Discussion of O. Jeanne's "From Fiscal Deadlock to Financial Repression: Anatomy of a Fall"

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
• The Story

- A government is embarked on a fiscally unsustainable path with increasing public debt.
- The only way to stabilize the debt is by extracing resources from the banks (fiscal repression).
- But fiscal repression is costly, so it pays to delay it until the government is at the brink of default.


Overall Assessment

- Clever theoretical treatment of financial repression.
- Simple model and intuitive result, though not obvious at all.
- Suggestive first pass at empirical evidence.

Financial Repression



m



Notation

m= deposits r= real interest rae (constant, exogenous) $r_m=$ real interest rate on deposits $\Rightarrow r-r_m=$ opportunity cost of holding deposits $\theta=(r-r_m)\cdot m$ (financial repression: resources taken from banks by the gov't)

Indirect Utility Function

$$u(c_t, m_t) = -\gamma_\tau \tau_t - \gamma_\theta \theta_t$$
$$\gamma_\theta > \gamma_\tau$$

 $\tau_t = \text{tax revenue}$

 $\theta = financial repression$

 $c_t = consumption$

 $m_t = deposits$

 γ_{τ} , γ_{θ} fixed parameters

Comment 1

The Fiscal Rule: Primary or Secondary Deficit?


Constant Secondary Deficit

$$\dot{d}_t = g - \tau_t + rd_t$$
$$g - \tau_t + rd_t = \delta$$
$$\Rightarrow \dot{d}_t = \delta$$

Note d_t and τ_t increase over time.

Stabilization With Financial Repression

$$\dot{d}_t = \delta - \theta_t$$
 and gov't sets $\theta_t = \delta \Rightarrow \dot{d}_t = 0$




Constant Primary Deficit

$$\dot{d}_t = g - \tau_t + rd_t$$
$$g - \tau_t = \delta$$
$$\Rightarrow \dot{d}_t = \delta + rd_t$$

Note τ_t constant and d_t increases over time (faster than before). **Stabilization With Financial Repression**

$$\dot{d}_t = \delta + rd_t - \theta_t$$
 and gov't sets $\theta_t = \delta + rd_t \Rightarrow \dot{d}_t = 0$




Question:

Does it still pay to delay financial repression? Worth exploring.

Comment 2

Linear Vs. Concave Preferences

Consumption Smoothing





$$c_t = y - \gamma_\tau \tau_t$$

Comment 3

Normative Theory of First-Generation BOP Crisis

Inflation Tax





 $\label{eq:money} \mbox{Notation} \\ m = \mbox{money demand}$

 $\epsilon =$ devauation rate

Conclusion

- Three comments:
- (1) Constant-Primary-Deficit Rule (a section is in order)
- (2) Concave utility (a comment is in order)
- (3) Normative Theory of First-Gen BOP Crisis (a follow-up paper is in order).
- This is an elegant paper on a highly relevant topic, the optimal dynamics of financial repression.

I learned a lot reading it and recommend it to all.