IMF Working Papers

Cooption and Repression in the Soviet Union

By Hershel I. Grossman, Dmitry Gershenson

December 1, 2000

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Hershel I. Grossman, and Dmitry Gershenson. Cooption and Repression in the Soviet Union, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2000) accessed November 21, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

The Soviet ruling elite, the nomenklatura, used both cooption and political repression to encourage loyalty to the communist regime. Loyalty was critical both in defusing internal opposition to the rule of the nomenklatura and in either deterring or defeating foreign enemies of the Soviet Union. We assume that the nomenklatura determined the extent of cooption and the intensity of political repression by equating their perceived marginal benefits and marginal costs. We use this assumption to construct an account of the historical evolution of policies of cooption and political repression in the Soviet Union.

Subject: Administration in revenue administration, Income distribution, National accounts, Population and demographics, Revenue administration

Keywords: Administration in revenue administration, Arms race, Choice problem, Communist Party, Cooption, Income distribution, Members of the nomenklatura, Nomenklatura, Nomenklatura's agent, Party membership, Repression, Soviet Union, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    22

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2000/201

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA2012000

  • ISBN:

    9781451874341

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941