

# INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS AND LOCAL CREDIT CYCLES\*

Yusuf Soner Başkaya<sup>1</sup>      Julian di Giovanni<sup>2</sup>  
Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan<sup>3</sup>      Mehmet Fatih Ulu<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Glasgow University   <sup>2</sup>ICREA, UPF, BGSE, CREI, and CEPR  
<sup>3</sup>University of Maryland, CEPR, and NBER  
<sup>4</sup>Central Bank of Republic of Turkey

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\*This project does not represent official views of the CBRT.

## BIG PICTURE

Large debate on how advanced country shocks and policies affect emerging market business cycles.

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2. What channels transmit these spillovers?
3. How do we use this information to build a better financial system and mitigate risks?

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3. How do we use this information to build a better financial system and mitigate risks?

**We exploit a new and a very large dataset to address these questions:**

- Focus: **On the role of capital flows/global financial conditions in international transmission**
- Emphasis: On the role of endogeneity—David Lipton, November 2, 2017

# MOTIVATING MACRO STYLIZED FACTS

## **In Emerging Markets:**

- Business cycles correlate strongly with **credit cycles**.
  - **Capital flows** go hand-in-hand with **credit cycles**.
- ⇒ Often resulting in financial crisis.
- EM policy makers: “**capital inflows/outflows problem.**”

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- EM policy makers: “**capital inflows/outflows problem.**”

## We ask:

- Do capital flows **causally** drive domestic credit cycles in EMs?
- If so, what are the **mechanisms** at work?

## A basic *identification problem*:

- Relative importance of “pull” or “push” factors for capital flows?
  - ⇒ Is domestic credit growth being driven by **exogenous** capital flows, i.e., an *exogenous international supply of credit*?
  - ⇒ **Standard open economy models**: capital flows are an endogenous response to a domestic or external shock to C and/or I.
  - ⇒ No role for global shocks/foreign investor sentiment for driving capital flows under UIP.

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  - ⇒ No role for global shocks/foreign investor sentiment for driving capital flows under UIP.
- Is there a role of heterogeneous agents?
  - ⇒ Important to shed light on micro-foundations of macro models.
  - ⇒ Evidence necessary to understand the *quantitative* role of heterogeneity for aggregate outcomes.



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Exploits micro data from [credit register](#) of Turkey together with bank-level, firm-level, macro data over 2003–13.

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- Evaluate the effect of [push-capital flows](#) on lending and borrowing patterns at the firm-bank level.
  - Banks’ international funding exposure.
  - Firm/bank risk taking and balance sheet shocks.
  - Role of currency denomination of loan: FX vs. TL (Turkish lira).

### Macro Literature so far:

- Many papers on the transmission of VIX/US Policy on global/country specific **asset prices**. (e.g., Bruno and Shin; Rey)
- Little consensus on whether VIX/US policy drive/explain **capital flows** to EMs (e.g., Cerutti-Claessens-Rose; Rey, Forbes-Warnock).
- Missing: causal evidence on the effect of exogenous “**risk-on-flows**” on EMs’ *real and financial outcomes*.

## CONTRIBUTION

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	Macro Data	Micro Data
Pros	Comparability country/time	Identification   F, P, UF Pin down the mechanism
Cons	Identification is hard (unobserved factors, UF) Different fundamentals/policies (F, P) Hard to pin down the mechanism Different frequency of <i>P&amp;Q</i> data	Specific country/episode

## PREVIEW OF RESULTS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION

1. Supply (“push”) driven capital inflows have a *quantitatively* important impact on domestic credit cycle
  - Large effect of VIX on capital flows (elasticity  $-1.7$  & high partial  $R^2$ ).
  - An increase in capital flows equivalent to its IQR leads to **1 pp reduction in real borrowing costs**.
  - Supply driven capital inflows explain **43% of aggregate corporate sector cyclical credit growth** on average.



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
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⇒ **Two margins of adjustment**: interest rate and collateral.



## VIX, CA/GDP, AND DOMESTIC CREDIT IN TURKEY



# EMERGING MARKET EXTERNAL FINANCING


60 PERCENT OF EXTERNAL LIABILITIES IS DEBT

WITHIN EXTERNAL DEBT: OTHER INVESTMENT DEBT (LOANS) 70%, PORTFOLIO DEBT (BONDS) 30%



Source: Avdjiev, Hardy, Kalemli-Ozcan, Serven (2017).

## BANK AND FIRM EXTERNAL FINANCING IN TURKEY



Sources: CBRT; Hale, Kapan, Minoiu (2017).



## CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Borrowing/funding costs decline with exogenous capital flows.

UIP with time varying risk premium:

$$i_{c,t} = i_t^* + \mathbb{E}_t \Delta e_{t+1} + \gamma_{c,t}, \quad \text{where}$$

$$\gamma_{c,t} \equiv \omega \text{VIX}_t + \alpha_{c,t}$$

At *firm-bank* level:

$$\gamma_{f,b,t} \equiv \alpha_{f,t}, \quad \text{then}$$

$$i_{f,b,t} = i_t + \gamma_{f,b,t}$$

$$= i_t^* + \mathbb{E}_t(\Delta e_{t+1}) + \omega \text{VIX}_t + \alpha_{c,t} + \alpha_{f,t}$$

Assuming PPP:

$$r_t = r_t^* + \gamma_t$$


$$r_{f,b,t} = r_t^* + \omega \text{VIX}_t + \alpha_{c,t} + \alpha_{f,t}$$

Data: UIP fails and VIX strongly correlates with regression residuals.

▶ UIP regressions

# QE, VIX, INTEREST RATES

EFFECT OF VIX ON DYNAMICS OF REAL BORROWING COSTS



## EMPIRICAL STRATEGY: TWO-LAYER IDENTIFICATION

### Layer I: Macro Credit Supply Shock

- Analyze impact of VIX on firm-bank-loan level borrowing/lending, both in IV and reduced-form regressions.
- Focus on domestic credit variables, both volume (loans) and **price** (interest rate) for identification.
- Include time-varying firm and bank variables, bank×firm fixed effects, firm-year effects and macro fundamentals/expectations/policy rate.

## EMPIRICAL STRATEGY: TWO-LAYER IDENTIFICATION


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### Layer II: Within-Firm and Within-Firm-Bank Estimators


1. We use a **within firm** estimator via firm $\times$ quarter fixed effects:
  - Analyze firms that borrow from multiple banks (Khwaja-Mian, Jimenez et al., Chodorow-Reich).
  - Exploit heterogeneity in non-core ratio at bank level.
2. Drill down to *loan level* to investigate firm credit constraints (lower cost versus hard collateral):
  - Identification from **within firm-bank** pair (firm $\times$ bank $\times$ month fixed effects)
  - Exploit heterogeneity in collateral ratio of newly issued loans.

# BASICS OF "MACRO" IDENTIFICATION



# BASICS OF "MACRO" IDENTIFICATION

## Demand and Supply Shocks



## “MACRO” CAPITAL FLOWS REGRESSIONS

$$\log Y_{f,b,d,q} = \alpha_{f,b} + \lambda \text{Trend}_q + \beta \log \text{Capital inflows}_{q-1} + \delta \text{FX}_{f,b,d,q} \\ + \Theta_1 \mathbf{Bank}_{b,q-1} + \Theta_2 \mathbf{Macro}_{q-1} + \varepsilon_{f,b,d,q}$$

- Y: Loan or interest rate (nominal and real) at firm ( $f$ ) $\times$ bank ( $b$ ) $\times$ currency denomination ( $d$ ) $\times$ quarter ( $q$ ) level
- Capital inflows: Turkish real inflows  
 $\Rightarrow$  Instrument with VIX.
- FX: FX dummy (0 = TL, 1 = FX).
- **Bank**:  $\log(\text{Assets})$ , capital ratio, liquidity ratio, noncore ratio, ROA.
- **Macro controls**: GDP growth, inflation, exchange rate change, expectations, policy rate.
- Include **firm** $\times$ **year** effects to control slow-moving demand.

# MACRO REGRESSIONS: OLS AND IV

★ LOW VIX/HIGH CAPITAL INFLOW EPISODES LEAD TO MORE CREDIT AND LOWER RATES

★ IV ESTIMATES SYSTEMATICALLY LARGER (IN ABSOLUTE VALUE) THAN OLS

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**Panel A. OLS and Second-stage of IV**

	log(Loans <sub>q</sub> )		log(1+i <sub>q</sub> )		log(1+r <sub>q</sub> )	
	OLS (1)	IV (2)	OLS (3)	IV (4)	OLS (5)	IV (6)
log(K Inflows <sub>q-1</sub> )	0.040 <sup>a</sup> (0.006)	0.041 <sup>b</sup> (0.017)	-0.005 <sup>a</sup> (0.001)	-0.011 <sup>a</sup> (0.002)	-0.005 <sup>b</sup> (0.002)	-0.010 <sup>a</sup> (0.003)
FX	0.645 <sup>a</sup> (0.012)	0.645 <sup>a</sup> (0.012)	-0.070 <sup>a</sup> (0.003)	-0.070 <sup>a</sup> (0.003)	-0.078 <sup>a</sup> (0.003)	-0.078 <sup>a</sup> (0.003)
Policy rate <sub>q-1</sub>	-0.078 (0.262)	0.171 (0.325)	0.231 <sup>a</sup> (0.022)	0.192 <sup>a</sup> (0.023)	0.046 (0.059)	0.009 (0.053)
Observations	19,982,267	19,982,267	19,982,267	19,982,267	19,982,267	19,982,267
R-squared	0.850	0.850	0.791	0.793	0.778	0.779
Bank×firm F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Macro controls & trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

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**Panel B. First-stage of IV: log(K inflows<sub>q</sub>) Regression**

log(VIX <sub>q-1</sub> )	Observations	R-squared	F-stat
-1.667 <sup>a</sup> (0.427)	1,685	0.5625	15.28

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First stage with US MP; Other Works—Brauning and Ivashina (2017); Morais et al. (2015)



## VIX REDUCED-FORM REGRESSIONS

$$\log Y_{f,b,d,q} = \tilde{\alpha}_{f,b} + \tilde{\lambda}\text{Trend}_q + \tilde{\beta}\log \text{VIX}_{q-1} + \tilde{\delta}\text{FX}_{f,b,d,q} \\ + \tilde{\Theta}_1\mathbf{Bank}_{b,q-1} + \tilde{\Theta}_2\mathbf{Macro}_{q-1} + \xi_{f,b,d,q}$$

	log(Loans <sub>q</sub> )	log(1+i <sub>q</sub> )	log(1+r <sub>q</sub> )
	(1)	(2)	(3)
log(VIX <sub>q-1</sub> )	-0.067 <sup>b</sup> (0.029)	0.019 <sup>a</sup> (0.003)	0.017 <sup>a</sup> (0.004)
FX	0.645 <sup>a</sup> (0.012)	-0.070 <sup>a</sup> (0.003)	-0.078 <sup>a</sup> (0.003)
Policy rate <sub>q-1</sub>	0.127 (0.323)	0.204 <sup>a</sup> (0.024)	0.021 (0.053)
Observations	19,982,267	19,982,267	19,982,267
R-squared	0.850	0.793	0.779
Bank×firm F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes
Macro controls & trend	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

▶ Bank-type regressions

▶ Robustness

## Bank and Firm Risk-Taking:

$$\begin{aligned}\log Y_{f,b,d,q} &= \alpha_{b,q} + \alpha_{f,q} + \kappa(\text{Noncore}_b \times \text{NetWorth}_f \times \log \text{VIX}_{q-1}) \\ &\quad + \delta_2 \text{FX}_{f,b,d,q} + \vartheta_{f,b,d,q}\end{aligned}$$

- Lower rates and more credit from banks with higher non-core liabilities.
- Low net worth firms obtain *lower rates* from high non-core banks, but they *do not borrow more* than high net worth firms given collateral constraints (loan-level evidence).

▶ Estimation details

▶ Regressions

▶ Loan-level results

▶ Risk-taking channels

## SUMMARY AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

- We provide causal evidence on impact of a global capital flow push factor on domestic loan growth in an EM.
- **Interest rate channel**: a fall in **all** firms' borrowing rates due to a decline in risk premium is the main transmission channel.

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- We provide causal evidence on impact of a global capital flow push factor on domestic loan growth in an EM.
- **Interest rate channel**: a fall in **all** firms' borrowing rates due to a decline in risk premium is the main transmission channel.
- Heterogeneity in financial intermediation/international market access:
  - Internationally funded **large domestic banks** and their **funding costs** are the key; i.e., they extend more credit at lower rates.

### Different from:

- Closed-economy macro literature on small banks.
- Foreign banks/cross-border syndicated loans
- Relaxation of VaR constraint of global banks.

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### Different from:

- Closed-economy macro literature on small banks.
- Foreign banks/cross-border syndicated loans
- Relaxation of VaR constraint of global banks.
- **Margins of adjustment**: interest rate and collateral
  - Risky firms can finance their borrowing at a lower cost but *not necessarily increase borrowing* due to collateral constraints.
  - Different from relaxation of borrowing constraints with capital flows.

## POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Global conditions impact domestic borrowing costs **conditional on** changes in **domestic monetary policy and the exchange rate**

⇒ Leads to an expansion of **local credit**.

- Driven by large domestic banks—importance of heterogeneity in designing **macroprudential and capital flow management policies**

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Support for the existence of a **financial trilemma**:

Regardless of the exchange rate regime, achieving financial stability is difficult under:

1. National financial regulation,
2. Free capital flows, and
3. A global financial cycle.

⇒ Obstfeld (2015); Obstfeld, Ostry, Qureshi (2017)

# Appendix Slides



## AGGREGATE IMPACT: “MACRO” REGRESSION

$$\begin{aligned}\log Y_{f,b,d,q} &= \tilde{\alpha}_{f,b} + \tilde{\lambda} \text{Trend}_q + \tilde{\beta} \log \text{VIX}_{q-1} + \xi_{f,b,d,q} \\ &\Rightarrow \log(\widehat{\text{Loan}}_{f,b,d,q}) = \widehat{\beta} \log(\text{VIX}_{q-1})\end{aligned}$$

Differentiate and multiply by  $w_{f,b,d,q-1}$ , such that  $\sum w_{f,b,d,q-1} = 1$ :

$$w_{f,b,d,q-1} d\log(\widehat{\text{Loan}}_{f,b,d,q}) = w_{f,b,d,q-1} \widehat{\beta} d\log(\text{VIX}_{q-1})$$

so,

$$w_{f,b,d,q-1} \left( \frac{\Delta \widehat{\text{Loan}}}{\widehat{\text{Loan}}} \right)_{f,b,d,q} = w_{f,b,d,q-1} \widehat{\beta} \left( \frac{\Delta \text{VIX}}{\text{VIX}} \right)_{q-1}$$

Summing above equation over  $\{f, b, d\}$  in a given quarter  $q$ :

$$\left( \frac{\Delta \widehat{\text{Agg. Loan}}}{\widehat{\text{Agg. Loan}}} \right)_q = \widehat{\beta} \left( \frac{\Delta \text{VIX}}{\text{VIX}} \right)_{q-1}$$

$$\frac{\text{Avg} \left\{ \left( \frac{\Delta \widehat{\text{Agg. Loan}}}{\widehat{\text{Agg. Loan}}} \right)_q \right\}}{\text{Avg} \left\{ \left( \frac{\Delta \widehat{\text{Agg. Loan}}}{\widehat{\text{Agg. Loan}}} \right)_q \right\}} = 0.43$$

## AGGREGATE IMPACT: “HETEROGENEITY” REGRESSION

$$\log Y_{f,b,d,q} = \alpha_{f,b} + \lambda \text{Trend}_q + \beta_1 \text{VIX}_{q-1} + \beta_2 (\text{Noncore}_b \times \log \text{VIX}_{q-1}) + \vartheta_{f,b,d,q}$$

$$w_{f,b,d,q-1} \left( \frac{\widehat{\Delta \text{Loan}}}{\text{Loan}} \right)_{f,b,d,q} = w_{f,b,d,q-1}^{HNC} (\widehat{\beta}_1 + \widehat{\beta}_2) \left( \frac{\Delta \text{VIX}}{\text{VIX}} \right)_{q-1} + w_{f,b,d,q-1}^{LNC} \widehat{\beta}_1 \left( \frac{\Delta \text{VIX}}{\text{VIX}} \right)_{q-1}$$

Summing above equation over  $\{f, b, d\}$  in a given quarter  $q$ :

$$\left( \frac{\widehat{\Delta \text{Agg. Loan}}}{\text{Agg. Loan}} \right)_q = \sum w_{q-1}^{HNC} (\widehat{\beta}_1 + \widehat{\beta}_2) \left( \frac{\Delta \text{VIX}}{\text{VIX}} \right)_{q-1} + \sum w_{q-1}^{LNC} \widehat{\beta}_1 \left( \frac{\Delta \text{VIX}}{\text{VIX}} \right)_{q-1}$$

$$\frac{\text{Avg} \left\{ \sum w_{q-1}^{HNC} (\widehat{\beta}_1 + \widehat{\beta}_2) \left( \frac{\Delta \text{VIX}}{\text{VIX}} \right)_{q-1} \right\}}{\text{Avg} \left\{ \left( \frac{\widehat{\Delta \text{Agg. Loan}}}{\text{Agg. Loan}} \right)_q \right\}} = 0.94$$

## MERGING THREE LARGE DATASETS

1. **Credit register data** have information on **all** loans in economy to households and firms (monthly). [▶ Data details](#)

Focus on loans to corporate sector. [▶ Comparison to whole economy](#)

- Bank, firm, currency, quarter level: 53+ million cash loans.
  - Loan value, interest rate, maturity, collateral, risk measures, ...
  - Roughly 75% of observations in value are firms with loans from multiple banks (50% in number, 2.5 bank per firm on average).
2. **Bank-level data** on all the balance sheet items and portfolio items for 45 banks.

Banks capture 90 percent of corporate liabilities and 86 percent of country's financial assets.

3. **Firm-level data** on balance sheet and income statement (annual level).

## LITERATURE

- Older literature on push-pull of *net* capital flows
  - Calvo et al. (1993, 1996); Fernandez-Arias (1996).
- Many papers on the transmission of VIX/US Policy on global/country specific asset prices
  - Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015); Bruno and Shin (2015a,b); Rey (2013, 2015).
  - These papers also show a tight link between VIX and the US monetary policy
- Unclear whether VIX/US policy drive capital flows into EMs or have any effect on domestic real and financial variables
  - Work based on annual capital flows data finds mixed results; studies using quarterly bank flow data or monthly emerging market fund data find procyclical effects but not studies based on yearly IMF-BOP data
  - Fratzscher (2011); Forbes and Warnock (2012); Fratzscher et al. (2013); Ahmed and Zlate (2014); Claessens et al. (2016); Cerutti et al. (2016); Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2016).


$$i_t - i_t^* = \alpha + \lambda_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \Delta e_{TL/USD,t+1} + \epsilon_t$$

	(1)	(2)
$\Delta e_{TL/USD,t}$	-0.005 (0.083)	0.122 <sup>b</sup> (0.045)
Time trend		-0.002 <sup>a</sup> (0.000)
Constant	0.084 <sup>a</sup> (0.006)	0.336 <sup>a</sup> (0.026)
Observations	30	30
R-squared	0.010	0.780
Correlation of residuals and VIX	0.685	0.487

## DATA: MERGING THREE LARGE DATASETS

1. Credit register data have information on all loans in economy to households and firms
  - Number of (cash) loans: 114 million
  - Number of loans to firms: 57 million
  - Share of firm loans: 87% in value
  - Number of bank-firm pairs: 3.3 million
2. We collapse credit register at firm-bank-quarter level going from 57 to 20.9 million observations (45 banks)
  - 50% represent firms borrowing from multiple banks
  - Multiple loans to a firm by a bank in a given quarter; do a weighted average
  - Currency composition: majority of loans in TL (count), but 2/3rd value in FX


## LOAN GROWTH COMPARISON OF CORPORATE SECTOR AND THE WHOLE ECONOMY



Notes: Firm sample and whole credit registry loan growth.

[◀ Data Summary](#)

## FX AND TL LOAN GROWTH IN TURKEY




Sources: CBRT. [Data Summary](#)




# POLICY RATE, AVERAGE LENDING RATES, AND VIX

◀ Macro regressions



# LONG-TERM RATES

◀ Macro regressions



# IMPACT OF VIX'S SPILLOVERS ON REAL BORROWING COSTS BY BANK TYPE

	<i>Bank Type</i>			
	Commercial (1)	Comm. + State (2)	Domestic (3)	Foreign (4)
$\log(\text{VIX}_{q-1})$	0.023 <sup>a</sup> (0.004)	0.017 <sup>a</sup> (0.004)	0.019 <sup>a</sup> (0.005)	0.009 <sup>b</sup> (0.004)
Observations	13,376,195	19,922,760	14,514,150	5,440,975
R-squared	0.784	0.779	0.706	0.857

◀ Reduced-form regressions

## MACRO REGRESSION ROBUSTNESS

- Add firm $\times$ year effects.
- Decompose VIX into volatility and risk aversion.
- Use only firms who borrow from multiple banks in a quarter.
- Separate short and long term maturity loans.
- Control for LT rates.
- Pre-post GFC/VIX spike.
- Control for exchange rate level and expectations.

◀ Reduced-form regressions

## HETEROGENEITY: DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES

$$\log Y_{f,b,d,q} = \alpha_{b,q} + \alpha_{f,q} + \kappa(\text{Noncore}_b \times \text{NetWorth}_f \times \log \text{VIX}_{q-1}) \\ + \delta_2 \text{FX}_{f,b,d,q} + \vartheta_{f,b,d,q},$$

$$\log Y_{f,b,d,q} = \alpha_{b,q} + \alpha_{f,q} + \rho(\text{Noncore}_b \times \text{FX}_{f,b,d,q} \times \log \text{VIX}_{q-1}) \\ + \delta_3 \text{FX}_{f,b,d,q} + u_{f,b,d,q}$$


- $\text{Noncore}_b$ : non-core liabilities ratio (0 = “low,” 1 = “high”).
- $\text{NetWorth}_f$ : firm net worth: (0 = “low,” 1 = “high”).
- FX: foreign currency indicator (0 = TL, 1 = FX).
- $\alpha_{f,q}$ : firm×quarter effect; fully controls time varying firm unobservables.
- $\alpha_{b,q}$ : bank×quarter effect; fully controls time varying bank unobservables.
- **Macro** controls are in the quarter fixed effect.

# HETEROGENEITY REGRESSIONS


	log(Loans <sub>q</sub> )			log(1+r <sub>q</sub> )		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Noncore <sub>b</sub> × log(VIX <sub>q-1</sub> )	-0.035 <sup>b</sup> (0.017)			0.015 <sup>a</sup> (0.004)		
Noncore <sub>b</sub> × NetWorth <sub>f</sub> × log(VIX <sub>q-1</sub> )		-0.004 (0.020)			-0.005 <sup>a</sup> (0.001)	
Noncore <sub>b</sub> × FX × log(VIX <sub>q-1</sub> )			-0.007 (0.018)			-0.012 <sup>a</sup> (0.004)
FX	0.690 <sup>a</sup> (0.013)	0.802 <sup>a</sup> (0.019)	0.745 <sup>a</sup> (0.095)	-0.079 <sup>a</sup> (0.003)	-0.078 <sup>a</sup> (0.004)	-0.042 <sup>c</sup> (0.021)
Observations	9,280,825	1,281,369	9,280,825	9,280,825	1,281,369	9,280,825
R-squared	0.876	0.764	0.877	0.852	0.814	0.877
Bank × firm F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank controls	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Firm × quarter F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank × quarter F.E.	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

◀ Heterogeneity results

## TURKISH CAPITAL INFLOWS: A REPRESENTATIVE EM



## CAPITAL FLOWS AND NON-CORE LIABILITIES



◀ Heterogeneity results



## ISSUANCE REGRESSIONS: WITHIN FIRM-BANK ESTIMATOR

Identify from within variation in loans given a firm-bank pair.

Firm  $f$ 's new loan  $l$  and month  $m$  from bank  $b$  (in FX or TL):

$$\begin{aligned}\log Y_{f,b,l,m} = & \omega_{f,b,m} + \beta_1 \text{Collateral}_{f,b,l,m} + \beta_2 (\text{Collateral}_{f,b,l,m} \times \log \text{VIX}_{m-1}) \\ & + \beta_3 (\text{Noncore}_b \times \text{Collateral}_{f,b,l,m}) \\ & + \beta_4 (\text{Noncore}_b \times \text{Collateral}_{f,b,l,m} \times \log \text{VIX}_{m-1}) \\ & + \beta_5 \text{FX}_{f,b,l,m} + e_{f,b,l,m},\end{aligned}$$

where 'Collateral' is the loan's collateral-to-principal ratio, and  $\omega_{f,b,m}$  is a configuration of firm-bank-month effects.

Further control for other loan-level characteristics (maturity, subjective risk, sectoral use...).

# LOAN-LEVEL RESULTS

★ LOAN LEVEL COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS ARE NOT RELATED TO FIRM AND BANK FACTORS.

★ INTEREST RATE-COLLATERAL RELATION DOES NOT RESPOND TO VIX ONCE FIRM FACTORS ARE CONTROLLED FOR.

	log(Loans <sub>m</sub> )				log(1+r <sub>m</sub> )			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Collateral/Loan	0.106 <sup>a</sup> (0.005)	0.089 <sup>a</sup> (0.010)	0.091 <sup>a</sup> (0.011)	0.090 <sup>a</sup> (0.004)	-0.002 <sup>a</sup> (0.001)	-0.004 <sup>a</sup> (0.001)	-0.004 <sup>a</sup> (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.0003)
Collateral/Loan × log(VIX <sub>m-1</sub> )	0.019 <sup>c</sup> (0.010)	0.025 <sup>c</sup> (0.013)	0.030 <sup>b</sup> (0.015)	0.056 <sup>a</sup> (0.008)	-0.004 <sup>a</sup> (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 <sup>a</sup> (0.001)
Noncore <sub>b</sub> × Collateral/Loan				-0.013 (0.038)				-0.014 <sup>a</sup> (0.003)
Noncore <sub>b</sub> × Collateral/Loan × log(VIX <sub>m-1</sub> )				-0.204 <sup>a</sup> (0.030)				0.015 <sup>a</sup> (0.003)
FX	0.441 <sup>a</sup> (0.019)	0.488 <sup>a</sup> (0.038)	0.560 <sup>a</sup> (0.048)	0.560 <sup>a</sup> (0.048)	-0.082 <sup>a</sup> (0.002)	-0.080 <sup>a</sup> (0.003)	-0.082 <sup>a</sup> (0.004)	-0.082 <sup>a</sup> (0.004)
Observations	16,578,790	11,618,529	10,096,917	10,096,917	16,578,790	11,618,529	10,096,917	10,096,917
R-squared	0.738	0.840	0.851	0.851	0.657	0.844	0.861	0.863
Bank × firm F.E.	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Sector F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Risk F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Maturity F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month F.E.	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Firm × month F.E.	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Bank × firm × month F.E.	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

◀ Heterogeneity results

# VIX AND THE EXCHANGE RATE RISK-TAKING CHANNELS

	log(Loans <sub>q</sub> )		log(1+r <sub>q</sub> )	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leverage <sub>b</sub> × FXshare <sub>f</sub> × log(VIX <sub>q-1</sub> )	0.041 (0.032)		-0.003 (0.002)	
Leverage <sub>b</sub> × FXshare <sub>f</sub> × log(XR <sub>q-1</sub> )		-0.392 <sup>a</sup> (0.107)		-0.006 (0.006)
FX	0.688 <sup>a</sup> (0.013)	0.688 <sup>a</sup> (0.013)	-0.079 <sup>a</sup> (0.003)	-0.079 <sup>a</sup> (0.003)
Observations	9,280,825	9,280,825	9,280,825	9,280,825
R-squared	0.877	0.877	0.877	0.877
Bank × firm F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm × quarter F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank × quarter F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

◀ Heterogeneity results

# EXCHANGE RATES

VIS-À-VIS THE USD

