Issue:

---
Series:

Working Paper No. 2001/110
Stock No:

WPIEA1102001
ISBN:

9781451853346
ISSN:

1018-5941

FACTSHEETS

RESOURCES

TOPICS

Flagship Publications

Other Publications

IMF reports and publications by country

Regional Offices

All News

See Also

For Journalists

Press Center

RESOURCES

FLAGSHIPS

KEY SERIES

IMF NOTES

IMF Working Papers