# Credit Risk Stress Testing for the Mexican Banking System

Javier Márquez May 2006

Paper presented at the Expert Forum on Advanced Techniques on Stress Testing: Applications for Supervisors Hosted by International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C., May 2-3, 2006

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) only, and the presence of them, or of links to them, on the IMF website does not imply that the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management endorses or shares the views expressed in the paper.

#### **Outline**

## I. CyRCE

### **II. Stress Testing**

# **CyRCE: Properties**

A closed form default model assuming that the loan portfolio loss distribution can be characterized by its mean and its variance:

- Closed form expression for Value at Risk (VaR):
  - Explicit management controls: Capital adequacy, single obligor limits, etc.
  - Portfolio Analysis: Risk concentration, allocation, pricing optimization.
  - Great computational efficiency: Large portfolios, fast feedback.
  - Limited portfolio information.
- > Explicit parametrization of all relevant credit risk elements:
  - Deal with information gaps through assumptions.
- Easy stress testing.

### **CyRCE: A General Model**

1. Let  $f_i$  denote the i th loan amount in the portfolio; i = 1,2,...,N

$$\mathbf{F} = (f_1, ..., f_N).$$

2. All loans have different default probabilities:

$$\pi = (p_1, ..., p_N).$$


3. Loan defaults can be correlated: covariance matrix.

$$\sigma_{i,j}$$
 = Default Covariance between loan *i* and loan  $j = \sigma_i \sigma_j \rho_{i,j} = M_{i,j}$ 

 $\rho_{i,j}$ : default correlation between loan i and loan j

#### **CyRCE: Value at Risk**


The *value at risk* with confidence level  $\alpha$  is given by:



By assuming a gamma distribution, VaR estimates are comparable with the ones obtained with CreditRisk+ and Creditmetrics<sup>™</sup>.

#### CyRCE: Value at Risk per segment

The portfolio can be segmented <u>arbitrarily</u> and a *value at risk* expression for each segment *j* per segment is given by:



#### **Outline**

# I. CyRCE

### **II. Stress Testing**

# Using the model for Credit Stress testing

- There is a lag between Credit and Market risk shocks.
- In our experience, it takes a very severe crisis (time and depth) before the impact reflects on credit.
- The economy's imbalance may span several years, so that stress tests are done over long time horizons.
- There is no consensus\* whether default volatilities and correlations are larger in a stress period.

<sup>\*</sup>A survey of stress tests and current practice at major financial institutions. BIS CGFS 2001

# Understanding the losses in Market and Credit shocks

There is a difference in how Market and Credit losses are realized:

- A credit loss is realized when a default occurs, rather than by being forced to sell underpriced assets.
- In market risk, the loss can be avoided if a position can be held until the market disturbance disappears.

#### **Designing the Stress Scenario**

- When constructing a stress Scenario, the first step is identifying events that could have adverse effects on Banks' credit exposures, such as:
  - Economic downturns
  - Market events
- The way the stress event will be identified depends on the type of scenario chosen: Historical or hypothetical
- The second step is to determine how the occurrence of the event affects the risk factors and then shock the current portfolio to perform the risk analysis under these conditions.

#### **Outline**

I. CyRCE


#### **II.** Stress Testing

- 1. Historical scenario
- 2. Main results

# The Stress Scenario used: 1994 Mexican Crisis


- Along with the political turmoil, there was an unsustainable current account deficit and a substantially overvalued currency.
- On December 19th, the Government devalued its currency. Eight days later, the exchange rate had risen 66% from \$3.47 to \$5.76 MXP per USD.
- Simultaneously, the interbank short-term interest rate rose 60% from 20.17% to 32.38% by December 22nd.

The Economy entered an inflationary period and the Central Bank switched to a free-floating currency.




#### Performing Credit portfolio Value

 Inflation, rising interest rates and a devalued currency were the preamble for defaulted loans and an abrupt halt in credit activity.




#### Non-performing loans Value

 Non-performing loans increased 60% in 1995, even after the government acquired the distressed debt of the most troubled banks.




### **Corporate Default rates**

 In the corporate portfolio, Default rates increased by 3 times the 1994 levels.




#### Default rates by economic sector

 The first economic sectors to exhibit a rise in default rates were the Agricultural, Transportation and Communications and Industrial sectors. Construction and Commercials were the last to react. Services exhibited high default rates over the 18 month stress period.




#### Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)

 The economic and financial situation is different from that of previous crisis periods: banks are better capitalized and most loans are fixed rate.



#### **Stressing Credit Risk**

 Schematically, the design of the stress test is given as follows:



Banking
System
Stability
Assessment

#### **Outline**


I. Introduction

II. CyRCE

- **III.** Stress Testing
  - 1. Historical scenario
  - 2. Main results


#### Value at Risk over a Stress period

 The Value-at-risk with a 97.5% confidence level under the stress scenario would be:




#### Risk contribution

 At the peak of the stress scenario, the risk contribution would be:




#### **Expected cumulative losses**

#### **Expected cumulative losses / Net Capital: Histogram**




#### **Loss Distribution Analysis**

 The loss distribution for the first six months changes dramatically with respect to the loss distribution fitted before stress.




 At the end of the scenario (18 months after its beginning), 20% of the banks show a CAR below 7%, while 8% of the banks show a CAR between 7 and 8%.



#### **Analysis of troubled banks**

- Banks showing a CAR below the 8% threshold, were lending mainly in the services sector.
- Loans in the agriculture sector are backed by the government.

Scatter plot: CAR vs Riskiest sector losses



# END