Working Papers
2023
August 25, 2023
The Economics of Sovereign Debt, Bailouts, and the Eurozone Crisis
Description: Despite a formal ‘no-bailout clause,’ we estimate significant net present value transfers from the European Union to Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, ranging from roughly 0.5% (Ireland) to a whopping 43% (Greece) of 2010 output during the Eurozone crisis. We propose a model to analyze and understand bailouts in a monetary union, and the large observed differences across countries. We characterize bailout size and likelihood as a function of the economic fundamentals (economic activity, debt-to-gdp ratio, default costs). Our model embeds a ‘Southern view’ of the crisis (transfers did not help) and a ‘Northern view’ (transfers weaken fiscal discipline). While a stronger no-bailout commitment reduces risk-shifting, it may not be optimal from the perspective of the creditor country, even ex-ante, if it increases the risk of immediate insolvency for high debt countries. Hence, the model provides a potential justification for the often decried policy of ‘kicking the can down the road.’ Mapping the model to the estimated transfers, we find that the main purpose of the outsized Greek bailout was to prevent an exit from the eurozone and possible contagion. Bailouts to avoid sovereign default were comparatively modest.
August 25, 2023
From Extreme Events to Extreme Seasons: Financial Stability Risks of Climate Change in Mexico
Description: This paper explores the financial stability implications of acute physical climate change risks using a novel approach that focuses on a severe season associated with a sequence of tropical cyclone and flood events. Our approach was recently applied to study physical risks in the Mexican financial sector, but the framework is applicable to other countries as well. We show that even if the scale of individual climate events may not be material at an aggregate national scale, considering a sequence of events could lead to potentially significant macro-financial impacts in the short term. This could occur even if none of the individual events affect the particular region(s) with highest concentrations of banking sector exposures. Our results indicate potential for even greater effects in the future given the increasing severity and frequency of extreme events from climate change. Thus, this paper highlights the importance of considering sequences of extreme physical risk events driven by climate change, rather than just individual extreme events, to better understand financial stability implications and design effective policies.
August 24, 2023
IMF Fossil Fuel Subsidies Data: 2023 Update
Description: This paper provides a comprehensive global, regional, and country-level update of: (i) efficient fossil fuel prices to reflect supply and environmental costs; and (ii) subsidies implied by charging below efficient fuel prices. Globally, fossil fuel subsidies were $7 trillion in 2022 or 7.1 percent of GDP. Explicit subsidies (undercharging for supply costs) have more than doubled since 2020 but are still only 18 percent of the total subsidy, while nearly 60 percent is due to undercharging for global warming and local air pollution. Differences between efficient prices and retail fuel prices are large and pervasive, for example, 80 percent of global coal consumption was priced at below half of its efficient level in 2022. Full fossil fuel price reform would reduce global carbon dioxide emissions to an estimated 43 percent below baseline levels in 2030 (in line with keeping global warming to 1.5-2oC), while raising revenues worth 3.6 percent of global GDP and preventing 1.6 million local air pollution deaths per year. Accompanying spreadsheets provide detailed results for 170 countries.
August 18, 2023
Reported Social Unrest Index: August 2023 Update
Description: This paper is the second update of the Reported Social Unrest Index (Barrett et al. 2022), outlining developments in global social unrest since March 2022. It shows that the fraction of countries experiencing major social unrest events has been stable. Reasons for social unrest can be broadly categorized as stemming from sdebate over constitutional issues, protests connected to specific policies, and other generalized disorder.
August 11, 2023
How Nations Become Fragile: An AI-Augmented Bird’s-Eye View (with a Case Study of South Sudan)
Description: In this study we introduce and apply a set of machine learning and artificial intelligence techniques to analyze multi-dimensional fragility-related data. Our analysis of the fragility data collected by the OECD for its States of Fragility index showed that the use of such techniques could provide further insights into the non-linear relationships and diverse drivers of state fragility, highlighting the importance of a nuanced and context-specific approach to understanding and addressing this multi-aspect issue. We also applied the methodology used in this paper to South Sudan, one of the most fragile countries in the world to analyze the dynamics behind the different aspects of fragility over time. The results could be used to improve the Fund’s country engagement strategy (CES) and efforts at the country.
August 11, 2023
Coping with Climate Shocks: Food Security in a Spatial Framework
Description: We develop a quantitative spatial general equilibrium model with heterogeneous house-holds and multiple locations to study households’ vulnerability to food insecurity from cli-mate shocks. In the model, households endogenously respond to negative climate shocks by drawing-down assets, importing food and temporarily migrating to earn additional income to ensure sufficient calories. Because these coping strategies are most effective when trade and migration costs are low, remote households are more vulnerable to climate shocks. Food insecure households are also more vulnerable, as their proximity to a subsistence requirement causes them to hold a smaller capital buffer and more aggressively dissave in response to shocks, at the expense of future consumption. We calibrate the model to 51 districts in Nepal and estimate the impact of historical climate shocks on food consumption and welfare. We estimate that, on an annual basis, floods, landslides, droughts and storms combined generated GDP losses of 2.3 percent, welfare losses of 3.3 percent for the average household and increased the rate of undernourishment by 2.8 percent. Undernourished households experience roughly 50 percent larger welfare losses and those in remote locations suffer welfare losses that are roughly two times larger than in less remote locations (5.9 vs 2.9 percent). In counterfactual simulations, we show the role of better access to migration and trade in building resilience to climate shocks.
August 11, 2023
The Elasticity of Substitution Between Skilled and Unskilled Labor in Developing Countries: A Directed Technical Change Perspective
Description: We develop a model of endogenous skill-biased technical change in developing countries. The endogenous response to a rise in skill supply counters the traditional substitution effect and dampens its role in reducing wage inequality. The model re-enforces consensus estimates of the elasticity of substitution between more/less educated workers by reconciling dispersed existing estimates. It also rationalizes estimates that were hitherto deemed implausible or model-inconsistent. We produce new estimates for developing countries with a novel global panel (finding values at or just above 2) and with Latin American data that facilitates analysis of dynamics (which reduce estimates to 1.7-1.8). We therefore shed new light on a parameter that is crucial for inequality, growth, and other key macroeconomic questions.
August 11, 2023
The Dominant Currency Financing Channel of External Adjustment
Description: We provide evidence of a new channel through which exchange rates affect trade. Using a novel identification strategy that exploits firms’ maturity structure of foreign currency debt around a large depreciation in Colombia, we show that firms experiencing a stronger debt revaluation of dominant currency debt due to a home currency depreciation compress imports relatively more while exports are unaffected. Dominant currency financing does not lead to an import compression for firms that export, hold foreign currency assets, or are active in the foreign exchange derivatives markets, as they are all hedged against a revaluation of their debt. These findings can be rationalized through the prism of a model with costly state verification and foreign currency borrowing. Quantitatively, the dominant currency financing channel explains a significant part of the external adjustment process in addition to the expenditure switching channel. Pricing exports in the dominant currency, instead of the producer’s currency, mutes the effect of dominant currency financing on trade flows.
August 4, 2023
Integrated Monetary and Financial Policies for Small Open Economies
Description: We develop a tractable small-open-economy framework to characterize the constrained efficient use of the policy rate, foreign exchange (FX) intervention, capital controls, and domestic macroprudential measures. The model features dominant currency pricing, shallow FX markets, and occasionally-binding external and domestic borrowing constraints. We characterize the conditions for the “traditional prescription”—relying on the policy rate and exchange rate flexibility—to be sufficient, even if externalities persist. The conditions are satisfied for world interest rate shocks if FX markets are deep. By contrast, we show that to manage non-fundamental inflow surges and taper tantrums related to local currency debt, capital inflow taxes and FX intervention should be used instead of the policy rate and exchange rate flexibility. In the realistic case where countries face both shallow FX markets and external borrowing constraints, we establish that some kinds of FX mismatch regulations may reduce the external debt limit friction but worsen FX market depth. Finally, we show that capital controls and domestic macroprudential measures cease to be perfect substitutes if there is a risk that the domestic borrowing constraint binds as a result of the transmission of the global financial cycle.
August 4, 2023
Not All Energy Transitions Are Alike: Disentangling the Effects of Demand and Supply-Side Policies on Future Oil Prices
Description: We use structural scenario analysis to show that the climate policy mix—supply-side versus demand-side policies—can lead to different oil price paths with diverging distributional consequences in a netzero emissions scenario. When emission reduction is driven by demand-side policies, prices would decline to around 25 USD per barrel in 2030, benefiting consuming countries. Vice versa, supply-side climate policies aimed at curbing oil production would push up prices to above 130 USD per barrel, benefiting those producing countries that take the political decision to keep on producing. Consequently, it is wrong to assume that oil prices will necessarily decline due to the clean energy transition. As policies are mostly formulated at the country level and hard to predict at the global level, the transition will raise uncertainty about the price outlook.